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Letter to the Prime Minister (July 2011)
 
Rt Hon David Cameron MP 
10 Downing Street 
London 
SW1A 2AA 
4 July 2011 
Dear Prime Minister 
I have completed my second Report, Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive Savings, in order 
to deliver it before the summer Parliamentary recess. As with my first Report, to implement the 
recommendations requires no legislative time and no net increase in public expenditure, but it does now 
need your political commitment to turn talk into action. 
It proved hard to finance Early Intervention in our country even when public resources were abundant. 
Now that they are severely restrained, the task may seem impossible. However, Early Intervention turns 
this conventional wisdom on its head by reaping massive savings in public expenditure for the smallest of 
investments in better outcomes, and by avoiding expensive provision when things go wrong. By building out 
the immense costs of failure, it is in fact the best sustainable structural deficit reduction programme available. 
My review, which has involved thousands of practitioners, service managers, policy makers and ministers, 
shows that there is an urgent case for greater investment in Early Intervention. There are no ‘magic 
bullets’ or instant cures – they do not exist. It has proved difficult; however, this Report outlines a serious 
programme of hard work to build a base from which to go further. People across the country have 
identified imaginative and creative ways to change our ‘late reaction’ culture. I know that ministers are 
persuaded, but my experience in compiling my reviews makes it clear that the whole official machine has 
to come to the party too, and my Report suggests how this can be done. 
However, this is not a task for the public sector alone. This Report makes recommendations that will 
enable others – from neighbourhood charities to City financiers – to play a part in keeping with your 
approach to rebuilding civic society. 
My first Report detailed the immense penalties to society and to the individual of failing to provide a 
strong foundation of social and emotional capabilities early in life. This second Report focuses more on 
addressing the vast financial and economic costs. It illustrates not just the price of failure to the taxpayer 
but the deadweight on the economy of carrying – across the generations – underachievement, low skills 
and poor educational attainment. Failure to address these will render us vulnerable to global competitors. 
Early Intervention must become a key priority for both our economic as well as our social renewal strategy. 
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In this Report, I propose two complementary approaches to funding: one is to use current public funding 
more effectively; the other is to mobilise additional investment from sources outside the public sector. 
This will require a new approach to supporting service commissioners, providers and a new cadre of 
investors. To achieve this, I propose the creation of a national, independent Early Intervention Foundation, 
the development of a reliable evidence base for the most effective Early Intervention programmes and 
the creation of a market in social finance to support Early Intervention. I am convinced that substantial 
additional funding could be found in order to give Early Intervention new impetus to produce lasting gains 
to individuals, public finances and economic competitiveness. This will have a clear benefit to individuals, 
communities and British society. 
There are many detailed recommendations in the Report but, as we have discussed, there are just 
two which I believe require your personal leadership to secure the potential impact of greater 
Early Intervention: 
1. To challenge and change the culture at the heart of government from late intervention to 
Early Intervention. 
2. To offer a bold challenge to funders from the private, charitable and local government sectors that, if 
they create an independent Early Intervention Foundation to drive progress from outside Whitehall 
you will support them with co-funding. 
It was extremely heartening to read the endorsements of the leaders of the UK’s three main political 
parties for both Reports. I believe that it is essential that the all-party approach to the intergenerational 
answers required is maintained. The financial and social benefits of Early Intervention last well beyond 
any one Parliament or any one Government and are best achieved in a climate of maturity, patience 
and stability. 
It is now time for clear leadership to change Early Intervention from a philosophy to a funded, sustained 
practical programme of investment and returns, which when taken to scale will transform the social and 
economic potential of a generation of babies, children and young people. 
Good wishes in the task ahead. 
Graham Allen MP 
The Early Intervention Review Team 
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Letter to the Prime Minister (January 2011)
 
Rt Hon David Cameron MP 
10 Downing Street 
London 
SW1A 2AA 
19 January 2011 
Dear Prime Minister 
I have completed the Review of Early Intervention requested by the Government last June and am 
delivering it ahead of time. I hope it will be helpful that there are no requests for legislation and no 
requests for immediate public spending. Should you accept and act upon the recommendations, not only 
will the life chances of so many children be enhanced but I would also expect considerable dividends to 
be paid to the taxpayer and government on a recurring basis. 
This Report therefore makes the following recommendations: 
1. The cross-party co-operation that has characterised this issue should continue and be actively 
developed. All parties should publicly accept the core message of Early Intervention, appended, 
acknowledge that the culture of late intervention is both expensive and ineffective, and ensure that 
Early Intervention plays a more central part in UK policy and practice. 
2. All parties should commit to the central objective of Early Intervention to provide a social and 
emotional bedrock for the current and future generations of babies, children and young people by 
helping them and their parents (or other main caregivers) before problems arise. 
3. With the encouragement of the Government, the best and most rigorously proven Early Intervention 
programmes should be pulled together using the best methodology and science available, to promote 
their wider use. 
4. The Government should encourage 15 local Early Intervention Places to pioneer the programmes. 
5. The Government should promote an independent Early Intervention Foundation, independently 
funded, to motivate those in the Early Intervention sector, prove the programmes above, work 
with pioneering Places above and raise additional long-term finance for Early Intervention from  
non-governmental sources. 
6. The Government should take further the existing policies in this field to make sure that all children 
have the social and emotional capability to be ‘school ready’ at five, including: 
a.	 a long-term plan to give all vulnerable first-time mothers who meet the criteria and want it, access 
to Family Nurse Partnerships; 
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b.	 working up a national parenting campaign as part of the Big Society; 
c.	 high-quality, benchmarked pre-school education for 2-, 3- and 4-year-olds as part of a 0–5 

Foundation Stage;
 
d.	 a cross-party review to plan progress towards a quality paternity and maternity settlement; and 
e.	 a more coherent series of assessments for the 0–5s to detect and resolve social and emotional 
difficulties before they become intractable. 
A full list of the recommendations can be found on pages xvii to xxi. 
Finally, to exploit the tremendous political and financial momentum behind Early Intervention, I strongly 
recommend that the Cabinet Social Justice Committee swiftly issues a timetable enabling those 
recommendations which are accepted to go ahead without delay. 
I will publish a further report, which will be delivered to you before the summer recess, exploring the 
use of new private sector financial instruments to fund the local roll-out of proven Early Intervention 
programmes to Early Intervention Places via the Early Intervention Foundation. This is a tremendous 
opportunity for this and future governments to take a long-term view on tackling causes rather than 
symptoms, reducing dysfunction and creating essential social investments with good rates of return. 
Countless children, who would otherwise underachieve, will be able to meet their potential and in turn 
become fully rounded citizens and, above all, excellent parents if the right decisions are taken now. 
Good wishes in the judgements you must make. 
Graham Allen MP 
The Early Intervention Review Team 
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The core message on Early Intervention
 
Early Intervention is an approach which offers 
our country a real opportunity to make lasting 
improvements in the lives of our children, to 
forestall many persistent social problems and 
end their transmission from one generation to 
the next, and to make long-term savings in public 
spending. It covers a range of tried and tested 
policies for the first three years of children’s lives 
to give them the essential social and emotional 
security they need for the rest of their lives. It also 
includes a range of well-established policies for 
when they are older which leave children ready to 
face the challenges of each stage of childhood and 
of passage into adulthood – especially the challenge 
of becoming good parents to their own children. 
In spite of its merits, which have achieved 
increasing recognition by national and local 
government and the voluntary sector, the 
provision of successful evidence-based Early 
Intervention programmes remains persistently 
patchy and dogged by institutional and financial 
obstacles. In consequence, there remains an 
overwhelming bias in favour of existing policies of 
late intervention at a time when social problems 
are well-entrenched – even though these policies 
are known to be expensive and of limited success. 
Strong leadership by all political parties is required 
to overcome this bias and achieve a cultural shift 
to Early Intervention. A move to successful Early 
Intervention requires new thinking about the 
relationship between central government and local 
providers. It also needs authoritative evidence 
about which forms of Early Intervention are most 
successful, and about their impact. 
The Early Intervention Review Team, 2011 
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Foreword
 
We now get to the sharp end. The arguments 
have been made, the evidence marshalled, now it 
becomes a question of leadership. Can we take 
the next step? Can we not only set the vision 
but boldly make the changes which will make it 
happen? Can Whitehall change its late intervention 
culture? Can we bring all of our assets to bear – 
private, local, philanthropic and voluntary – and 
not just government? 
Money needs to be reprioritised and generated 
for investment that will ultimately return to us 
many fold. A new institution must be created to 
support commissioners, providers and investors 
and to build on the momentum to advance Early 
Intervention; ministers must willingly take on the 
pain of cultural change across Whitehall. By the 
time you read this, you will know which path has 
been chosen. 
This Report promises no ‘magic bullets’ or  
quick fixes, only a route map for the hard work 
 required for progress. It is reinforced by all the 
other recent distinguished reviews of the  
Rt Hon Frank Field MP, Dame Clare Tickell and 
Professor Eileen Munro – all four of us argue for 
the cost-effectiveness of early intervention. This 
is not the end of the work; it is the beginning. 
A fantastic start has been made by many 
practitioners, decision makers and policy makers, 
and this Report indicates where further work is 
needed or where leadership and institutions are 
required to make change happen. 
The potential 
This Report is very technical in some sections, 
which is inevitable with its focus on new innovative 
financial approaches. Underneath that, this Report 
is rooted in one simple ambition: to ensure 
that every baby, child and young person 
grows up with the basic social and emotional 
competencies that will give them the bedrock 
skills upon which all else is built. That is the 
objective set in both the first and second of 
these Reports. We should never forget that early 
intervention is already commonplace in the UK.  
It is probably what readers experienced and what 
you gave or give to your own children often in 
an unconscious way through the development 
of attachment, attunement, empathy, and 
communication. All that I ask is that those basics 
that you take for granted are put in place for all 
babies, children and young people so they too  
can realise their potential. 
During the Victorian era, our country faced a 
daunting challenge in public health, in eliminating 
cholera and other diseases caused by poor 
sanitation. People might have carried on with 
business as usual. Instead, local and national 
government united with philanthropists and private 
investors to make the long-term investments 
needed to create cleaner and healthier cities. 
I believe that today our generation faces an 
equally daunting challenge in social health. Will 
we carry on with business as usual? Or will we 
match the Victorians in innovatory institutions 
and investments to overcome deep and costly 
social problems? Not only our generation but 
generations to come will pay a heavy price for 
failing to take action now, when it is most possible, 
most affordable and most effective. 
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Action already taken 
I am heartened by the action already taking place 
as a result of my first Report: 
•	I recommended that government promotes 
evidence-based programmes for Early 
Intervention. The Report was welcomed and I 
am pleased to see the emergence of standards 
of evidence, independent advice on what works, 
and costs and benefits of competing investment 
models. 
•	I recommended that local authorities and third 
sector partners pioneer new approaches to 
Early Intervention. I have been gratified by 
the response: no fewer than 27 have asked to 
become Early Intervention Places exploring 
new options, and several have offered to actively 
support the development of new infrastructure 
in this field. 
•	I recommended the establishment of an 
independent Early Intervention Foundation. 
The Cabinet Committee on Social Justice 
welcomed my work on setting this up, and 
the idea has received support from local 
government, the private sector and from 
the emerging social investment sector, all of 
whom are constituting a ‘shadow board’ and 
completing a business plan as I write. In this 
Report, I set out in more detail the role of 
the Early Intervention Foundation and how 
it could help to bring in investment into Early 
Intervention. 
It is obvious that a 16-week review cannot deliver 
all the answers in what is a highly technical field, 
hence its recommendations to use the immense 
resources of Whitehall to continue this work 
and to set up the Early Intervention Foundation. 
The work we propose on the Comprehensive 
Spending Review, better co-ordination, a Task and 
Finish Group, a Treasury review, the long-term 
studies suggested and the creation of channels for 
Early Intervention funds both inside and outside 
government, are all about growing and sustaining 
this work. It will continue to need the partnership 
with Whitehall to bring all of the committed 
partners together. 
Seize the time 
This is the perfect moment for national leadership 
on Early Intervention. Our knowledge base is 
now strong enough to progress the work. It is a 
tremendously exciting time with the burgeoning 
interest in social finance, the strength of the  
all-party political commitment and some 
unparalleled opportunities for progress. 
There is a unique conjunction of factors that 
make this the ideal time to move forward on 
Early Intervention. The evidence of its benefits 
grows stronger each day. A relatively new 
government still has the freshness and energy to 
take on the vested interests and naysayers, while 
the previous government laid down good work 
in the field by providing the opportunity for an 
all-party approach. Private and philanthropic capital 
is beginning to explore new forms of finance and 
local authorities and third sector providers are 
enthusiastically embracing Early Intervention as a 
long-term sustainable alternative to the permanent 
firefighting of social ills. 
Thinking afresh 
Early Intervention investment has the potential to 
make massive savings in public expenditure, reduce 
the costs of educational underachievement, drink 
and drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, vandalism 
and criminality, court and police costs, academic 
underachievement, lack of aspiration to work 
and the bills from lifetimes wasted while claiming 
benefits. 
Just a small part of these savings will be required 
to pay back public and private investors for the 
outcomes they will achieve. This payment is a 
necessary investment in the nation’s human capital. 
In its lifetime, Early Intervention investment will 
not only repay all of its investors, public and 
private, but make enduring reductions in public 
expenditure. 
Some of the old conventions and practices 
that inhibit sensible change, particularly inside 
Whitehall, need to be examined and challenged 
when they perpetuate existing difficulties. 
Implementing this cultural change is very difficult  
– if it were easy it would have been done long 
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ago – but essential. Those in Whitehall who say 
tough economic times are the trigger to innovate 
and to be creative must ensure that they too are 
open to new ideas. 
Stock and flow 
One of the key concepts used when we are 
looking at the problems of dysfunction is through 
that cold business phrase – stock and flow. 
Remedial or late intervention policies address 
the stock of people already suffering from deep-
rooted problems. Early Intervention seeks to block, 
reduce or filter the flow of new people (babies, 
children and young people) entering the stock. The 
current balance of policy is simply wrong and this 
Report makes recommendations to address both 
dimensions with equal vigour. 
Many of the welcomed payment-by-results 
schemes that are currently being pioneered within 
social finance necessarily relate to the stock. 
Examples are the payment-by-results scheme 
being pursued by the Department for Work and 
Pensions on worklessness, or that being pursued 
by Social Finance in Peterborough on preventing 
recidivism. While these can only be said to be 
influencing the flow of dysfunction in a marginal 
way, I thoroughly commend and encourage these 
schemes for the excellent work they are doing. 
However, our ambition is to spread this good 
practice into Early Intervention in order to tackle 
the flow. In this Report, I seek to take many of the 
pioneering financial ideas, such as payment-by­
results for outcomes and social impact bonds, that 
have been used on the stock and seek to adapt 
them to the flow. The very nature of flow makes it 
harder to prove, to fund and to improve, but it is 
where Early Intervention practice must be located. 
It is where the personal, social and economic 
prizes are the biggest. 
Measuring progress 
Another key concept is to have measures against 
which progress can be judged. These measures 
can either be actual benchmarks or proxy ones. 
Benchmarks for remedialism (for example, the 
number of prisoners who do not repeat offend 
and return to jail) are often easier to find and 
define than those for Early Intervention (for 
example, the number of babies who are not 
developing social and emotional skills effectively). 
However, as we outlined in the first Report, it 
is perfectly possible to have assessments in a 
0–5 Foundation Stage that measure social and 
emotional capability and track the impact of 
Early Intervention programmes. My first Report 
and those of the Rt Hon Frank Field MP, Dame 
Claire Tickell and Professor Eileen Munro alluded 
to the 0–5 Foundation Stage; I proposed clear 
assessments for each child at this stage in order to 
catch and pre-empt any dysfunction which, if left 
unattended, would potentially result in massive 
remedial expenditure throughout an individual’s 
lifetime. In this way, we can begin to put monetary 
values on the consequences of making or not 
making effective early interventions, which is the 
crucial task in achieving the massive savings on offer 
from the right investments in Early Intervention. 
Government and non-government 
together 
Whitehall needs to distinguish between what 
government can do and what those outside 
government can do. We need to ensure that both 
partners respect the value and work of the other 
so that their activities can be complementary 
and work towards the same goals. Even if all the 
aspirations in this Report for non-government 
involvement are realised, government will still 
manage 99% of the expenditure in the field, but 
I am still confident that the 1% of non-government 
expenditure can have a major benign influence 
on Early Intervention programmes and practice, 
and achieve benefits far in excess of its scope. To 
have spent billions and billions of pounds year after 
year for many decades and for often only marginal 
impact (certainly on the social and emotional 
development of children) is really the central issue 
that we should question. I propose in the Report 
how the budgetary and personnel juggernaut 
of late intervention can be halted. If the elected 
politicians can keep their departments open to 
these influences, then there is a real possibility 
that, over time, the deep-rooted culture of late 
intervention could begin to rebalance towards 
cheaper and more effective early intervention. 
That is why we recommend a careful incremental 
change focused around the several years of 
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preparation required for the next Comprehensive 
Spending Review, and sober incremental change 
in the balance of spending between late and 
early intervention. 
Markets 
One of the objectives of creating new ways 
of investing in early intervention is to create a 
market in early intervention and social investment 
products. It is fundamental to my mission to do this 
and to do it as an addition to, and not a substitute 
for, continued high levels of public spending in 
this field. 
Despite lots of optimism around social investment, 
such a market has not been achieved anywhere 
in the world and nor will it be without the 
right government leadership and institutional 
arrangements. It requires long-term, all-party 
commitment from this Government and its 
successors. The UK leads global thinking on this. 
Adding private and charitable money to the mix 
in the early intervention field will of course be 
a tremendous boost, especially as public money 
becomes ever tighter. In addition, drawing on 
the finances and talents of the non-government 
sector, including philanthropic, local government 
and charitable interests will make such a market a 
hothouse for new ideas, invention and creativity, 
providing it is not suffocated by outdated rules and 
constraints in Whitehall. This will be good in itself 
but will also be an incredibly helpful stimulus and 
challenge to maximise the value of the immense 
governmental stake in the field. 
Finally, before plunging into the detail, I think it 
is important to repeat the public commitment 
that I seek from this and future governments: to 
ensure that all babies, children and young people 
have the social and emotional skills – the bedrock 
of all future achievement – to make the best 
of themselves. It is what you give to your own 
children, and it should be the life gift for all children 
in our country. 
A note on style 
Many programmes and policies across the world 
have been given the title and kudos of ‘early 
intervention’. Not all of them deserve status. As in 
my previous Report, I have sought to reserve the 
term Early Intervention for the general approaches 
and the specific policies and programmes which 
are known to produce the benefits I describe. 
For that reason, I have generally turned it into a 
proper name, with capital letters. In some contexts 
I use ‘early intervention’ in its everyday sense, 
without capitals. 

xix 
Recommendations
 
Chapter 1 Creating a culture change 
1. I recommend that government sets out, as its 
policy ambition for Early Intervention, that in order 
to reach its social and economic goals, all babies, 
children and young people should have the social 
and emotional bedrock essential for their future 
development and their ability to make effective 
life choices. I further recommend that this 
ambition should set the tone of the Families in the 
Foundation Years statement due this summer. 
2. I recommend that there is the strongest 
possible commitment from political leaders 
to a culture change from late intervention 
to Early Intervention, building on the political 
momentum generated, not least by the recent 
Field, Tickell, Munro and Allen reviews. To 
this end, I recommend that there should be 
an annual statement to Parliament accounting 
for the progress made and projected on the 
policies, programmes in place and expenditure on 
Early Intervention. 
3. I recommend that government, when planning 
the next Comprehensive Spending Review, 
should consider making Early Intervention its 
theme, and that work undertaken by a Treasury-
led team should signal a decisive rebalancing 
of central government spending from late 
intervention to investing in Early Intervention. 
I believe that steady and incremental migration of 
funding – I would propose by 1% – per annum 
would signal government’s commitment to do this. 
Chapter 2 Leadership and co-ordination 
to enable investment in Early Intervention 
4. I recommend that the Families in the 
Foundation Years statement must include 
regular and purposeful assessments for the 
0–5s, focusing on measuring social and emotional 
development to enable all children to attain ‘school 
readiness’. I further recommend that ‘school 
readiness’ should be adopted as an intended 
outcome from Early Intervention and be used as a 
measure, or basket of measures, of the impact of 
investment and the extent of savings, and thereby 
as an incentive for further investment. 
5. I recommend that there should be an Early 
Intervention Task and Finish Group reporting 
to the Social Justice Cabinet Committee. This 
could be a dedicated team of experts with 
representatives from major spending departments, 
the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. It should 
also have external secondees from providers 
and financial organisations. This group should 
co-ordinate the currently disparate activity on 
Early Intervention and social investment and 
communicate lessons learnt to government 
departments. Working closely with the 
independent Early Intervention Foundation, it 
should ensure consistency in the establishment of 
Early Intervention outcomes that are important to 
government, jointly agree the standard of evidence 
needed to measure whether these outcomes have 
been achieved, and improve data on measures, 
outcomes and cashable savings to allow Whitehall 
and local areas to attach payments appropriately 
to outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 A locally driven agenda 
6. I recommend that the systems and 
organisations arising from the NHS changes 
give priority to Early Intervention, with health 
and well-being boards providing leadership for 
Early Intervention’s contribution to health and  
well-being in every locality. 
7. The Early Intervention agenda is driven by local 
action. I recommend that government continues 
to support the joint working between the 
local Early Intervention Places and Community 
Budget areas which has arisen since the first 
Report. I further recommend that central and 
local government players agree how existing 
Community Budget areas should focus on Early 
Intervention alongside their work on families 
with multiple problems as soon as possible. The 
27 Early Intervention Places that are not yet 
Community Budget areas should become part 
of this work at the earliest opportunity, and all 
Community Budget areas should be encouraged  
to focus on Early Intervention as a priority. 
Chapter 4 Building an Early Intervention 
Foundation 
8. I recommend that ministers take a positive 
leadership role on the independent Early 
Intervention Foundation in encouraging local 
areas and philanthropic and private institutional 
investors to continue their exploration of setting 
up a Foundation to complement, from the outside, 
the work that is beginning inside Whitehall. 
9. I recommend, once the business case is 
fully worked up, the creation of a £20 million 
endowment to sustain an independent Early 
Intervention Foundation and that the Prime 
Minister issues a bold challenge to external funders 
from the private, charitable and local government 
sectors that if they create an Early Intervention 
Foundation to drive progress, government will 
support them with co-funding. 
10. I recommend that, beginning with the 27 
existing Early Intervention Places, local areas 
should drive the work of the independent 
Early Intervention Foundation to start the 
process of procuring the services, develop 
core evidence building, fidelity and outcome 
measurement functions, and that they should  
be strongly represented on its board. 
Chapter 5 External finance through 
outcome-based Early Intervention 
contracts 
11. I recommend that, given the public 
expenditure situation, we need to be much more 
creative in finding additional (not substitute) 
non-government money. The social goal 
of Early Intervention and the design of new 
instruments should be tightly coupled together 
so that the instruments do not lose their raison 
d’être, as happened in the past with Private 
Finance Initiatives. This will require outcome-based 
contracts coupled with external investment. 
Government and local areas can pay for results 
from the savings that they will make. 
12. I recommended that the Social Justice 
Committee commissions the Early Intervention 
Task and Finish Group (see Recommendation 5) 
to work with the Early Intervention Foundation 
to assess the financial and economic value of 
outcomes, to inform better decision making by 
commissioners of services. This should also assess 
the extent to which cashable savings can be made, 
to whom the savings would accrue and over 
what timescale. 
13. I recommend that central and local 
government agree to pay Early Intervention 
outcome-based payments (where savings accrue 
to them). Specifically, I recommend that: 
•	HM Treasury and departments develop 
methods of accounting to ensure that future 
payments based on successful outcomes will be 
honoured from their departmental budgets; and 
•	the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, and the Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and Accountancy (for Local 
Government) develop a method of accounting 
to ensure that future payments based on 
successful outcomes will be honoured, and that 
incentives are in place for local areas to utilise 
outcome-based contracts. 
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Chapter 6 Early Intervention Funds 
and bonds 
14. I recommend that, through pilots and agreeing 
to pay for outcomes, government enables private 
money to be attracted to Early Intervention 
through the establishment of an Early 
Intervention Fund or Funds in close co-operation 
with the Big Society Bank, which over time can 
be developed to offer investors a diverse range 
of Early Intervention products. This should be 
driven forward by government, local areas and the 
Early Intervention Foundation, working with fund 
managers such as social intermediaries or banks. 
15. I recommend that this initial fund should 
look to raise around £200 million of investment, 
although in the first instance £27 million would 
enable the Early Intervention Places to begin with 
pilots over the current Comprehensive Spending 
Review period. 
16. I recommend that central government 
supports local areas to pilot different ways of 
contracting for Early Intervention outcomes, and 
that when a fund is available they pilot the use of 
this fund. 
17. HM Treasury should encourage councils, in 
association with financial institutions, to produce 
practical yet innovative locally based financing 
ideas for Early Intervention. Should economic 
circumstances allow, this could include putting 
together an innovative collective bond issue on 
Early Intervention to kick-start a revived local 
authority bond market. To facilitate this, ministers 
would need to issue a Capitalisation Directive to 
councils that allows up to £(less than 500) million 
of Early Intervention spending to be capitalised, 
provided that it is funded through the local 
bond market. 
Chapter 7 Creating the social investment 
market and tax incentives 
18. I recommend that HM Treasury should 
commission a thorough review of Early 
Intervention growth incentives ahead of the 
2012 Budget to assess what more the tax regime 
can do to enable all relevant investor groups, 
including high net worth individuals, social and 
philanthropic investors, businesses and retail savers 
to support Early Intervention investment. This 
should include: 
•	incentives relating to Capital Gains Tax; 
•	incentives relating to Corporation Tax; 
•	lessons learnt from tax credits as part of the 
Dutch Green Funds Scheme; 
•	allowing local authorities the right to borrow 
against cost savings from outcome-based 
contracts (similar to tax incremental financing); 
•	Community Investment Tax Relief; 
•	a cash-limited Early Intervention Tax Credit; and 
•	accreditation for Early Intervention ISAs and 
increased ISA allowances for Early Intervention 
investors. 
Chapter 8 Moving forward 
19. I recommend that when the Early Intervention 
Foundation is in place, it initiates serious all-party 
discussions on Early Intervention to agree 
on actions to maintain and promote long-term 
commitment to Early Intervention. 
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Executive summary 

My first Report Early Intervention: The Next 
Steps made a strong social and economic case 
for investing in Early Intervention and creating a 
new and all-pervasive Early Intervention culture. 
I recognised the great work being done in some 
pioneering areas, but ultimately concluded that 
delivery of Early Intervention was patchy and 
seriously underfunded. 
The message for government and UK society is 
simple, deeply moral and economically sound: we 
must invest now in neglected children to improve 
their lives and avoid future costs to society. We 
cannot afford the alternative of inaction. 
This is a message that has found its moment. At 
a time of straitened public finances, there is near 
universal acceptance that we, as a society, need 
to start thinking and acting differently if we are 
to live sustainably within our means. Everyone I 
have met in the course of the review agrees that, 
despite the UK’s poor financial position, we should 
strengthen and not relax our commitment to the 
most disadvantaged children. 
This simple message has received the emphatic 
support of the leaders of all three main political 
parties. Twenty-seven local authorities have already 
come forward as Early Intervention Places in order 
to take forward my recommendations – either 
on a pilot or a fully scaled basis. Investment banks 
and social investors have expressed enthusiasm 
for the opportunity to invest for both a social and 
financial return. 
We have then, in many respects, a coalition – in 
the wider sense – of the willing. The challenge 
is how to turn this support into practical action 
that can make the greatest difference to children’s 
lives. Early Intervention: The Next Steps set out 
many ways in which to improve delivery and 
recommendations to support them. However, we 
did not address the challenge of how to increase 
investment in Early Intervention at a time when 
public resources are constrained. 
This Report focuses on how to finance an 
expansion of Early Intervention through better 
use of public resources and through the use of 
alternative routes to attract additional investment. 
I make recommendations about the structure and 
function of a new Early Intervention Foundation 
that will support the expansion of Early 
Intervention. I outline ways in which agencies can 
contract on a payment-by-results basis, where they 
are paid only for successful delivery of outcomes 
that matter. I then proceed to summarise the 
main options for financing Early Intervention and 
incentivising investment. 
Localism drives this agenda 
Local agencies are the key actors for Early 
Intervention practice and culture change. It is 
usually they who will pull together the evidence-
based policies to create a local Early Intervention 
package appropriate to their area. At a local area 
level, there are multiple beneficiaries from Early 
Intervention and local agencies need to expand 
their work together to maximise the potential flow 
of savings. The creation of the Early Intervention 
Grant locally is immensely symbolic and full of 
potential even when it is constrained financially. 
Twenty-seven Early Intervention Places have joined 
me on the journey of my review. Their enthusiasm 
and recognition of the potential of Early 
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Intervention have already persuaded government 
departments that Early Intervention should be 
at the heart of Community Budgets, with Early 
Intervention programmes building social and 
emotional development in order to help families 
help themselves, alongside the range of activities 
focused on addressing their complex needs. 
Working together and with government, Early 
Intervention places can lead the culture change 
necessary to help all areas and all public sector 
bodies recognise the value of investing in Early 
Intervention programmes; they can demonstrate 
the opportunities for improved outcomes and 
shared savings available through improved public 
sector commissioning. An Early Intervention 
culture can only have real meaning and a proper 
chance of flourishing if people see with their 
own eyes the financial and social benefits that it 
provides. This will then motivate more investment 
in further programmes. 
Roles for central government 
Strong leadership, planning and co-ordination are 
needed to drive a steady and ongoing migration of 
expenditure from ineffective late intervention to 
cost-effective Early Intervention. 
I recommend that government, when planning 
the next Comprehensive Spending Review, should 
consider making Early Intervention its theme. 
I believe that HM Treasury should convene a 
cross-government group of officials to explore 
the impact of Early Intervention programmes in 
preparation for the next Spending Review. This  
will enable all lessons learnt to be incorporated 
into the Spending Review and the development  
of a cross-government approach to measuring,  
and setting aside, future savings. This will reflect  
a switch in philosophy from expensive and largely 
ineffective late intervention to one ever more 
focused on effective Early Intervention and will 
provide a strong signal to central government 
departments. 
Support from central government also needs to 
be more accessible, coherent and supportive. 
It needs to send consistent messages to 
commissioners, providers and investors alike if we 
are to make substantive progress. Fragmentation 
and competition have little place in any effective 
administration and are all the more regrettable at 
a time when the direction at a political level and the 
imperative at a financial level could not be clearer. 
Cultural change of this dimension can only be 
undertaken with the full authority of the Prime 
Minister. My evidence suggests that not all 
government departments are yet committed or 
geared up for the application of Early Intervention. 
This problem needs to be addressed at the political 
level by the Social Justice Cabinet Committee 
(SJCC), which should be the forum to provide 
a general sense of direction and to eliminate 
obvious duplication. It should be supported by 
an Early Intervention Task and Finish Group, 
with an independent chair, who would offer an 
independent eye to promote government change 
via action reports to the SJCC. This would make 
regular reports on the objectives and milestones 
achieved in implementing the new cross-
government Early Intervention strategy. This group 
should also report to the leaders of the other 
main parties in order to continue to take these 
issues above day-to-day politics, and to Parliament 
through an annual statement. This underlines my 
belief and the generously expressed view of the 
three party leaders that this has to be an enduring 
all-party effort. 
Overcoming barriers 
For Early Intervention investment to go further, 
we must overcome key barriers. These include: 
a lack of funding certainty, which particularly 
affects local area confidence in being able to repay 
investors when outcomes are achieved; a lack of 
incentives to invest where other organisations will 
benefit; legislative, ethical and political drivers to 
focus resources on the most serious problems 
after they have developed; the complexity of 
identifying appropriate outcome measures and the 
payments that are attached to them; and difficulties 
in scaling up programmes (for instance due to a 
lack of trained workforce) to deliver more widely. 
I address each of these barriers in this Report and 
show how with political will, and with the support 
of an Early Intervention Foundation, each can be 
eliminated or reduced. 
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Ensuring value for money of  investment in 
Early Intervention 
The traditional model – waiting until problems 
become apparent, paying for programme delivery 
and assuming good outcomes will follow – is no 
longer enough. The public sector knows that it 
must continue to lead, innovate and be creative 
in increasing Early Intervention funding. However, 
the public purse is stretched and so more 
intelligent public and private investment options 
are also needed. 
I am clear that, given the returns to the public 
purse of Early Intervention, this should start with 
the use of outcome-based contracts to drive 
better delivery; we should also seek to attract 
external investment. External investors will of 
course expect some form of return. There are 
a number of ways in which new investment can 
be mobilised in order to capitalise new Early 
Intervention programmes, but this immediately 
raises issues of value for money. We need to 
ensure that the price paid for this capital is 
commensurate with the added value offered. 
The first principle is that there must be a genuine 
transfer of risk from purchaser to provider/ 
investor. We need to set up results-based 
contracts that will only pay a return on delivery of 
successful outcomes, preferably where cashable 
savings have been identified, or where reductions 
to levels of unmet need are observed that will 
then lead to savings in future years. There is more 
evidence and support needed for commissioners 
on the link between social returns and the 
subsequent decommissioning of services; this is 
something that I envisage the Early Intervention 
Foundation would advise on. 
I am confident that if the details of contract 
specification, robust appraisal, terms of trade and 
capital structure is attended to, then it will be 
possible to access volumes of capital on a large-
scale basis that will be excellent value for money 
for the Government and wider society. This 
remains an area where I believe that HM Treasury 
must do more work as part of its due diligence 
to prevent the waste of billions of pounds on late 
intervention. Early Intervention is not an instant 
cure or a quick fix – it requires patient capital and 
patient politics. I recognise that this is complex 
analytical work and we have only just started but 
the potential savings are enormous. 
The need for an Early Intervention 
Foundation 
Central government must do all it can, but it 
cannot do this alone. The principles of Early 
Intervention can be readily explained, but there is 
much critical detail that needs to be in place for 
these proposals to work on the scale envisaged. It 
is for these and many other reasons that I propose 
the creation of an independent Early Intervention 
Foundation that can act as a truly long-term 
champion of Early Intervention. 
I recommend that the Early Intervention 
Foundation should be: independent from 
government; guided by the strongest possible 
evidence base; financially sustainable and scalable; 
and an intermediary and connector bringing 
together investors, providers and funders in 
partnership, in order to inspire a spiral of hope 
rather than an endless cycle of dysfunction. 
The five initial functions of the proposed Early 
Intervention Foundation might be as follows: 
a.	 A centre to champion and promote 
Early Intervention. 
b.	 Improving the evidence base so that investment 
is targeted on what works. 
c.	 Increasing awareness of social investment 
opportunities in Early Intervention. 
d. Improving fidelity and developing 
Early Intervention programmes. 
e.	 Acting as a source of advice on social 
investment for Early Intervention. 
Through these functions and the more detailed 
set of services entailed, the Early Intervention 
Foundation will help to build a new, scaled, fully 
functioning marketplace in Early Intervention, 
characterised by an ever growing range of 
approved interventions, more local agencies taking 
part on greater scale, more competent providers 
and wider and more scaled sources of finances 
of all different kinds. Steps are now in progress to 
create such a Foundation. 
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For investors’ and providers’ confidence, it is vital 
that the Foundation maintains its independence 
and sustainability. It will do this by drawing modest 
funds from an endowment. I am asking the Prime 
Minister to offer a bold challenge to funders from 
the private, charitable and local government sectors 
that if they create an Early Intervention Foundation 
to drive progress from outside Whitehall, the 
Government will support it with co-funding. 
Investing in evidence-based policies and 
programmes 
A greater focus on evidence-based policies 
and programmes, measurable outcomes and 
associated cashable savings is needed to help 
set up outcome-based contracts and thus to 
encourage social investment. Central and local 
government need an agreed and transparent 
position on the type and quality of evidence 
sufficient to make investment decisions within the 
public sector, and on outcome-based payments to 
the private sector. We need to set the bar high in 
terms of the evidence of effectiveness required 
for investing in any particular programme, but 
this need not mean that the approach be overly 
restrictive; I therefore challenge providers from all 
sectors to build the most compelling case for their 
programmes to be included in the living list of best 
evidence-based programmes (first published in 
Annex B of Early Intervention: The Next Steps). I also 
consider that some resource within any investment 
portfolio should be ear-marked for systematic 
testing and innovation of new models of delivery. 
Given the exciting possibilities and momentum in 
this area at present, this work needs to be started 
as a matter of priority. As noted above, the Early 
Intervention Foundation will have a critical role to 
play. We are also building on much outstanding 
work such as that of the Social Research Unit 
at Dartington and the complementary streams 
of evidence provided by agencies such as C4EO 
(Centre for Excellence and Outcomes in Children’s 
and Young People’s Services). 
Options for raising finance 
Once local areas (and central government, where 
savings accrue centrally) have agreed to pay for 
specific outcomes, a number of specific vehicles 
for raising external investment will follow. 
In order to initiate discussion, my team, with an 
expert finance working group, considered various 
methods of attracting investment into Early 
Intervention. We are clear that as long as contracts 
are specified carefully and there is careful market 
testing of the terms of trade, there will be a wide 
variety of financing options open to whoever takes 
the lead – most commonly a lead provider or a 
joint venture – at a local level. 
The most practical vehicle for the first tranche of 
investment into Early Intervention was considered 
to be an Early Intervention Fund. The Big Society 
Bank should be approached to provide investment, 
alongside private investors. This model is similar to 
a social impact bond, but on a larger scale. 
Any body regulated by the Financial Services 
Authority (for example, social intermediaries and 
banks) could set up a fund, or indeed a number 
of funds. However, the fund would only attract 
investment if it could attract or had attracted Early 
Intervention contracts from local areas. Local areas 
would have to calculate appropriate outcome 
payments, considering central government 
payments where relevant. The Early Intervention 
Foundation could provide advice. 
It would of course be up to both local and central 
government to decide how to contract with a 
fund (or rather the intermediary running it). In the 
first instance, it might wish to contract with just 
one fund, re-tendering every few years, in order 
to support local areas to build the infrastructure 
needed to bring in more investment into Early 
Intervention. Alternatively, it might wish to leave 
this to the market and be open to contracting 
with a number of funds, if local areas felt this 
appropriate. Whichever route it takes, central 
government must declare that it is open to the 
negotiation of such contracts and mindful of local 
area preferences. Central and local government 
should encourage the activity of the private sector 
in this area. Pilots to explore the commissioning 
process with a fund are recommended. 
Additional funding models 
The review team, with the expert finance group, 
also looked at different models of funding Early 
Intervention. For example, in the longer term, 
there might be scope for different providers 
to pioneer a Junior Individual Savings Account 
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(ISA) that would link investment in your own 
children, over the long time period needed for 
payback on Early Intervention, with investment 
in less advantaged children. Similarly, investment 
banks have indicated their enthusiasm to raise a 
£100 million early investment bond, with a senior 
and junior equity portion. We have also explored 
how we might kick-start a local bond market, 
so that people could invest in the children and 
future of their areas. These options are currently 
considered more risky than the Early Intervention 
Fund by HM Treasury. However, in the longer 
term, we believe that they should be considered, 
as the returns expected, although guaranteed, are 
likely to be less than those expected on an equity 
based Fund. Alternative models are discussed 
elsewhere in this Report. 
Incentives to invest 
External investment will increasingly drive 
improved social outcomes and therefore future 
public sector savings. 
My view, and certainly the view of potential 
social investors, is that this investment into Early 
Intervention will be stimulated by helpful tax 
incentives. After careful research, it is my view 
that HM Treasury should review incentives for 
social investment ahead of next year’s Budget. This 
review should include: incentives relating to Capital 
Gains Tax and Corporation Tax; lessons learnt 
from tax credits within the Dutch Green Funds 
Scheme; allowing local authorities the right to 
borrow against cost savings from outcome-based 
contracts (similar to tax incremental financing); 
Community Investment Tax Relief; a cash-limited 
Early Intervention Tax Credit; accreditation of Early 
Intervention ISAs and increased ISA allowances for 
Early Intervention investors. 
Finally, investment in Early Intervention, and social 
investment more generally, could be a beneficiary 
of broader policy objectives. Government could, 
for example, look creatively at ways to utilise 
money, through the tax system, for social good that 
would otherwise be sent off shore, for example. 
An increase in investment in Early Intervention can 
and should be achieved. It will not be simple, but 
without this change we will be facing increasing 
dysfunction, more violent crime, an increasing 
number of families dependent on the welfare 
state etc, and we will be subjecting our vulnerable 
children to more years of underachievement 
and disadvantage. Early Intervention must be 
implemented, and politicians should signal their  
will to see it happen immediately. 
In conclusion, then, there are several broad themes that are critical to the improvement and which 
will be articulated across this review: 
•	Inside government, decisive leadership at the political level and effective planning and  
co-ordination at official level are required to secure a steady and ongoing shift in spending 
from ineffective later intervention to cost-effective Early Intervention. 
•	Outside government, a nimble and effective new partner, an independent Early Intervention 
Foundation, is needed to maintain momentum, challenge the evidence base, support 
programmes and work with central government, local areas and social intermediaries to 
facilitate and increase investment in Early Intervention. 
•	Localism will be the primary enabler and commissioner for Early Intervention to create culture 
change at local level and to prompt behavioural change from central agencies. 
•	Outcome-based contracts based on ever improving data should promote social investment 
in Early Intervention. Central and local government must work to attach prices to outcomes to 
facilitate this. 
•	A market in social finance must be facilitated above all by an Early Intervention Fund or 
funds, developed by social investment intermediaries, to offer investors a diverse range of 
Early Intervention financial products. 
•	Government needs to lead by incentivising investment. 
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What they say about what has to happen next on 
Early Intervention 
‘It’s already an exciting time for City involvement in the development of a new and dynamic 
market around Social Finance in general and Early Intervention in particular. I have been 
delighted to help support the thinking around these concepts. The Allen review proposals 
open up more possibilities to develop this relationship even further and an independent Early 
Intervention Foundation will provide a sustainable source of information, advice and drive 
which is essential if investors’ confidence is to continue to be built.’ 
Jim O’Neill, Chairman, Goldman Sachs Asset Management 
‘The two reports from Graham have a wealth of knowledge around Early Intervention. 
They are a helpful platform for the next stage – to create an institutional champion for 
Early Intervention to advise, test and facilitate further progress including rolling out best 
practice and evidence-based policies, and to facilitate investment. With clear leadership 
from the Government in taking a longer term view, we will aim to create a market which 
will bring long-term funding to bear on helping babies, children and young people to 
develop the social and emotional capabilities that will pre-empt so many of the ills that 
blight their lives and our society.’ 
Richard Collier-Keywood, UK Managing Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
‘I welcome the idea of an independent Early Intervention institution linking the communities 
of finance, local government and the social sector. It should play an important role in helping 
to develop organisations capable of achieving significant social impact in this crucial area.’ 
Sir Ronald Cohen, Chair, Portland Capital 
‘If Early Intervention is to go to the next level, the Private Equity Foundation believes that 
we need urgent action to make investing in early intervention attractive to commissioners, 
investors and providers. We need to attract new sources of finance to back the best proven 
interventions and demonstrate how investing in Early Intervention can deliver real savings to 
government and greater benefits to society. An institution independent of central government 
which can promote Early Intervention would promote and support this effort. We would be 
keen to play our part in transforming the ideas in both Allen reports into action.’ 
Charlie Green, Trustee, Private Equity Foundation 
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‘Early Intervention must take the next steps forward. We would consider working 
with others to help get an institution off the ground that could act as a broker between 
the different interests in early intervention, commissioners, investors and deliverers to 
develop policies and models of intervention, as well as defining and measuring outcomes. 
Good work is being done in this area by government and others. It now needs to be given 
additional clout and an extra dimension.’ 
Ian Charlesworth, Commercial Director, The Social Investment Business 
‘The Allen Report opens up the possibility for City investment schemes to flow into tried and 
tested Early Intervention programmes forging the link between attractive rates of return for 
investors and serious benefits for individuals and their families. We need to make the step 
up from individual philanthropy to sustained private income streams. An Early Intervention 
Foundation could be the vehicle to make this happen and I hope the Government will allow 
those who wish to take this further, to do so.’ 
Chris Robinson, Chief Executive, Mayor’s Fund for London 
‘Over the last year, Graham Allen’s review has highlighted the critical importance of 
Early Intervention. We share the aspirations of the public, practitioners and policy makers 
to ensure that children are supported from a young age to reach their full potential. Graham 
Allen’s second report will undoubtedly stimulate further debate about how funding and 
practice can best be aligned to achieve this aspiration.’ 
Peter Wanless, Chief Executive, Big Lottery Fund 
‘Views is a new cross-sectoral partnership seeking to raise standards of impact reporting 
and evidence-based policy and practice. We see Graham Allen’s report as a major step 
forward – not just for children but for all vulnerable groups in society. This report will 
set a challenge to decision makers and opinion formers of all hues to spend more on 
programmes that have been proven to work, stop funding what doesn’t deliver or isn’t 
needed, and save government a fortune in the process. We are committed to help make 
the proposed Early Intervention Foundation a reality.’ 
Matthew Pike, Chair, Views Partnership 
‘An independent Foundation separate from central government, created and led by local 
councils, supported by private investment, academia, and charitable and ethical partners, 
could impartially evaluate and make freely available the most cost-effective early intervention 
policies, help put them into practice and explore new resources from non-government funding. 
Graham’s review recommendations demand a serious appraisal and an urgent response.’ 
Sir Howard Bernstein, Chief Executive, Manchester City Council 
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‘Local government will be delighted if a locally driven Institution of the type floated in the 
Allen Report is given the job of breaking through on Early Intervention. Rigorous evidence-
based policies and strong methodologies, faithfully implemented, are the key to combining 
localised decision making with the most effective programmes around. At a time of scarce 
public resources it’s even more important that we implement evidence-based programmes 
proved to work and tackle the causes of social problems rather than always be forced to deal 
with their consequences. I would urge government to look further into the Allen Report and 
enable us to build an independent centre to take this work forward.’ 
Stephen Hughes, Chief Executive, Birmingham City Council 
‘We’ve known for many years that the right investments in children’s early years pay 
off handsomely. But nowhere has yet translated this knowledge into a comprehensive 
system for channelling finance into evidence-based action. The Allen review provides 
a great opportunity to take the first steps, and I welcome its proposals for creating a 
properly financed independent foundation, which can bring together government, local 
authorities, investors and voluntary organisations. The UK hasn’t always done well in 
providing the best start for all of its children. But we may now have the chance to lead 
the world towards a radically new model for investing in life chances.’ 
Geoff Mulgan, Chief Executive, NESTA 
‘The police service has much to gain from capable parenting. Raising babies, children and 
young people who prove to be socially and emotionally capable is important, since this will 
inevitably mean fewer offenders in later life. Should an Early Intervention Foundation be 
agreed by the Government we would want to be closely involved with local authority and other 
partners to help maximise its value and explore the options of investing to pre-empt crime.’ 
Ian McPherson QPM, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Service 
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Chapter 1 
Creating a culture change 
We know the challenges. We’ve heard them. We’ve talked about them for 
years. What’s stopped us from meeting these challenges is not the absence 
of sound policies and sensible plans. What’s stopped us is the failure 
of leadership, the smallness of our politics – the ease with which we’re 
distracted by the petty and trivial, our chronic avoidance of tough decisions, 
our preference for scoring cheap political points instead of rolling up our 
sleeves and building a working consensus to tackle big problems. 
Barack Obama, formal announcement for President, 10 February 2007 
1. There has to be a culture change – led by 
government – from expensive and largely 
ineffective late intervention to highly effective and 
inexpensive Early Intervention. My first report, 
Early Intervention: The Next Steps,1 demonstrated 
that Early Intervention offers our country a real 
opportunity to make lasting improvements in the 
lives of our children: to forestall many persistent 
social problems, and end their transmission from 
one generation to the next, and to make long-term 
savings in public spending. Early Intervention is 
delivered by a proven set of policies covering the 
0–18 age group with special care taken with the 
0–3s. An agreed set of policies put in place by local 
areas could give babies, children and young people 
the essential social and emotional capabilities they 
need for the rest of their lives. There are a range 
of well-established evidence-based programmes 
that would leave children ready to face the 
challenges of each stage of childhood and the 
passage into adulthood – especially the challenge 
of becoming good parents to their own children. 
2. In spite of the merits of Early Intervention, 
which have achieved increasing recognition by 
national and local government and the voluntary 
sector, the provision of successful evidence-based 
Early Intervention programmes remains uneven 
and dogged by institutional and financial obstacles. 
There remains an overwhelming bias in favour of 
existing policies of late intervention at a time when 
social problems are well-entrenched – even though 
these policies are known to be expensive and of 
limited success. Strong leadership is required to 
overcome this bias and achieve a cultural shift to 
Early Intervention. 
Early Intervention: good for individuals 
and society 
3. An overwhelming body of evidence now 
points to the benefits of intervening early in 
children’s lives, before problems develop. The 
right kind of intervention is especially important 
in the first three years of children’s lives, when 
children achieve their most rapid development 
and when Early Intervention can embed essential 
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social and emotional skills. Dame Clare Tickell,2 
Professor Eileen Munro3 and the Rt Hon Frank 
Field MP4 have also reinforced the powerful case 
for intervening early to improve the life chances of 
children and young people in their recent reviews. 
Sir Michael Marmot, in his Strategic Review of Health 
Inequalities, also noted that ‘the foundations for 
virtually every aspect of human development are 
laid in early childhood. What happens during these 
early years (starting in the womb) has lifelong 
effects on many aspects of health and well-being’, 
including mental health, educational achievement 
and economic status.5 
4. Developing attunement, attachment, good 
communication skills and empathetic behaviour 
can help babies and children to flourish and 
reduce problems seen later in life. Indeed, a wealth 
of research illustrates how early experiences 
and levels of development can predict later life 
outcomes. For example: 
•	A child’s development score at just 22 
months can serve as an accurate predictor of 
educational outcomes at 26 years.6 
•	Vocabulary at age 5 has been found to be the 
best predictor (from a range of measures at age 
5 and 10) of whether children who experienced 
social deprivation in childhood were able to 
‘buck the trend’ and escape poverty in later 
adult life.7 The Ministry of Justice shows that 
70% of young offenders have communication 
difficulties.8 
•	Some 54% of the incidence of depression in 
women and 58% of suicide attempts by women 
could be attributed to adverse childhood 
experiences, according to a study in the US.9 
•	An authoritative study of boys assessed by 
nurses at age 3 found that the boys who were 
considered to be ‘at risk’ had two and a half 
times as many criminal convictions at age 21 as 
the group deemed not to be at risk.10 
5. Early Intervention also plays a vital role at other 
key stages throughout childhood, especially in 
primary school and during early adolescence. With 
school-age children, intervention should do more 
than react to the first manifestations of school 
failure and antisocial behaviour. It should also equip 
all children to achieve at school, make effective 
choices about their lives, aspire to work and, above 
all, to become good parents, thus breaking the 
transfer of dysfunction from one generation to 
the next. 
6. Early Intervention promotes social and 
emotional development that in turn significantly 
improves mental and physical health, educational 
attainment and employment opportunities. Early 
Intervention can also help to prevent criminal 
behaviour (especially violent behaviour), drug and 
alcohol misuse and teenage pregnancy.11 In addition 
there is a link to reduced child abuse incidences, 
reduced first-time offending rates (which of 
course entails a general reduction in offending) 
and increased numbers of parents participating 
in training or employment.12 All of these have a 
serious impact on society and cost a great deal of 
public money to address. 
7. Early Intervention works by developing a 
package of policies to help to ensure that all babies, 
children and young people develop the social and 
emotional foundation skills they need to become 
school ready, life ready and child ready (see box 
on page 3) and to help parents nurture and 
develop their children as the excellent parents of 
tomorrow. For example, by developing empathy, 
children learn to respect others and this means 
that they are able to have better relationships and 
be less inclined to abuse or be violent in later life. 
By developing self-esteem and confidence, children 
are better equipped to be able to make positive 
choices about their life, education, aspiration to 
work and to avoid drug and alcohol misuse.13 Early 
Intervention is, for example, a key component 
of the successful reduction in teenage pregnancy 
rates in my own City of Nottingham. 
The economic case for investment in Early 
Intervention 
8. My first report also set out the strong 
economic benefits of Early Intervention, 
demonstrating that intervening later is more 
costly and that the rate of return on remedial, 
rehabilitative and reactive treatments declines as 
children get older, and entrenched behaviours 
become harder, or impossible, to correct. 
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Social and emotional bedrock
 
School ready – having the social and emotional foundation skills to progress in speech, perception, 

ability to understand numbers and quantities, motor skills, attitude to work, concentration, 

memory and social conduct; having the ability to engage positively and without aggression with 

other children and the ability to respond appropriately to requests from teachers.
 
Life ready – having the social and emotional capability to enter the labour market; understanding 

the importance and the social, health and emotional benefits of entering work, the impacts of 

drug and alcohol misuse, crime and domestic and other violence.
 
Child ready – understanding what it is like to build and sustain a relationship, to have a family and 

to look after a small child; understanding how babies grow and develop and how parents can best 

promote this development.
 
9. The rationale for Early Intervention investment 
is simple: many of the costly and damaging social 
problems in society are created because we are 
not giving children the right type of support in 
their earliest years, when they should achieve 
their most rapid development. Without the 
filters of Early Intervention we set up a tsunami 
of dysfunction, which overwhelms and degrades 
the services originally set up to deal with only the 
toughest cases. 
The financial cost to society and of  failure 
to pre-empt dysfunction 
10. Each child with untreated behavioural 
problems costs an average of £70,000 by the time 
they reach 28 years old – 10 times the cost of 
children without behavioural problems.14 
•	The cost of youth crime in 2009 was estimated 
by the National Audit Office at £8.5–11 billion.15 
•	The average annual cost for a youth offender 
to be placed in a young offenders institution is 
£59,000.16 
•	It is even more expensive if a child is placed in a 
secure children’s home (£219,000) or a secure 
training centre (£163,000).17 
•	The cost of each additional young person not 
engaged in education, employment or training 
(NEET) is approximately £45,000.18 
•	The productivity loss to the state as a result of 
youth unemployment is estimated at £10 million 
every day.19 The average cost of an individual 
spending a lifetime on benefits is £430,000, not 
including the tax revenue.20 
•	The costs associated with mental health 
problems in the UK are estimated at 
£105.2 billion. This represents an increase of 
36% since 2002–03 and an increase in the 
health and social care share of these costs of 
over 70%.21 
11. There is increasing and overwhelming 
evidence that intervening early is cost-effective. For 
example, an evaluation by the RAND Corporation 
of the Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) known 
as the Family Nurse Partnership (FNP) in the UK 
(a preventive home visiting programme targeted 
to support ‘at risk’ families by supporting parental 
behaviour to foster emotional attunement and 
confident and warm parenting) estimated that the 
programme provided substantial savings to society 
and for high-risk families by the time children were 
15. These savings were over five times greater 
than the cost of the programme and came in 
the form of reduced welfare and criminal justice 
expenditures and higher tax revenues.22 The costs 
of the programme were recovered by the time the 
child was aged 4, with positive benefits for children 
and mothers in the form of reduced emergency 
attendances at hospital, fewer subsequent 
pregnancies and longer gaps between births, 
improved parenting and fewer months on welfare 
and more months employed.23 
12. In addition, an independent review has placed 
the average economic benefits of early education 
programmes for low-income 3- and 4-year-olds at 
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close to two and a half times the initial investment: 
these benefits take the form of improved 
educational attainment, reduced crime and fewer 
instances of child abuse and neglect.24 Within this 
overall figure, there is substantial variation, and 
reviews of individual early education programmes 
have noted benefit-to-cost ratios as high as 17:1.25 
13. The investment benefit-to-cost ratio for 
Early Intervention data in the US suggests 
that £40 million invested in positive parenting 
interventions could save £400 million over a 
15-year period.26 All this helps to demonstrate 
that Early Intervention is fundamental to our 
economic survival. We cannot continue to carry 
an unnecessary deadweight of the costs of failure. 
This is especially true in the fiercely competitive 
global economy where high levels of education, 
skills and emotional intelligence are prerequisites 
for success, and those nations who do not invest 
in the capabilities that make these possible are 
doomed to slip back. 
14. The social and economic evidence in favour 
of the beneficial impacts of Early Intervention 
is now overwhelming. The time has come for 
all our political parties together to set out the 
national vision, the policy ambition that will guide 
our actions over a generation. The Government 
should demonstrate national leadership on Early 
Intervention by making a public commitment to 
provide all babies, children and young people with 
the social and emotional bedrock they need. The 
policy statement Families in the Foundation Years,27 
due to be published this summer, provides an ideal 
opportunity to make the first public commitments, 
especially to effective assessment of the 0–5s and 
ensuring that every child is school ready. This 
must be followed up by clear commitments in the 
programme of government, when it is reviewed, 
and departmental business plans, published 
annually. The business plan for the Cabinet Office 
should show how cross-government work on 
Early Intervention will be co-ordinated. Early 
intervention should replace late intervention in the 
DNA of government. Better cross-government 
co-ordination of Early Intervention policy was an 
important recommendation in my first report; 
I repeat it with even greater vigour in this my 
second report. 
Recommendation 1 
I recommend that government sets out, as 
its policy ambition for Early Intervention, 
that in order to reach its social and 
economic goals, all babies, children and 
young people should have the social and 
emotional bedrock essential for their 
future development and their ability 
to make effective life choices. I further 
recommend that this ambition should set 
the tone of the Families in the Foundation 
Years statement due this summer. 
All in this together 
15. Early Intervention has great momentum at 
the moment and not only are all political parties 
motivated to progress it but the independent 
reviews of Dame Clare Tickell, the Rt Hon Frank 
Field MP, Professor Eileen Munro and myself 
have added evidential weight to the case for Early 
Intervention. 
16. Against this momentum stands public policy 
which has shown a persistent bias in favour of 
waiting to tackle social problems when they are 
well-entrenched and more expensive to address, 
and when many interventions are of limited 
success. Throughout my time on this report it 
is evident that this mindset is deeply rooted and 
strongly resistant to challenge. Of course, we 
need to deal with the problems created by a lack 
of support in the past, and indeed in many cases 
there are statutory duties to ensure that we do. 
However, failure to stop problems arising is, quite 
simply, short sighted. The choice between fire 
fighting or smoke alarms is a wholly false one. 
17. Clear political leadership and a rebalancing 
of expenditure are the way forward. Total public 
spending has been set for the next four years 
by the Government’s current spending review. 
This spending needs to be used to build up Early 
Intervention capability, including research and 
planning skills inside and outside government. 
Within this period, local areas led by councils 
and their partners should be supported to 
work together to ensure that there is capacity 
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to respond to the new and symbolic focus of 
the Early Intervention grant and other Early 
Intervention expenditure. 
18. It is a central tenet of this report that given 
the constraints on current public expenditure not 
only must local government and Whitehall spend 
more wisely but central and local government 
should also seek to draw on external finance for 
additional investment in Early Intervention. This 
will help to provide more sustainability for Early 
Intervention policies and programmes in the longer 
term. It will also create new incentives to improve 
the provision and performance of services for 
babies and children. 
19. Government often says, rightly, that public 
sector bodies having less money can drive them 
to be more creative. A thread throughout this 
Report is that this should apply equally to the 
Treasury along with the rest of government. 
Money is scarce, so ideas and creativity should 
be encouraged, facilitated and promoted. Due 
diligence should be used at all levels of government 
to question the comparative costs of wasteful late 
intervention programmes versus Early Intervention 
alternatives. Levels of savings to be achieved 
should be an integral part of all public investment 
calculations. Short-term cuts that jeopardise 
massive long-term returns should be avoided. 
Rules and methods of working established for a 
different era should be reviewed. President Obama 
has introduced rule changes so that money can 
be committed over longer periods than is usual in 
public contracts (see Chapter 6). Improving the 
social return on investment decisions and bringing 
in new sources of investment from non-central 
government sources, including local government, 
philanthropic and ethical and commercial sources, 
should be consciously facilitated. 
Leadership 
20. Strong national and local leadership is required 
to effect the necessary culture change and ensure 
that public sector resources are steadily refocused 
on Early Intervention. We all need to see the 
steps being taken to make this cultural change 
happen, including the public. This should start by 
ensuring that there is much greater transparency 
in making available the data and information that 
will demonstrate that change is occurring. I have 
placed much onus on government to lead this 
process; however, the legislature – whose function 
is to hold government to account – should not 
be an idle bystander but a strong partner in 
this cultural change. The Parliamentary Select 
Committees have a key role to play in investigating 
how Early Intervention can contribute to the work 
of the departments which they shadow. If Early 
Intervention is to be a centrepiece of government 
policy then ultimately a regular annual debate 
should take place in Parliament to scrutinise 
progress and support ministerial efforts. 
21. The independent Early Intervention 
Foundation that I recommended in my first 
report and on which I provide more detail in 
Chapter 4 of this report should play a key role in 
championing and supporting a cultural shift to Early 
Intervention. This should be supported by all those 
with an interest in Early Intervention, particularly 
those in the voluntary sector. 
Recommendation 2 
I recommend that there is the strongest 
possible commitment from political leaders 
to a culture change from late intervention 
to Early Intervention, building on the 
political momentum generated, not least 
by the recent Field, Tickell, Munro and 
Allen reviews. To this end, I recommend 
that there should be an annual statement 
to Parliament accounting for the progress 
made and projected on the policies, 
programmes in place and expenditure on 
Early Intervention. 
Shifting resources to Early Intervention 
22. Late intervention expends an enormous 
amount of money each year, yet the Early 
Intervention budget is miniscule by comparison. 
This imbalance must be addressed not least to 
ensure that we can compete in the world market. 
Early Intervention has a critical role to play in 
ensuring that we invest in future generations and 
that those generations can contribute fully as 
members of society and the labour market and 
aid our global competitiveness. In doing so, Early 
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Intervention can support central government’s 
economic objectives in the long term, including 
future economic growth in particular. Early 
Intervention can give Britain a more productive 
labour force. It would reduce the number of 
workers with low educational achievements, low 
skills and low aspirations, and of those who are 
fundamentally unemployable. It would increase the 
number of workers with the skills and ambitions 
to succeed, and the ability to innovate and adapt 
to innovation. Early Intervention can also reduce 
the scale of costly social problems and allow both 
public and private resources to be invested more 
productively elsewhere. 
23. Early Intervention programmes can provide 
significant value for money for the taxpayer, when 
compared to late intervention programmes that 
are more expensive to provide and have a lower 
success rate. Evidence-based investment that is 
effectively managed can also help to ensure that 
the taxpayer receives the maximum possible 
return for every pound of expenditure. These 
lessons are being learnt and applied across the 
globe. We certainly should not be afraid of  
taking the best practice from North America  
or European countries, for example. 
24. Closer to home, colleagues in the devolved 
governments and assemblies in the UK with 
greater room for manoeuvre to innovate have also 
recognised the value of Early Intervention. Visiting 
Northern Ireland, the new Scottish Government 
and the new Welsh Assembly, it is evident that 
they all see Early Intervention as a priority and they 
are developing their policy and practice on Early 
Intervention. They are also considering how new 
financial models might help. Annex C provides 
further information on their plans. 
25. My review has demonstrated a compelling 
case for investment in Early Intervention which 
should be supported over time with more long-
term certainty of funding. This could best be 
achieved by making Early Intervention a central 
objective for the next government Comprehensive 
Spending Review period and beyond. The spending 
review should signal a commitment to steadily 
increase the proportion of total spend devoted 
to Early Intervention over the next spending 
review period (and future spending reviews). This 
would help provide background to making the 
Comprehensive Spending Review themed around 
Early Intervention and the value for public money 
it represents. 
26. Preparation for the next spending review 
should start immediately with HM Treasury and 
Cabinet Office leading cross-government work to 
ensure that the appropriate research and evaluation 
are already in place or are commissioned to allow 
a comprehensive assessment of how much is 
currently being spent on Early Intervention by 
department. This can be the baseline upon which 
we can judge the costs, benefits and potential 
savings to the public purse and taxpayer of Early 
Intervention policies and programmes. This work 
should include research that will add to the evidence 
on how to calculate outcome-based payments and 
how savings should be released. 
27. A steady rebalancing of early and late 
intervention funding has widespread support 
from people contributing to my review. In one 
contribution, David Robinson, co-founder and 
senior adviser for Community Links, said: 
‘A swift and radical switch of resources 
from acute services to community building 
The new Scottish Government has made a number of manifesto commitments that are relevant 
to early intervention in the early years. 
This builds on a six-month investigation into Preventive Spending by the Finance Committee of 
the Scottish Parliament in early 2011, which said that there needed to be a shift from reacting 
to crises to a greater focus on prevention and early intervention. The committee’s report also 
emphasised the need for a consensual approach in moving towards a more preventive approach 
to public sector spending and investment in early years in particular. And that this will require 
leadership across all political parties. 
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and preventive action is impractical but 
a steady, incremental migration could be 
achieved. Government’s stepped approach 
to the reduction of carbon emissions with 
low carbon transition plans is not dissimilar. 
Government departments and local 
authorities should draw up transition plans and 
publish early action milestones. We spend 5% 
of our budget on prevention and early action. 
We should aim to increase that proportion by 
5% each year for the next three years.’ 
28. I agree with those who have expressed this 
view but more modestly and, after discussion with 
departments, I propose an incremental migration 
of funding of 1% each year from late intervention 
budgets to Early Intervention. This would require 
no additional spending by departments, just 
a steady internal redistribution managed by 
departments themselves, hopefully in discussion 
with local areas. In education for example, one 
obvious place to manage such a transition would 
be through the Early Intervention Grant currently 
spending over £2 billion nationally each year. 
The Health, Home and Justice departments 
already have machinery to run prevention 
programmes which could be steadily increased. 
The reorientation of internal spending in this way 
could provide some of the funds to pay investors 
for the departments’ outcome-based contracts 
recommended in Chapter 5. 
Recommendation 3 
I recommend that government, when 
planning the next Comprehensive 
Spending Review, should consider 
making Early Intervention its theme, and 
that work undertaken by a Treasury-led 
team should signal a decisive rebalancing 
of central government spending from 
late intervention to investing in Early 
Intervention. I believe that steady and 
incremental migration of funding – I would 
propose by 1% – per annum would signal 
government’s commitment to do this. 
New investment needs to be effectively 
targeted at evidence-based policies and 
programmes 
29. My first report also included an illustrative 
list of the most thoroughly evidenced Early 
Intervention programmes across the world, 
which commissioners can confidently use to help 
give children and young people the social and 
emotional bedrock they need to thrive throughout 
their lives. However, the report also underlined 
that this initial list of programmes needed further 
development to ensure that there was broad 
agreement on how effective Early Intervention 
programmes had been identified and assessed. 
Further work is also needed to build improved 
evidence on the cost benefit of programmes. 
30. Additional investment needs to be directed 
to the right Early Intervention programmes, and 
all who commission them would be advised to 
focus on those with the greatest evidence base of 
success. 
31. Early Intervention: The Next Steps sets out 72 
global programmes that have a strong evidence 
base, of which 19 meet the toughest evidence 
standards. This needs to be a living list, further 
developing to reflect the best programmes in the 
world, with a particular emphasis on what works 
in the UK. In Annex A, I have included a list of 
the 25 programmes assessed as having a strong 
evidence base that are delivered or available in 
the UK. 
32. There are also a great number of Early 
Intervention programmes that are not supported 
by the rigorous standards of evidence used 
for my first report. This is sometimes due to 
the poor quality of evaluation or evidence, or 
factors such as low resources that hinder them 
when gathering further evidence. However, 
this does not mean that these programmes are 
ineffective, particularly where they are informed 
by evidence from research or evaluation of other 
programmes/initiatives and are still working to 
develop their own definitive evaluation. I would 
advise that, where possible, providers and local 
authorities attempt to improve their evidence 
base around Early Intervention programmes to aid 
extension of the list. I believe that this list will help 
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commissioners to focus their limited resources on 
services that produce the most effective results in 
the lives of children and families. 
33. Figure 1.1 shows how some of the most 
robustly assessed interventions map across age 
ranges, target groups and types of provision. This 
does not purport to show a holistic system of 
early interventions, but demonstrates that many 
interventions with proven impact are available and, 
in many cases, have already been woven into the 
public service infrastructure of the UK. 
34. An important message from my first report 
was that Early Intervention programmes need 
to be implemented with fidelity to the original 
design of their originators. Failure to do this 
typically reduces both their economic benefits 
and, more importantly, their contribution to 
children’s well-being. This has all too often been 
tolerated in the public sector. Consequences 
in the non-governmental sector, however, are 
more immediate and drastic. If programmes are 
not implemented with fidelity, potential returns 
are threatened and investors will lose trust and 
confidence, which is why I have established a 
list of the best evidence-based programmes to 
ensure that confidence from investors is retained. 
Fidelity is key to the success of Early Intervention 
programmes. Organisations seeking to deliver 
Early Intervention outcomes should therefore have 
access to data on the best programmes and how 
they should be delivered to maximise their chances 
of successfully delivering the outcomes and, thus, 
getting paid. 
35. We also need to ensure more effective 
monitoring of delivery of Early Intervention 
programmes and more effective evaluation 
of outcomes and cost-effectiveness, and we 
need to support the continual improvement of 
interventions through innovation. I do not make 
a further recommendation on best programmes 
in this Report because it was comprehensively 
covered in my first report and will continue 
to evolve. 
Figure 1.1: Effective intervention examples by age 
HEALTH VISITING 0 years GP SERVICES 
–9 months 
PARENTING
 
SUPPORT
 
SOCIAL CARE 
Incredible 
Years (0–12) 
Multidimensional 
Treatment Foster 
Care (3–17) 
Multisystemic 
Therapy (12–17) 
Functional 
Family 
Therapy (10–17) 
Reading 
Recovery (5–6) 
Family Nurse 
Partnership (0–2) Triple P (0–16) 
Parent-Child 
Home Programme (1–3) 
Targeted 
Nottingham 
18 years 
3 years 
SURE START/ 
EARLY YEARS Lifeskills (11–16)
EDUCATION
 
Success
 
for All (3–11)
 YOUTH SERVICES 
PRIMARY
 
SCHOOLING
 
5 years 
PATHS (4–5) 
11 years 
SEAL (6–11) Life Skills 
Training 
Universal (9–15) 
SECONDARY
 
SCHOOLING
 
Note: PATHS stands for Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies and SEAL stands for Social and Emotional Aspects  
of  Learning. 
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36. Without Early Intervention, this country will 
face enduring obstacles to economic growth. 
Without Early Intervention, this country will 
continue to spend huge sums of public money 
ineffectively. Without Early Intervention, this 
country will continue to face major structural 
difficulties in securing a balanced budget and 
reducing public debt. Without Early Intervention, 
these problems will become more entrenched 
and more severe, both for this government and its 
successors. 
37. For all these reasons, I believe that Early 
Intervention represents the most fundamental 
investment in the human capital of our country. 
However, it is a form of investment that requires 
some cultural change, and this may have 
contributed to the institutional barriers against 
Early Intervention in our country. In Chapter 2, 
I will examine the barriers to further investment in 
Early Intervention in more depth. 
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Chapter 2 
Leadership and co-ordination to enable 
investment in Early Intervention 
The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago, the next best time is now. 
Rt Hon Francis Maude MP, quoting an old African proverb 
1. In Chapter 1, and in my first report, I make 
the case for investment in Early Intervention. 
Past governments have done excellent work 
on Early Intervention, including beginning Sure 
Start children’s centres, pre-school hours for 
3- and 4-year-olds and introducing the Family 
Nurse Partnership. The current Government has 
carried on this good work, for example through 
the creation of the Early Intervention Grant1 and 
through increasing the health-visiting workforce by 
4,200 at the same time as doubling the number 
of places on the Family Nurse Partnership 
programme from 6,000 to 13,000 by 2015. This 
is also demonstrated through the new Fairness 
Premium, which is worth £7.2 billion in total 
over the Spending Review period to support the 
poorest in the early years and at every stage of 
their education, which includes providing  
15 hours of free pre-school education a week  
to 2-year-olds.2 
2. However, there is more that can be done. It has 
become clear to me in conducting my two reports 
that while a great deal of work is going on across 
the government machine on Early Intervention 
and on Social Finance, it is not always co-ordinated 
or shared effectively. This is not a criticism of 
the commitment of those who work in the field, 
it is however a call to action for more decisive 
leadership and more effective co-ordination at 
official level. Hard as governments have tried, Early 
Intervention programmes are not reaching all 
those who need them. For example, in my home 
constituency of Nottingham North only a third 
of those who would be eligible for support from 
the Family Nurse Partnership scheme receive this 
programme. There are a number of barriers to 
increasing investment and this chapter outlines 
these and how decisive leadership and effective 
co-ordination are needed to overcome them. 
Multiple beneficiaries 
3. The beneficiaries of Early Intervention are 
multiple and in order to incentivise investment we 
need to ensure that future savings accrue to those 
making the original investment, be they public or 
private investors. 
4. The first key challenge is to ensure that 
agencies work with each other to agree to 
commission projects, share funding and distribute 
savings. We will explore how Early Intervention 
Places and Community Budgets can join up to 
achieve this aim in Chapter 3. In addition, central 
government is likely to be asked by local areas to 
distribute savings accruing to them, and to protect 
local budgets, so that Early Intervention savings 
can be paid back, in part to external investors. 
Working out appropriate outcomes and payments 
will require complex analytical work, which from 
an efficiency perspective might be best located in 
one government department rather than many. 
Local area input and participation in this analysis 
will also be essential. 
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5. An example of some helpful existing work 
in this area is a Department for Education-led 
project with the Association of Directors of 
Children’s Services and the Centre for Excellence 
and Outcomes in Children and Young People’s 
Services (C4EO), titled ‘Cost-effective Children’s 
Services’. Using this approach, Hertfordshire 
County Council has worked with a number of 
local partners and agencies to create a better 
understanding of the cost of services and how 
different agencies contribute to better outcomes 
for children, young people and families. As a result, 
they are projecting savings of £23 million over four 
years, through a stronger focus on prevention and 
Early Intervention, with a multi-agency approach to 
working with families with multiple problems. 
A lack of  detailed data 
6. The collection and collation of high-quality data 
across departments needs effective co-ordination. 
Given the long-term nature of Early Intervention 
and the associated high costs of evaluation and 
cost-effectiveness work, it is sometimes difficult 
to calculate robust outcome measures and 
cashable savings, or payment levels calculated on 
future cashable savings from Early Intervention 
programmes. Although, as a whole, we can identify 
that Early Intervention is the right investment to 
make, because of the accumulation of evidence 
from around the world, it is more difficult to 
specify the level of savings that would accrue 
from implementing a particular programme, or 
achieving a particular outcome. In addition, where 
interim measures, at age 3 and 5, for example, are 
suggested as proxy measures to satisfy investor 
appetites for shorter investment horizons, we 
need further data on the degree to which these 
reliably predict the desired improvements in social 
and emotional capability in young adulthood. 
7. The Social Research Unit at Dartington is 
translating the Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy cost-benefit model for use in the UK. The 
model calculates the return on public investment 
from evidence-based prevention and intervention 
programmes and policies and the Social Research 
Unit will replace the US data in the model with UK 
inputs. Once the model is developed for the UK, 
it will be helpful in terms of understanding cost 
benefits made through Early Intervention. Making 
this evidence available for free to all local areas 
could be one of the first tasks of the independent 
Early Intervention Foundation referred to in 
Chapter 4. 
8. I recognise that Early Intervention calls for 
complex work across Whitehall, but strongly 
believe that the Government and local areas 
should have a joined-up approach, with an 
ambition to enable central government to work 
with local areas in a more timely, unbureaucratic 
and efficient manner. There is also a role here 
for local areas to develop their own evaluation 
frameworks that are relevant to their specific 
areas, and for local and central government to 
work together as the 27 Early Intervention Places 
are now working together as a result of my 
first report. 
9. Equally important is the need for data on 
children and young people’s social and emotional 
development to be available that allows decisions 
to be made on their future development needs 
and also allows the impact of interventions with 
the child, young person or family to be measured. 
In my first report I recommended that there 
should be a commitment to regular assessments 
of children’s development from birth up to and 
including age 5, focusing on social and emotional 
development. This would help to ensure that 
the 0–5s are helped at the most cost-effective 
point in their lives to develop the social and 
emotional bedrock that is essential to their 
future progress and potential. I am even more 
convinced now that this is essential and that the 
assessment should include a measurable outcome 
that will allow the impact of interventions to be 
monitored and analysed for cost-effectiveness. I 
further recommend that ‘school readiness’ should 
be adopted as an intended outcome of Early 
Intervention and be used as a measure, or basket 
of measures, of the impact of investment and the 
extent of savings, and thereby as an incentive for 
further investment. 
10. As I said in Chapter 1, the Families in 
Foundation Years statement due this summer 
should set the tone for the Government’s ambition 
for Early Intervention. The statement should 
include information on how children’s social and 
emotional development will be regularly assessed. 
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Recommendation 4 
I recommend that the Families in the 
Foundation Years statement must include 
regular and purposeful assessments for 
the 0–5s, focusing on measuring social 
and emotional development to enable 
all children to attain ‘school readiness’. I 
further recommend that ‘school readiness’ 
should be adopted as an intended outcome 
from Early Intervention and be used as a 
measure, or basket of measures, of the 
impact of investment and the extent of 
savings, and thereby as an incentive for 
further investment. 
Savings made are not claimed by central 
government 
11. In local areas there is a fear that central 
government will restrict savings to be paid back 
through future budget reductions or through a 
failure to recognise reduced levels of unmet need 
as a positive outcome, particularly in this time of 
deficit reduction. Local authorities need to have 
the confidence to put in place outcome-based 
contracts. 
12. High levels of unmet need mean that cashable 
savings can be difficult to identify because while 
Early Intervention programmes work, prisons 
and care homes, for example, do not close. This 
is because someone else takes the place that has 
been freed up. For cashable savings to accrue, 
places would not be able to be filled by others. 
Strict allocation criteria might enable more 
cashable savings to be identified; however, we 
have heard of high levels of unmet need. There 
are ethical considerations in not providing places 
to those who need them and this needs to be 
considered in determining the calculation of 
outcome payments. In the short term I would 
consider that an over-reliance on the identification 
of cashable savings to fund payments might restrict 
future outcome payments. 
13. Local areas, non-government and investors 
alike are concerned about central government 
involvement given the frequency of policy change 
and the need to deal with problems as they arise, 
and would require guarantees to assure them of 
the safety of any investment/strategy that involved 
central government. However, in addition, we 
recognise that some of our Early Intervention 
Places wanted no central government involvement 
at all, even if that meant not being able to benefit 
from savings made to national funding streams. 
14. To ensure that future changes to government 
spending allocations do not restrict the ability 
of areas to pay back, we support the following 
proposals made by London Councils and the 
Greater London Authority (GLA), after a 
workshop we developed with them. 
15. These challenges should not mean that 
investors, local and central government wait to 
invest in Early Intervention until precise data 
on effects and cashable savings are known for 
each outcome and programme. While analysts 
might regard this as a ‘safe’ strategy, it would in 
fact be the opposite. In the first instance, we 
know that the moral and economic case for Early 
Intervention investment is strong, and secondly, 
we will never have perfect information. We need 
to track robust performance measures to pay the 
returns, however we should not wait another 25 
years for follow-up studies on each programme/ 
policy before we start. The effect of a delay in 
expansion of Early Intervention in our society 
would ruin more lives and cost billions of pounds. 
It is important to help facilitate the introduction of 
investment to public sector bodies delivering Early 
Intervention programmes. 
Impact over a lifetime 
16. The impact over a lifetime of the successful 
implementation of Early Intervention would be 
huge. This success would give substantial payback 
over long periods of time. 
‘A child’s early years form the pattern of their 
future adult life. However, children are not just 
adults in waiting, destined to become society’s 
future. We have a duty to give children a ‘now’ 
– a present where they are loved, nurtured 
and cared for within families, not for society’s 
benefit, but because they deserve it and it’s 
their right. Tackling health inequality is a key 
priority for my department. Given what we 
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Some key principles to support external investment in Early Intervention, from London 
Councils and the Greater London Authority 
1. There needs to be reassurance from government and public sector partners that budgets 
will not change at short notice, particularly in those areas that relate to the Early Intervention 
work and those identified areas where savings are expected. Both the security of budget and 
potential for future savings would act as a huge incentive for local partners. 
2 Public sector partners must retain an agreed share of the savings that are identified to be 
released through the programme. They must also agree to a percentage share in advance that 
will go to any private sector investor as their return on investment. This will require public 
sector partners to show restraint in order to ensure that savings earmarked for private sector 
investors are not redirected to resource what is at present ‘unmet’ need. Of course, any agreed 
savings retained by public sector partners can be used to meet unmet need as required. 
3. An agreement must be drawn up on the division of savings across public sector organisations 
(e.g. local authorities, health and police services). There must be some flexibility within this 
agreement to reflect when savings in particular areas differ from the original agreement. 
4. Outcomes and milestones must be agreed by all partners and be measured according to an 
agreed timetable. The timing of any release of cashable savings linked to achieving particular 
outcomes needs to be agreed upfront. 
5. Programmes must reflect local needs and therefore there needs to be recognition of this in the 
tailoring of programmes at the outset. 
know about the foundational nature of a 
child’s first few years for lifelong health and 
well-being, action to address health inequalities 
must start from the very earliest stage. I 
believe early support makes a real difference 
to families, particularly families who might be 
slipping into difficulty, and helps them maintain 
positive family life.’3 
Edwin Poots, Minister for Health, 
Northern Ireland 
17. This long-term impact can, however, be a 
barrier to investment. For example, one might 
hypothesise that we need to intervene with a 
family between birth and age 2 of a child to help 
the child attune and to build empathy. One of 
the key benefits of such a programme may be to 
reduce violent crime and domestic abuse and to 
promote harmonious relationships. The ‘big ticket’ 
payback is in young adulthood. 
18. This presents two key challenges. The first is 
that over such a long timescale it will be difficult, 
and expensive, to attribute a change observed in 
behaviour, for example in violent crime, to one 
particular policy; it is possible, however, if one can 
control for economic and demographic change and 
other policies implemented. Tracking individuals 
over time, with a control group, might be the best 
way to identify any meaningful effect. 
19. The second challenge is that the long timescale 
makes outcome-based contracts less attractive 
to investors because of investor appetites for 
shorter time horizons. One solution is to identify 
earlier robust predictors of the change that we 
want to see in the future. For example, some 
shorter term outcomes that come from successful 
implementation of Early Intervention can be seen 
in the time frame of two to four years, where a 
family in one of the Incredible Years programmes 
can gain more immediate outcomes in the form of 
reduction in conduct disorder, reduced antisocial 
behaviour and a reduction in parenting stress. 
20. Investment in Early Intervention therefore 
requires investors, and commissioners – be they 
local areas or central government departments 
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– to take a longer-term view. This requires cross-
party support and long-term leadership. This may 
require incentivising professionals to take a longer 
term view, through their organisational values and 
performance management systems. There is a 
need to make Early Intervention a long-term policy 
which will need enduring cross-party effort. 
Fragmented provider base and scaling up 
21. Issues regarding scaling up Early Intervention 
programmes and their implementers have been 
arising throughout the preparation of the Report. 
If these issues continue, this will limit the ability 
to invest large sums in the programmes in the 
near future. 
22. Public sector organisations such as local 
authorities and the National Health Service can 
often provide evidence-based interventions, such 
as Incredible Years programmes and Family Nurse 
Partnership. However, some are small charity 
providers who may only have capacity to provide 
services to a limited number of individuals. Smaller 
providers can help to broaden the provider base 
and potentially offer greater expertise in Early 
Intervention to support outcomes. However, there 
are risks relating to their ability to scale up. 
23. Many of the issues that need to be addressed 
relate to the ability to source, find and develop 
appropriately trained staff – Early Intervention 
programmes need to engage with families 
with complex problems and in challenging 
circumstances. Competent and skilled practitioners 
are fundamental to ensuring that programmes are 
delivered with enough fidelity to aid successful 
outcomes and to ensure programme providers 
can take the step from managing programmes for 
a small cohort of babies, children or families to 
setting up a business that can provide services for 
much larger numbers. 
24. It is therefore reassuring to see that a number 
of organisations on my expert Finance Working 
Group are, through the use of venture philanthropy, 
providing support to evidence-based programmes 
to become business ready, and to help improve the 
information they have on metrics. 
25. Figure 2.1 shows how Westminster City 
Council is identifying and addressing the barriers. 
Ongoing work to overcome barriers to 
increasing investment 
26. Some work is already under way within central 
and local government to tackle these issues and 
to explore, not just for Early Intervention, the 
possibilities that exist to bring in alternative funding 
for social policy. 
27. Most advanced is the Peterborough social 
impact bond, developed with the Ministry of 
Justice, the Big Lottery Fund and Social Finance 
to reduce re-offending rates, which has already 
started. 
28. A number of government departments have 
also started work in this area. The Cabinet Office 
is working with Community Budget areas to 
develop a social impact bond to help reduce the 
number of families with multiple problems who 
place a disproportionally high cost on the taxpayer. 
A social impact bond to help reduce the number of families with multiple problems 
The Cabinet Office is exploring, together with a small group of local authorities, how to use social 
investment to support some of the most troubled families in society. Specifically it is looking at 
how socially motivated investors can help to finance a new way of commissioning interventions for 
these families, one that leaves providers free to innovate but only pays for results achieved using 
money saved in other areas of service provision. Different local areas might focus on different 
results – for example children at risk of care, teenage pregnancy, a specific town or even a sink 
estate. If even four to five local areas commissioned interventions to support families in need 
in this way, demand could be created for £20–30 million of social investment to support these 
families, which could become a contender for one of the Big Society Bank’s first investments. 
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Figure 2.1: How Westminster City Council is identifying and addressing the barriers 
Sources of  Early Intervention 
funding for local area 
Major sources: Local authority, schools, external grant (DfE, YJB, Home Office), DH, DWP 
Minor sources: Community Budgets pilot, income and fundraising 
There are 
barriers to 
this working 
as a smooth 
and effective 
system 
Cultures 
and service 
structures 
discourage 
agencies from 
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Lack of  joint 
accountability 
for targets 
Quality of 
information: 
– needs 
analysis 
Identifying 
the ‘right 
cohort’ 
Lack of 
common data 
on outcomes 
Short­term 
timescales 
Allocation 
process 
What funding is committed to Early 
Intervention (social and emotional 
capability) 
0–5 
£3.3m 
5–11 
£1.9m 
11–18 
£2.0m 
Commissioning 
Who contributes to 
commissioning decisions 
Local authority children’s services and elected members.
 
Three health bodies – Inner North West London PCT, Central London Community Health
 
Care, Central North West London Mental Health Trust.
 
Third sector – including Action for Children, Paddington Development Trust,
 
Westminster Society for People with Learning Difficulties and London Early Years 

Foundation. In addition, Voluntary Action Westminster (the local CVS) represents about 

300 local organisations. 

Schools, day nurseries and familiy centres.
 
Adult services, particularly in relation to substance misuse, family support, carers and 

transition.
 
The police are a key partner in relation to commissioning of  community safety services.
 
Current provision 
Currently on service basis. 
Children’s centres core offer, 
Every Child A Talker, FAST. 
Various evidence­based 
parenting programmes. 
Currently on service basis. 
School social work, family 
support, parenting support, 
targeted mental health 
services, Triple P. 
Currently on service basis. 
Targeted youth support 
and youth work, youth 
crime prevention. 
All budgets are approximate, due to the lack of an agreed deﬁnition 
of Early Intervention, and represent only the local authority spend. 
Existing public sector 
funding does not cover the 
needs of  all 
Underfunded cost of population need, churn between services/programmes and 
migration into the local area. 
Allocation 
process 
Amount by age group/ 
intervention (social and 
emotional capability) 
0–5 
FAST = £1.5m 
(3 years) 
FNP = £0.3m 
5–11 
Triple P = £0.4m 
PATHS = £0.5m 
11–18 
MST = £0.3m 
Commissioning 
Which additional 
interventions/programmes 
should be commissioned 
if  additional funding 
were a vailable? 
11–18 
MST (100%) 
0–5 
FAST (33%) 
FNP (100%) 
5–11 
Triple P (50%) 
PATHS 
Who will be the ﬁnancial 
beneﬁciaries of  the additional 
outcomes? 
Beneﬁciaries include schools, police, health, Home Office and DWP. Westminster 
City Council will beneﬁt from less than 50% of savings. 
There are 
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this working 
as a smooth 
and effective 
system 
Quality of 
information 
Shared 
understanding 
of  population 
need 
Tracking/ 
measuring 
outcomes 
Agreeing 
beneﬁciaries 
Releasing 
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Note: Please see Annex A for full titles of  Early Intervention programmes and Annex B of Early Intervention: The Next Steps 
for more detail. 
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29. The Department for Communities and Local 
Government is supporting a political leadership 
group, led by Baroness Hanham, looking at the 
barriers to using innovative financial models 
to support Community Budgets. And there 
are a number of other initiatives led by the 
Departments of Work and Pensions, Education, 
Health, and Business Innovation and Skills. 
30. While much good work continues inside 
central government, there is no question that if 
the culture and practice changes that we have 
discussed are to take place, the poor lines of 
account and departmental territorialism that I 
identified in my first report need to be addressed. 
Otherwise the tough obstacles in the way of 
drawing further resources into Early Intervention 
will not be overcome. I am therefore making the 
proposal that an independent figure from outside 
Whitehall is brought in. My further suggestion is 
that all the relevant Whitehall departments are 
represented on a Whitehall Task and Finish Group, 
which should draw together all the work taking 
place and propose how to move it forward. This 
high-level group should have an independent chair 
and report regularly to the Social Justice Cabinet 
Committee. Such a body should be the driving 
force of government action as Early Intervention 
goes into its next phase, unites all departmental 
interests around one vision and becomes 
better resourced. 
Recommendation 5 
I recommend that there should be an 
Early Intervention Task and Finish Group 
reporting to the Social Justice Cabinet 
Committee. This could be a dedicated 
team of experts with representatives 
from major spending departments, the 
Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. It 
should also have external secondees from 
providers and financial organisations. This 
group should co-ordinate the currently 
disparate activity on Early Intervention 
and social investment and communicate 
lessons learnt to government departments. 
Working closely with the independent Early 
Intervention Foundation, it should ensure 
consistency in the establishment of Early 
Intervention outcomes that are important 
to government, jointly agree the standard 
of evidence needed to measure whether 
these outcomes have been achieved, and 
improve data on measures, outcomes 
and cashable savings to allow Whitehall 
and local areas to attach payments 
appropriately to outcomes. 
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Notes 
1	 Department for Education, Early Intervention Grant, 
see detail in Annex B. Education Secretary Michael 
Gove has said that this unringfenced funding will be 
10.9% lower than the aggregated funding for 2010/11 
(BBC report, quoting Michael Gove, 14 December 
2010). The Early Intervention Grant is welcomed but 
some of  the advantages created may be offset by the 
overall reduction in funding. 
2	 HM Treasury (2010) Spending Review 2010. London: 
HM Treasury, p. 27. 
3	 Speaking at an early years interventions conference in 
Belfast in May 2011, Northern Ireland Health Minister, 
Edwin Poots MLA. 
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Chapter 3 
A locally driven agenda 
Although social change cannot come overnight, we must always work as 
though it were a possibility in the morning. 
Dr Martin Luther King, Jr 
1. The UK is arguably the most over-centralised 
of the Western democracies. Indeed, in my first 
report, I recommended the proper codification 
of the central/local relationship as the only viable 
long-term settlement to give the localities the 
sustainability and stability they need. It is often 
hard for local authorities to make the independent 
contribution they could be capable of. This 
uncertainty and short termism impact on Early 
Intervention even more strongly than other fields. 
In my first report I also recommended a series of 
proposals to boost local activity by allowing local 
areas to be free of central government control 
and interference, and also to raise money from the 
private sector. Freeing local authorities to at least 
the level enjoyed in most Western democracies 
is key to unlocking the creativity and innovation 
of local authorities and their partners, particularly 
those in the voluntary sector. 
2. I explore in this chapter and in Chapter 6 
(on funds and bonds) how empowered local 
authorities can make a contribution to our social 
infrastructure, comparable to that which less 
restricted councils made to our public health and 
physical infrastructure in Victorian times, when 
entrepreneurial local investment in roads, sewers 
and other utilities put an end to cholera and other 
epidemics, improved mortality and health, and 
gave people a better quality of life. Modern local 
authorities released from central control are just 
as capable of doing for our social health what their 
forebears did for our physical health. 
3. Even within the current restricted constitutional 
position, local elected leaders and senior managers 
from all public services, working with their 
partners, are in the best position to improve the 
outcomes, impact and value for money achieved 
from existing investment and to promote further 
investment in Early Intervention for babies, 
children and young people. 
4. I know from my time as Chair of the local 
strategic partnership in Nottingham that it takes 
vision, energy and persistence to create the 
right leadership, governance and partnership 
arrangements to ensure that Early Intervention 
is part of an integrated strategy agreed, funded, 
implemented, evaluated and recognised as 
delivering the right outcomes for all key partners. 
However, the fruits of such working are well 
worth the effort. 
5. I am encouraged that many local areas, 
particularly the 27 areas that stepped forward to 
say they want to become an Early Intervention 
Place as proposed in my first report, are building 
on the lessons learnt through the work of their 
local strategic partnerships, Total Place pilots, 
children’s trust boards and initiatives on localism 
and Community Budgets to create a renewed 
focus on leadership, governance and partnership  
24 Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive Savings 
at local level in order to improve the delivery of 
Early Intervention. 
6. This chapter examines the possibilities at a local 
level, and sets out how local partners, supported 
by central government, can make better use of 
existing investment in Early Intervention and play a 
key role in expanding investment in effective Early 
Intervention provision. These include: building on 
national initiatives and local experience in order 
to transform services; making better informed 
commissioning decisions using a stronger evidence 
base and using Community Budgets as a vehicle to 
cut through some of the complexities that hinder 
investment in Early Intervention and alternative 
contracting approaches. Behaviours and ways of 
working need to change. 
Informing national policy and shaping 
transformed local services 
7. I have already said that strong national 
and local leadership is required to effect the 
necessary culture change and ensure that public 
sector resources are steadily refocused on Early 
Intervention. Elected leaders, chief executives of 
local authorities and other local leaders have an 
important role to play in recognising and endorsing 
the need for change. 
8. Local leaders working with their partners are 
in the best position to influence new government 
policy and transform local services. Putting Early 
Intervention at the centre of local strategic plans 
is a coherent part of multi-agency working and 
integrated delivery of services for babies, children, 
young people and their families. 
9. A good example of this is the local delivery of 
social and emotional capability for the 0–5s. In my 
first report I recommended ‘the Department of 
Health and the Department for Education should 
work together with other partners and interests to 
produce within 18 months a seamless Foundation 
Years Plan from pregnancy to 5 years of age, which 
should be widely understood and disseminated 
in order to make the 0–5 foundation years a 
reality. I recommend that this Plan is endorsed by 
Case study: Early Intervention in East Sussex 
East Sussex County Council is leading the development of Early Intervention through: 
1. continuing to invest in children’s centre services through the Early Intervention Grant; 
2.	 creating a 0–5 budget, by pooling resources for children’s centres with primary care trust health 
visiting funding in order to reshape services, increase support for more vulnerable families 
(including through investment in the Family Nurse Partnership programme) and maintain a 
good universal offer; 
3. as part of that increased support, implementing new protocols designed to stop families from 
falling through the net – for example, health visitors contacting all families that have been 
referred to social care but don’t meet the threshold; 
4. investing in primary school age Early Intervention (the Parent Support Adviser service), 

working with key school leaders in order to manage the service for groups of schools and 

linking it up to social care, again to prevent families from falling through the net;
 
5. raising awareness of Early Intervention services and how to access them – for example, 

developing new arrangements for GPs to refer into preventive services;
 
6. prioritising targeted youth support for individual vulnerable teenagers at the expense of more 
traditional open access youth provision; 
7. leading discussions with other agencies, particularly the police, about a collective approach to 
Early Intervention in order to generate and build interest locally in combining resources for 
more up-front investment. 
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Parliament’.1 I therefore look forward expectantly 
to the Government’s plans to issue a policy 
statement on Families in the Foundation Years this 
summer. I am also hopeful that the statement will 
be strongly influenced by local leaders from the 
statutory and voluntary sectors. It should provide 
an ideal opportunity to develop a coherent 
strategy from conception to age 5 and beyond, 
and promote an Early Intervention approach 
across central and local government. We should 
never forget that it will be the local commitment 
of parents, health visitors, nursery staff, teaching 
assistants and others that will deliver capable 0–5s. 
10. Since my first report, Professor Eileen 
Munro’s report A child centred system2 has also 
emphasised the importance of a co-ordinated 
approach to services being provided locally, 
both to maximise the efficient use of resources 
and to effectively safeguard and promote the 
welfare of local children and young people. I 
welcome her conclusions that local areas need 
to have the freedom to respond to local need, 
not implement a centrally prescribed service, and 
that preventive services can do more to reduce 
abuse and neglect than reactive services. Professor 
Munro has also proposed a new statutory duty 
for local authorities and statutory partners to 
secure the sufficient provision of local early help 
services for children, young people and families. I 
believe that if such a duty is introduced it should 
encompass the provision of Early Intervention 
services and programmes for social and emotional 
development. 
11. For all our emphasis on Early Intervention 
programmes, the role of mainstream local health 
services will always provide the earliest and 
strongest filters of dysfunction. That is why I said 
in my first report ‘the proposed changes to local 
health services may present opportunities for 
health to play an even more important role in Early 
Intervention than it does now.’ 
12. The proposed new health and well-being 
boards must rediscover the preventive mission 
of public health and drive local strategies and 
incentivise commissioning for Early Intervention. 
They must work with and alongside all public 
sector and voluntary sector partners, including 
schools, police and crime commissioners, youth 
justice services and GP consortia, as key partners 
on strategic planning and commissioning for Early 
Intervention. 
13. In addition, the proposed Public Health 
Outcomes Framework must add weight to local 
partnership arrangements by introducing outcomes 
that encourage both public health funding for Early 
Intervention and collaborative commissioning for 
shared outcomes across all public, voluntary and 
private agencies funding streams. 
14. I believe that it is essential that the proposed 
Public Health Outcomes Framework includes 
outcomes related to children’s development, 
focusing on social and emotional development. 
I note the intention in the consultation document 
for an assessment at age 2–2.5, but believe that 
more regular assessments as proposed earlier 
would be more beneficial for children, their 
families and the country. 
Recommendation 6 
I recommend that the systems and 
organisations arising from the 
NHS changes give priority to Early 
Intervention, with health and well-being 
boards providing leadership for Early 
Intervention’s contribution to health and  
well-being in every locality. 
15. I now move on to how local areas can make 
better informed commissioning decisions and how 
Community Budgets could help to cut through 
some of the complexities that hinder investment 
in Early Intervention and the use of alternative 
contracting approaches. 
Using the evidence base to support investment 
decisions 
16. Local leaders and commissioners of public 
services need to know if their current investments 
in services and programmes are actually working 
or whether they would do better to direct funding 
elsewhere. They also need to know whether 
programmes are being effectively managed and 
whether they are achieving the required level of 
service to their intended beneficiaries. 
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17. My first report highlighted the difficulties 
commissioners face in identifying proven models 
of Early Intervention that will work in their area. 
A number of organisations have emerged or 
extended their scope to help commissioners in this 
area, including: the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence, the Social Research Unit 
at Dartington, the Centre for Excellence and 
Outcomes in Children and Young People’s Services, 
and the Local Authorities Research Consortium. 
A number of academic research institutions 
also publish relevant research and evaluation 
studies. This is discussed more in Chapter 4, 
where I set out how support is needed to help 
local areas better understand the evidence base 
and the potential role for an independent Early 
Intervention Foundation including the Foundation’s 
role in working with existing institutions to use 
evidence-based approaches specifically to promote 
early intervention and make the best advice and 
methodologies in the world freely available to all 
those local areas that want it. 
Outcome-based contracting could bring benefits 
at a local level 
18. Having examined the evidence, I believe that 
outcome-based payments can help to encourage 
delivery providers to focus on programmes or 
interventions that have a proven evidence base 
and ensure fidelity in the way those programmes 
are implemented. I hope that the Open Public 
Services White Paper underlines this view and that 
it becomes the Government’s expectation. 
19. Taking this into account, local commissioners 
should prepare to go with the flow and consider 
making more use of outcome-based contracting 
approaches in order to strengthen the incentives 
on service and programme providers to deliver 
Early Intervention outcomes. Outcome-based 
payments – sometimes described as payment by 
results – ensure that those delivering services 
receive certain payments only when they achieve 
certain agreed and measured outcomes. I have 
purposely used the term outcome-based payments 
in order to emphasise the importance I place on 
outcomes. Some payment by results contracts 
allow payments to be made when outputs as 
opposed to outcomes are achieved. For Early 
Intervention and the babies, children and young 
people I want to help, only outcomes will do. 
20. Outcome-based contracts can offer an 
important means of aligning the incentives of those 
who commission services with those who provide 
them. They can help to promote innovation 
through specifying an outcome rather than the 
exact way of achieving that outcome. In the longer 
term (through a better understanding of costs and 
results), I hope that outcome-based contracting 
will improve the cost-effectiveness of Early 
Intervention services, ensuring that public money is 
focused on achieving outcomes and not on activity, 
reducing demand for expensive later interventions. 
It should therefore, as a minimum, allow local 
areas to save money or reinvest it in more 
Early Intervention, in order to deliver improved 
outcomes through these kinds of activities. It will 
also, over time, provide the income stream needed 
to repay investments in effective evidence-based 
programmes. 
21. A number of contributors to this Report 
have also commented that outcome-based 
contracts must be considered alongside the 
need for better local commissioning decisions 
in general. To make progress in rebalancing 
provision away from late intervention and onto 
new investment in Early Intervention, it will 
be important to deepen the skills base among 
commissioners in local authorities, health and 
well-being boards, and other local commissioning 
bodies. This is partly about learning to work 
better in partnership in order to identify local 
need, partly about developing engagement with a 
diverse provider base and partly about challenging 
(often inaccurate) received wisdom about how 
to set about procurement processes. The task of 
commissioning innovative provision from a diverse 
range of providers in the voluntary, mutual and 
private sectors is one that requires specific skills 
and attitudes. There are special problems which 
outcome-based contracting poses for smaller 
concerns that cannot carry the costs as easily as 
local authorities or large private providers. It is 
essential that they are not squeezed out of this 
developing market. 
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22. There have been successful efforts in the 
recent past to develop the skills and effectiveness 
of commissioners, in particular through the 
Third Sector Commissioning Programme, which 
has provided support and training to 4,000 
commissioners. The Government is currently 
considering whether to tender for a further phase 
of this programme. I believe that would be a 
helpful development. 
Using the Community Budget agenda to 
enable system reform and bring benefits 
to Early Intervention 
23. Community Budgets are a central part of 
the Government’s drive to improve services and 
outcomes across multiple organisations at local 
level. Community Budgets should enable a more 
flexible, integrated and cost-effective approach 
to delivering local services by removing artificial 
funding or legislative barriers to funding being 
pooled in order to facilitate the better design 
and commissioning of interventions. Community 
Budgets are designed to allow public spending 
by place (or local area) rather than by individual 
organisations or services, making it much easier for 
local leaders, working with their communities, to 
take an overview of the needs of their community, 
decide how money should be spent more 
effectively and provide innovative solutions to 
difficult problems. 
24. Tackling families with multiple needs is the 
centrepiece of the first phase of Community 
Budgets. Sixteen areas, covering 28 local 
authorities, are developing proposals with the 
ambition to use Community Budgets to deal with 
at least 10,000 troubled families over four years, by 
removing obstacles to multi-agency working and 
joining up funding streams in order to encourage 
service transformation. 
25. I welcome this focus on families with multiple 
needs, but if we are to break the cycle of 
disadvantage, it is also right that local authorities 
work together with other agencies in their areas 
to offer wider preventive support to all children 
and families that need it. In addressing families with 
multiple needs, local areas need advice on how to 
use Early Intervention policies and programmes, 
which will prevent these issues arising in the first 
place and well before they become intractable. 
The Government has announced the intention 
for Community Budgets to be available nationally 
by 2013, drawing on the learning from the first 
phase areas. I believe expanding Community 
Budgets to include Early Intervention in order to 
ensure that all babies, children and young people 
develop the social and emotional foundation skills 
to become school ready, life ready and child ready, 
and that additional help is offered to parents who 
need it so that they can nurture and develop their 
children, should become the standard practice for 
Community Budgets when they become available 
nationally. 
Early Intervention Places can advance the benefits 
of  Community Budgets 
26. Throughout the work of my review I have 
been encouraged by the level of interest and 
engagement of local areas. For my first report, 
27 local authorities expressed an interest in 
becoming Early Intervention Places. These areas 
have continued to engage with the review and 
want to be part of plans to improve the delivery  
of Early Intervention across the country. 
27. Eight of the local authorities that put 
themselves forward as Early Intervention Places 
are also operating Community Budgets already, 
removing barriers to system reform and providing 
more co-ordinated and streamlined intervention 
for the most troubled families. I am keen that all 
eight areas are given freedom to now extend their 
service redesign work to include Early Intervention 
services. These local authorities should have access 
to the same level of support as the local authorities 
operating the new Families with Multiple Problems 
Community Budgets. This should specifically 
include access to a Whitehall Champion, advances 
on the future years Early Intervention Grant and 
other kinds of specialist support in developing 
evidence-based approaches in order to enable 
strategy and systems change. 
28. My vision is that they should make best use 
of evidence-based programmes and practice – 
offering both best possible outcomes for children 
and young people and value for money. They will 
want to identify their own focus for this preventive 
work and identify how best they can reduce 
the number of families that go on to develop 
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multiple problems in the future. That could include 
using Sure Start children’s centres as a source of 
integrated support for targeting disadvantaged 
families of young children, offering integrated 
support to children with disabilities and/or special 
educational needs, local schools offering Early 
Intervention programmes, catch-up support or 
support to parents. Manchester City Council,  
for example, has pooled funding from a number  
of sources, including its Early Intervention Grants  
in order to fund more customer-focused 
preventive services. 
29. I want the best practice from the work of 
the Early Intervention Places to inform the wider 
roll-out of Community Budgets focusing on Early 
Intervention and families with multiple problems 
and would like the other Early Intervention Places 
to be at the forefront of this wider roll-out. 
They should start preparing now for Community 
Budgets so that they too can be at the cutting edge 
of system reform. 
30. The Early Intervention agenda is driven 
by local action. I would like to see all Early 
Intervention Places that are Community Budget 
areas working with the Department for Education 
and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government in order to consider how Community 
Budgets can be used to: 
•	carry out outcome-based contracts for Early 
Intervention; 
•	contract with social intermediaries for delivery 
of Early Intervention outcomes in their areas; 
•	incentivise individual organisations to make a 
contribution to Early Intervention investments, 
where the benefits accrue to multiple 
organisations; and 
•	make it easier to agree contracts over periods 
longer than traditional budgetary and political 
cycles, thus supporting a focus on longer-term 
outcomes. 
Recommendation 7 
The Early Intervention agenda is driven by 
local action. I recommend that government 
continues to support the joint working 
between the local Early Intervention 
Places and Community Budget areas 
which has arisen since the first Report.  
I further recommend that central and local 
government players agree how existing 
Community Budget areas should focus on 
Early Intervention alongside their work on 
families with multiple problems as soon as 
possible. The 27 Early Intervention Places 
that are not yet Community Budget areas 
should become part of this work at the 
earliest opportunity, and all Community 
Budget areas should be encouraged to 
focus on Early Intervention as a priority. 
Supporting and enabling the voluntary and 
community sector 
31. The evidence provided for my first report 
reinforced my view that voluntary and community 
sector (VCS) organisations play an important role 
in supporting and delivering Early Intervention 
policies and programmes. 
32. Local areas will want to draw on the strengths 
and experience of the sector as partners in 
understanding the needs of communities and 
in designing the right Early Intervention policies 
for their area. They will also want to ensure 
that their commissioning arrangements enable 
VCS partners to be effective delivery providers, 
where appropriate. VCS providers already play an 
important role in delivering Sure Start children’s 
centre services in many areas. But I received lots of 
evidence to demonstrate there is much more they 
can do. 
33. The VCS community both benefits from 
and is challenged by its diversity, with some 
major organisations that will wish to be involved 
in the design and delivery of Early Intervention 
programmes across many areas of the country and 
others that provide important services for one 
local authority or even one community or ward 
within a local authority. 
Chapter 3 A locally driven agenda 29 
34. Local areas should consider how their 
local Compact arrangements3 support capacity 
building for small VCS organisations and promote 
collaboration between organisations that wish 
to be involved in Early Intervention delivery. 
They should also consider how they can work 
in partnership with neighbouring local areas 
or regional partners in order to maximise the 
potential of VCS partners to contribute to Early 
Intervention. VCS partners have a key role to play 
in helping to realise the Government’s vision of 
strengthening civic society. 
35. Government departments with an interest in 
Early Intervention should also use their influence 
and strategic partnerships to help to build capacity 
at a local and national level; the Department 
for Education, for example, uses 4Children as a 
strategic partner for early years. 
36. I also believe that there is a role for the Early 
Intervention Foundation discussed in Chapter 4 
to broker effective partnership arrangements 
between VCS partners and the private and public 
sectors at national level. 
Empowering public service employees 
37. Early intervention should also benefit from 
plans to expand employee ownership of public 
services by increasing the number of new 
structures, including mutuals and co-operatives. 
38. There is increasing evidence that, where 
staff are given a real stake in the ownership and 
governance of the organisations they work for, 
productivity is increased, innovation encouraged 
and absenteeism reduced. Staff turnover is lower 
when employees feel they can influence the way 
their organisation works, and productivity can be 
up to 19% higher in organisations where staff feel 
they have a stake in success. 
39. Ownership also empowers employees to 
redesign services around the needs of their users 
and communities, and can ensure that services are 
more efficient. 
40. Groups of public sector staff working on 
Early Intervention could be encouraged to form 
organisations that challenge the current delivery 
model and deliver better outcomes. Public Service 
Mutuals, as promoted by the Mutuals Task Force, 
could be spun out of Early Intervention services 
and provide existing and innovative services in 
newly efficient and effective ways. Ideas developed 
within these mutuals could then help the overall 
development of Early Intervention services via 
adoption back into public, private and voluntary 
organisations. 
41. The governance, and some elements of 
ownership of these new Public Service Mutuals, 
could engage stakeholders other than employees 
with, for example, representatives of community 
or user groups on boards, or some direct 
ownership by these groups, thus encouraging 
greater co-production of services. 
42. For some areas where there are particular 
investment needs, and/or managerial 
improvements, Joint Venture Mutuals could be 
formed, which the evidence suggests would not 
have all of the innovation benefits of the Public 
Service Mutuals, but would allow smaller and 
medium-sized independent providers to contribute 
to the delivery of public services and to the 
development of a diverse range of providers that 
can improve quality through effective competition. 
43. Mutuals give genuine autonomy and room 
for innovation to frontline public servants. They 
can foster effective partnership working more 
easily than when constrained by silo working and 
bureaucracy. Because of their autonomy, capacity 
for innovation and better partnership working, 
they are well placed to attract inward investment, 
especially under outcome-based contracts. 
44. While measures considered in this chapter 
could help to increase investment in Early 
Intervention and help to deliver more outcomes 
from the same level of investment, they could not 
alone provide the additional investment required 
to achieve a major increase in the benefits on 
offer from Early Intervention. Chapter 5 therefore 
examines options to increase the levels of privately 
funded investment. 
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Chapter 4 
Building an Early Intervention Foundation 
I cannot fix on the hour, or the spot, or the look, or the words, that laid the 
foundation. It is too long ago. I was in the middle before I knew that 
I had begun. 
Jane Austen (Pride and Prejudice) 
1. I have outlined how, with decisive political 
leadership, government can change its own culture 
and create some new institutional frameworks 
internally to make a tremendous impact on 
rebalancing late and Early Intervention. However, 
government even then should not seek to do all 
that is required to take Early Intervention to the 
next phase on its own. It can be so much stronger 
by looking beyond central departments and using 
independent partners to make Early Intervention a 
success. There is a case for decentralising research 
and support functions from departments and 
their surrogates that can be done efficiently and 
independently elsewhere. The Government is 
not best placed to build the new market that is 
required in social finance, for instance, or to take 
a role in measuring progress against outcomes or 
determining when outcomes have been achieved. 
This would deter investors, who would infer that 
government has a vested interest in not paying 
returns. Like it or not, government’s record and 
reputation on entrepreneurialism, flexibility and 
nimbleness precedes it, and external partners can 
easily develop those qualities. 
2. My first report recommended the 
establishment of an Early Intervention Foundation 
to support local people, communities and 
agencies. I set out that the Foundation would 
have an important role in leadership, campaigning 
and motivation, help to expand and improve 
the provision of services, and encourage new 
investment for Early Intervention. I have looked 
further at the case for these functions to be 
carried out, and am now even more convinced 
of the need for an independent body to drive 
forward this important work. 
3. Since the recommendation to create an 
independent Early Intervention Foundation 
appeared in my first report, the Social Justice 
Cabinet Committee has welcomed my analysis of 
the issues. Subsequently, a group of heavyweight 
opinion formers in the field – in effect, a shadow 
board – have met to discuss taking this further. 
They include individuals from the Big Society Bank, 
the National Lottery, the Metropolitan Police, two 
large City Councils, the Mayor’s Fund for London, 
private financiers and others. Proposals are now 
at an advanced stage, with a concepts paper 
circulating among interested parties and a business 
plan being prepared. 
4. The existence of 27 Early Intervention Places, 
forward-looking local areas that wish to increase 
investment in Early Intervention, and the existence 
of potential investors will not alone be enough 
to facilitate the creation of an Early Intervention 
market. A wider supporting infrastructure is 
needed first in order to both provide evidence on 
programmes and champion Early Intervention. 
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5. Quite simply, without the right independent 
support, it will not be possible to unlock the 
massive savings from Early Intervention, create 
the conditions for attracting external investment 
to Early Intervention or for local areas and central 
government to agree suitable outcome-based 
contracts. Most importantly: 
•	Evidence needs to be available to commissioners 
and investors in order to show that programmes 
work and can make a return. For example, 
the Social Research Unit at Dartington is 
already engaged in discussions to make freely 
available to all local areas involved with the Early 
Intervention Foundation all the state-of-the-art 
research and advice from globally renowned 
experts such as Steve Aos in Washington State 
and Dell Elliott in Colorado. There is a role to 
ensure that the UK translation of this work is 
sufficient to meet the robust evidence needs  
of commissioners. 
•	There is a role to promote Early Intervention. 
Many providers, commissioners and potential 
investors are unaware of the broader social 
investment opportunities. There is a range of 
ways available to commissioners for increasing 
awareness, and it is important they understand 
all their options for harnessing the higher social 
and financial returns to be generated by Early 
Intervention. 
•	Support needs to be available to assure 
commissioners and investors that the roll-out 
and delivery of programmes can be managed 
effectively. 
•	In order to allow investors and commissioners 
to reach outcome-based agreements, they need 
to know that outcomes are being independently 
and robustly evaluated. 
•	Central government and local areas need to be 
able to agree commercially robust outcome-
based agreements. Many will have limited 
experience in agreeing similar contracts, and 
would require information or commercial 
support. 
6. I have considered the extent to which all of 
these functions could be carried out by existing 
institutions, including government, and believe 
that a new independent Early Intervention 
body is required to carry out at least some of 
these functions. It is important that the political 
leadership makes it clear that advice and help 
from outside Whitehall should be viewed as an 
opportunity and a complement to departmental 
activity and not a threat to it. 
Recommendation 8 
I recommend that ministers take 
a positive leadership role on the 
independent Early Intervention 
Foundation in encouraging local areas 
and philanthropic and private institutional 
investors to continue their exploration of 
setting up a Foundation to complement, 
from the outside, the work that is 
beginning inside Whitehall. 
Functions of  an independent 
Early Intervention Foundation 
A: A centre to champion and promote 
Early Intervention 
7. This review has found that there is a massively 
dominant late intervention culture that needs 
to be better balanced with Early Intervention. 
Early Intervention needs a voice, and a national 
campaigning and motivation capability. 
8. There is no single authoritative voice in 
the Early Intervention market on what works, 
particularly in a user friendly format. The 
Foundation could promote a consistent approach 
to evaluating the effectiveness of Early Intervention 
policies and programmes, and promote consistent 
support to commissioners of Early Intervention 
services. For example, while the review has found 
that the Centre for Excellence and Outcomes in 
Children and Young People’s Services (C4EO) is 
currently providing important evidence building 
and capacity building services to local areas, and 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence is producing guidance on social and 
emotional well-being in early years, there is no 
single focus on Early Intervention. In my view, the 
existing bodies alone will not be able to provide all 
the evidence that is required for commissioners, 
providers and investors. Neither will they be able 
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to provide a single framework to co-ordinate and 
disseminate that information. The information the 
Foundation will capture will be used to support 
local areas in making investment decisions, and 
support locally agreed outcome-based contracts. 
9. As the complex world of contracting and 
investing develops, the Early Intervention 
Foundation could act on behalf of the broader 
Early Intervention community to highlight 
obstacles, and bad and good practice, and speak 
up for local people and areas, not least to central 
government, so that Early Intervention can be 
more easily facilitated. 
B: Improving the evidence base so that 
investment is targeted on what works 
10. As was set out in Chapters 2 and 3, improving 
the evidence base is critically important in order to 
drive improved social and emotional outcomes for 
babies, children and young people, and to give local 
areas the information they need to make the case 
to invest. It would be expensive and impractical 
for every single local authority to individually 
reinvent the wheel in order to create or access the 
information they need when one Foundation could 
pull it together for all the key evidence building and 
disseminating functions that need to be in place. 
Some of the key functions are set out below: 
What does it involve? Detail 
Collect information from programmes (and other 
evidence building bodies) of key historical output 
and outcome data, and of characteristics of the 
specific programmes. 
Evidence of which programmes are best at 
delivering outcomes is currently limited, and 
existing evidence is currently held by a range of 
different bodies. There are also significant gaps in 
the evidence covered. There is a case for evidence 
to be brought together and to improve the quality. 
Agree a methodology and analyse that data. This 
would inform the creation of a list of high-quality 
programmes that meet the agreed methodology. 
Analysing data against a set methodology, 
which would be tailored towards providing 
commissioners with the information they need, 
in the form of a list, to make outcome-focused 
investment decisions. 
Publish that data in an accessible format. Publishing information that is freely available to 
commissioners, investors and delivery bodies. This 
could be done as a virtual tool, with evidence on 
programmes provided, using a Kitemark system, 
with the Foundation confirming that certain 
programmes deliver an agreed standard. 
Provide minimum standards for investment 
criteria to investors who wish to have evidence of 
programmes that are not in the list. 
In some circumstances an intermediary may wish 
to invest a proportion of its funds in programmes 
that are not on the list, where it believes untested 
programmes could have a real benefit. In these 
circumstances it may look to an institution to 
provide evidence on whether those programmes 
meet a minimum standard (rather than the ‘list 
standard’ which would require further testing 
to assess). 
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What does it involve? Detail 
Develop and maintain a directory/database of 
research and evaluation on Early Intervention. 
Commission or advise on further research to 
support investment in Early Intervention. 
Research and evaluation evidence will provide 
important information to influence policy makers 
and to inform commissioners and investors. 
Making all relevant research and evaluation 
available in one place will enhance the ability to 
influence and inform. There is also a case for 
centralising how new research and evaluation 
is commissioned using common standards and 
criteria. There is a range of studies on the  
cost-effectiveness of programmes, but they often 
use different methods and criteria, which makes 
comparative analysis difficult. The evidence base 
for Early Intervention would also benefit from 
additional longitudinal research; the Foundation 
would develop the best expertise to advise on 
or commission such research, for example on 
complex problems, complex measures, and 
comprehensive longitudinal evaluation of Early 
Years Intervention on the lives of our children. 
There is also a case for the intermediary/ 
Early Intervention body to be able to draw on 
funding from existing research budgets, for 
example the Economic and Social Research 
Council and the Medical Research Council. 
11. It is important that both the contracting body 
(local areas or local areas and central government) 
and the intermediary have confidence in the 
evidence available, including the strength of any 
list of programmes. The intermediary particularly 
needs to be sure that the information is accurate 
in order for it to make sound investment decisions. 
An independent body would be best suited to 
support this objective. 
12. It is important that the evidence base is 
provided in a clear and accessible format, drawing 
together rather than duplicating existing evidence. 
Duplication would not only create inefficiency, but 
could create an unco-ordinated picture of Early 
Intervention. The Foundation will work closely with 
existing research institutions already examining 
evidence across a range of social programmes, not 
least the Social Research Unit mentioned earlier. 
In addition, C4EO already gathers national and 
regional data for a number of Early Intervention 
programmes, and a number of local areas have 
come together to form the Local Authorities 
Research Consortium (LARC), increasing the 
evidence base through a locally led solution. 
C: Increasing awareness of  social investment 
opportunities in Early Intervention 
13. Chapter 6 sets out some of the limitations 
on introducing investment for Early Intervention, 
including the fact that the social investment class is 
still being developed and is not widely understood. 
Many potential investors would not proactively 
consider investing in Early Intervention. It may 
therefore be necessary to provide information 
in order to increase awareness of the benefits of 
social investment in Early Intervention. 
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What does it involve? Detail 
Help to make potential investors aware of the 
range of investment opportunities available in 
early year interventions. 
Increase awareness to potential investors (for 
example, high net worth individuals) of the range 
of investment opportunities available. 
D: Improving fidelity and developing Early 
Intervention programmes for roll-out 
14. Best practice evidence can focus on how 
efficiently services are delivered across a range of 
providers, and demonstrate the case for focusing 
on fidelity of programmes. 
15. While information alone of what works could 
have significant benefits, additional benefits could 
be achieved through giving providers support to 
introduce and roll out programmes, and ensure 
that comprehensive packages of Early Intervention 
policies are installed, not just individual ‘magic 
bullets’. A franchising model could support the 
wider implementation of Early Intervention 
programmes within the UK by boosting fidelity, 
generating innovation and providing a financial 
incentive to succeed. 
What does it involve? Detail 
Provide evidence of best practice in order 
to show how positive outcomes can be best 
delivered by a specific programme. 
Would require the collection of specific delivery 
practice, including evidence on its effectiveness. 
Would allow individual providers to make 
improvements by drawing on the successes of 
others. It would also support commissioners 
and investors in demanding higher standards of 
delivery from providers, both supporting value for 
money and the overall level of outcomes. 
Provide support to providers in order to allow 
them to implement best practice in existing 
programmes, or roll out new programmes with a 
focus on fidelity. 
This would involve providers accessing a package 
of support that assists with implementation and 
delivery of programmes. This could be based on a 
franchise model. 
E: Acting as a source of  advice on social 
investment for Early Intervention 
16. It would be possible for local areas and central 
government to reach their own outcome-based 
agreements with an intermediary or provider, 
with no wider brokering role needed. However, 
this may not on its own create the optimal 
outcome for both parties. Local areas may not 
have sufficient information, including information 
on the terms agreed from wider outcome-based 
contracts from Early Intervention, to drive the best 
deal for the taxpayer. A potential brokerage role 
could involve the following: 
What does it involve? Detail 
Support investment agreements made between 
the public sector and the private sector by 
providing information on what efficient costs are; 
and what a realistic and sufficiently challenging set 
of outcome based targets are. 
Establish what economic and efficient delivery 
costs should be for a specific set of programmes 
in a specific area and what outcomes are realistic, 
so an investment agreement can be based on 
robust evidence. This could involve providing an 
assessment of whether proposed agreements 
are economic and efficient, and take a value-for­
money approach to risk transfer. 
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17. There is a pressing need for a specific 
independent Early Intervention body to provide 
information on efficient costs, best practice and 
the types of interventions that could be specified 
in a contract. This needs to develop over time 
and be led by what local areas and commissioners 
demand. I am conscious of learning the lessons 
from the history of private finance initiative/public 
private partnerships, which demonstrated that the 
need to keep privately financed deals transparent 
for the public and to test whether private finance 
offers value and suggests an accessible independent 
resource to backup contracting is essential. 
18. Existing local government bodies or 
sponsoring departments could provide support to 
local areas. For contracts where Treasury approval 
is required, there may be a case for the Major 
Project Authority to provide scrutiny over the 
exact contracting arrangements. Such an approach 
would utilise existing expertise and capability, 
with the ability to draw on wider expertise across 
outcome-based or payment by results contracts. 
F: Confirming whether outcomes have been 
achieved 
19. Investors have informed this review of the 
need to have independent validation of outcomes 
in place. Local areas would also need to know 
that they are only paying for outcomes that have 
actually been achieved. The table below sets 
out the specific functions that would need to be 
carried out and in which investors would need to 
have confidence. 
What does it involve? Detail 
Assess whether outcomes have been achieved 
as agreed in outcome-based contracts. 
This would involve measuring outcomes (for 
example, child attendance record at school) and 
assessing whether the outcomes achieved meet the 
targets agreed in contracts. 
Trigger outcome-based payments. This would involve informing the Government 
or local authority of the payments and timing of 
payments that are contractually committed. The 
public sector entity would be committed to making 
the payments confirmed by the institution. 
The Early Intervention Foundation could consider taking this role in the longer term. 
G: A franchise function? 
20. There are a number of proven Early 
Intervention programmes that are currently 
delivered outside of the UK. Introducing those 
programmes to the UK would require them to be 
developed according to a UK context, reflecting 
different social and cultural norms. It is also the 
case that a number of existing UK programmes 
only operate in particular areas of the country, and 
rolling them out more widely may require support. 
An independent body could introduce a franchise 
model to help to both make programmes UK 
ready and support effective roll-out. Further detail 
on a franchise option is provided in Annex D. 
H: Providing support to enable the voluntary 
and community sector to contribute to 
Early Intervention delivery 
21. I have already mentioned the important 
role voluntary and community sector (VCS) 
organisations play in supporting and delivering 
Early Intervention policies and programmes. 
While the primary responsibility for supporting 
the VCS community must lie with local areas 
and government, there is a need to support VCS 
organisations to play a crucial role – passing on 
the latest information to the field; and brokering 
partnerships, locally, regionally and nationally, 
offering them a forum to directly influence evolving 
policy on Early Intervention. 
22. In the first instance, the Foundation will 
concentrate on Functions A, B, C, D and E of the 
analysis provided earlier. This will provide evidence 
to commissioners of which programmes work 
towards outcomes for children and families – with 
the aim of continually updating the list attached at 
Annex A, and agreeing the methodology by which 
this is done. 
Creating the Foundation 
23. Subsequent to my first report, the Social 
Justice Cabinet Committee has welcomed my 
analysis of the issues and has outlined that this 
work should be developed independent of 
government. As I set out in my first report, a long-
term and sustained focus on Early Intervention 
will be crucial in order to break down inter-
generational cycles of dysfunction. It is therefore 
important that an Early Intervention Foundation is 
for the long term and is sustainable. I believe that 
an Endowment Fund is the best way to provide 
that certainty and provide year-on-year funding 
for staffing, research, training and dissemination 
of information. 
24. Serious work has started on a business case 
to deliver an independent Foundation, and I 
recommend that, once the business case is fully 
worked up, a £20 million endowment is created 
to sustain an independent Early Intervention 
Foundation. I will therefore be approaching non­
government institutions, foundations, charities and 
the private sector to support up to £10 million of 
funding, with the proviso that government co-fund 
it in order to kick-start the endowment Fund. 
A stable and secure future for the Foundation 
will have a significant impact on the ability of local 
areas to effectively drive forward additional Early 
Intervention investment. Its financial independence 
will make it less vulnerable to those who might 
be challenged by it carrying out its functions. As 
the Foundation becomes established and trusted 
by investors and commissioners, it will be able to 
attract further contributions to the endowment 
and develop income streams from services that 
will give it even stronger financial independence. 
25. At this early stage in the development of Early 
Intervention, it is clear that central government 
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requires greater information in order to support 
outcome-based payments made out of savings. 
The Foundation would wish to work in close 
partnership with central government and I would 
be happy for central government departments 
to also utilise the information capabilities of the 
Foundation in order to drive forward external 
investment in Early Intervention through outcome-
based contracts. Given these benefits, there is 
a case for government to procure the services 
of the Foundation over time, as it demonstrates 
its effectiveness in supporting Early Intervention 
outcomes. 
Recommendation 9 
I recommend, once the business case 
is fully worked up, the creation of a 
£20 million endowment to sustain an 
independent Early Intervention Foundation 
and that the Prime Minister issues a bold 
challenge to external funders from the 
private, charitable and local government 
sectors that if they create an Early 
Intervention Foundation to drive progress, 
government will support them with  
co-funding. 
Meeting local needs 
26. It is evident throughout this chapter that 
local areas will drive the agenda of, and be the 
main beneficiaries of, the new Foundation. It is 
important that a bedding-in period takes place. 
I do not propose that an Early Intervention body 
would need immediately to have a direct financial 
role, or direct contractual relationships with local 
areas or government. However, I do want to keep 
the options open in a rapidly developing situation, 
hence I have considered the scope for a specific 
Early Intervention body to provide a wider support 
and brokering role, not least with local areas. This 
role could include: 
•	Providing information to local areas to support 
specific contracting decisions, including the 
specification of contracts. 
40 Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive Savings 
•	Providing specialist Early Intervention resource 
that individual intermediaries or providers could 
buy. For example, that could include expertise 
on specific programmes or Early Intervention 
delivery, including the tailoring of them to 
local contexts. 
•	Helping to attract investment into funds, 
managed and owned externally, of the 
Early Intervention body. 
•	Over the longer term, using its own funds, 
raised from investors, to invest in intermediaries 
or providers delivering Early Intervention 
outcomes. 
27. It would be for local areas exercising their 
influence as Early Intervention places, or through 
their representatives on the Foundation board, 
to decide whether they want support from such 
a body to help with contracting. It would also be 
for individual intermediaries to decide whether 
they wanted to purchase additional resource from 
the Early Intervention Foundation, or provide it 
themselves. However, I believe the availability of 
that resource could help to provide local areas and 
intermediaries or providers with the confidence 
they need to enter into contracts. 
28. If the Early Intervention Foundation were to 
carry out these roles, alongside its core evidence 
and championing role, it could create a conflict of 
interests. One option to consider here would be 
to create a clear separation between the evidence 
building and outcome measurement role, and the 
direct financial role. 
29. It would be perfectly possible to create a core 
Early Intervention body responsible for building 
the evidence base, providing support to areas on 
fidelity, and having an overall championing role: 
30. Separately, there could be a subsidiary body 
with a commercial focus, responsible for helping to 
broker contracts, advising on investment decisions 
and managing relationships with investors. This is 
an issue that will be driven by the demands of the 
local areas, investors and commissioners, and it can 
be addressed by the Early Intervention Foundation 
board as and when necessary. 
31. Crucially, local areas need to understand all 
the finance options they have in order to secure 
investment in these programmes. Given the 
long-term nature of Early Intervention, there’s 
a critical role to play in maintaining momentum 
for this work over time. This will secure the best 
outcomes for the children and families in their 
area, and deliver savings. 
32. By being wholly independent of government, 
an independent body will have greater credibility 
and certainty of funding than relying solely 
on existing bodies that have closer links to 
government. Central government will also benefit 
from the evidence-based investment, but any 
Foundation must have local support and be locally 
driven. I consider that central government has an 
interest in enabling local areas to procure these 
services and to access the information provided by 
an independent Foundation. 
Recommendation 10 
I recommend that, beginning with the 
27 existing Early Intervention Places, 
local areas should drive the work of 
the independent Early Intervention 
Foundation to start the process of 
procuring the services, develop core 
evidence building, fidelity and outcome 
measurement functions, and that they 
should be strongly represented on 
its board. 
33. The following chapters look at the potential 
for investment in Early Intervention to form part 
of the UK social investment market and different 
financial models for attracting investors and 
structuring their investments. 
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Chapter 5 
External finance through outcome-based 
Early Intervention contracts 
Disruptive behaviour disorders, including conduct disorder, affect at least 
10% of children and are the most common reasons for referral to children’s 
mental health services. The long-term economic impact on society of 
unresolved conduct disorder can exceed £1 million for one individual over 
their lifetime.1 
Outcome-based contracts 
1. In Chapter 3, I noted the opportunities to 
improve the commissioning of Early Intervention, 
through better use of evidence-based programmes 
and through tighter management, with the 
introduction of an element of outcome-based 
contracting. 
2. Paying providers only when successful delivery 
has occurred also transfers risk out of the public 
sector. It should also help to stimulate greater 
innovation and competition, and will also strongly 
incentivise delivery bodies to focus on outcomes  
in order to receive payments. 
3. Outcome-based contracts require a 
transformational shift in the way public services 
are commissioned and designed. The model is 
desirable because: 
•	it limits the need for public services to continue 
to pay for poor quality services that fail by linking 
payments to demonstrable improvements in 
outcomes; 
•	it recognises that other providers working with 
disadvantaged young people might be better at 
delivering the desired results; 
•	it reduces the need for government to be 
directly involved in the delivery of social 
outcomes and increases the scope for social 
ventures and charities to become more directly 
involved; and 
•	incentives are strengthened – no result, no 
payment; the better the result, the greater 
the payment. 
4. It is clear to me that paying service providers 
for the social outcomes they deliver is a core 
component of service delivery if we want to take 
the Early Intervention agenda forward. It fits in 
with the Government’s public service reform 
agenda, and offers scope for new programme 
providers to help deliver ‘better for less’. 
5. I have seen that a number of departments 
are already pioneering outcome-based contract 
models (i.e. the Department for Work and 
Pensions’ Work Programme for longer term 
benefit claimants; Ministry of Justice pilot for 
reducing re-offending; and the Department 
for Education’s business plan to explore the 
introduction of greater outcome-based  
contracts for Sure Start children’s centres).  
If the co-ordination that I have recommended  
in Chapters 1 and 2 takes hold, this will be  
just a start. 
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6. Although the rebalancing of late to Early 
Intervention within existing budgets is entirely 
practical, it is highly improbable in the current 
economic climate that additional expenditure 
through traditional public spending routes 
will occur. 
7. I believe that outcome-based contracting could 
also be used for services and programmes funded 
through external investment in Early Intervention. 
However, it will not be appropriate for delivering 
all public services or social goals. This may be 
because we do not know enough about current 
performance to be able to work out how to pay 
for success or the outcomes we seek may be too 
complex and diverse. Nevertheless, outcome-
based contracts, as a model, are a significant step 
forward and underpin the suggestions in this 
Report. Early Intervention needs to be at the front 
of this new learning curve. 
8. This method poses some limitations for smaller 
delivery bodies that might not be able to wait for 
payment in order to provide their services, or 
who are less confident at winning public sector 
contracts against larger providers. It may also be 
harder for smaller organisations to raise working 
capital through other means (such as bank loans), 
and often more costly for them to do so than it is 
for larger organisations. 
9. Building on the social impact bond (SIB) model 
may offer a possible alternative solution. This 
still enables commissioners to pay for outcomes, 
and therefore to transfer risk outside the public 
sector. But rather than placing the risk on those 
delivering Early Intervention, this model could 
potentially draw on external finance from investors 
to take the delivery risk. Investors, through use of 
an intermediary, provide the working capital for 
the delivery providers, and receive their money 
back (plus a return) only where delivery has been 
successful. 
10. More detail on building up outcome-based 
contracts for Early Intervention can be found in 
Annex F. We describe two models: in one local 
and central government pay providers the return; 
in the other they pay an intermediary the return. 
The case for external finance 
11. Given the tight constraints on public 
expenditure, the plain truth is that only 
reprioritisation of public spending within current 
limits or the introduction of external finance will 
make it possible to increase Early Intervention 
investment to anything like the required level. 
12. While bringing in external finance will 
diversify income sources for Early Intervention and 
hopefully create a future private market for social 
investment, ultimately the decision to use external 
finance needs to be based on rigorous value for 
money testing. That being so, it is important to 
maximise the additional benefits which external 
finance can achieve for Early Intervention when 
structured round outcome-based payments. These 
are summarised in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of key benefits of using external finance under an outcome-based contract model 
with an intermediary 
Potential benefit Detail 
Public sector pays only 
where successful outcomes 
delivered 
External investors could take risk associated with poor administration 
or management of Early Intervention programmes away from the 
taxpayer. Investors pay the penalty for failure to achieve the intended 
outcomes, rather than the taxpayer. 
By entering into a risk-for-reward agreement, external investors may 
be incentivised to ensure that the interventions chosen and the actual 
provision achieve positive outcomes. 
Better resources for 
management of risk. Greater 
due diligence and monitoring 
of programmes and 
interventions 
An intermediary may have greater time and resources to support 
outcome-based decisions and to monitor whether success is on track, 
and the incentives to find alternatives where this is not the case. 
Greater funding certainty External finance could provide greater funding certainty beyond 
existing public sector budgetary horizons. This could help to improve 
performance and give the sector confidence to take decisions to 
scale up. 
Higher standards of delivery Outcome-based payments also provide incentives to the intermediary 
to ensure that the programmes achieve the agreed objectives in a 
cost-effective way. 
Innovation and competition Through an outcome-based contract, the commissioner can leave the 
intermediary free to choose what are the most effective programmes 
and ways of delivery, hence increasing the scope for innovation. 
13. External finance (by which I mean money 
which comes from outside the public sector) has 
been used by the present and recent previous 
governments across several different areas of 
public expenditure, particularly through the Private 
Finance Initiative and other forms of public private 
partnerships. Important lessons must be learnt 
from those examples. 
14. Investors will require a return for their 
investment, and will usually expect their principal 
investment back. Where there is a reduced chance 
that they will receive their principal amount back, 
they will require a higher return. At first glance 
this seems more expensive than the public sector 
borrowing options, were these allowed. However, 
there are a number of additional benefits that 
can be gained through using external finance. 
For instance, through use of outcome-based 
payments the public sector is reducing the chances 
of having to pay out the full amount, which may 
mean delivery ends up being cheaper. It can mean 
that risk is transferred to those who have better 
resources and the skills to manage the risks, which 
in turn should result in a more effective delivery 
of outcomes than would otherwise have been 
achieved. However, the private sector investors 
will accept risk transfer only in areas they have 
control over, where the can influence the outcome 
and manage their exposure. 
15. In some cases the introduction of external 
investment in public provision has indeed given 
good value to the taxpayer, with an appropriate 
balance between risk transfer and payment of 
reward. However, when the correct balance is 
not struck it can provide poor value for money, 
because private investors receive high rewards and 
may assume little or no risk. If the public sector 
knows what to do and how to achieve it, then if 
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it were possible, it would usually be cheaper for 
them to borrow the money through the usual 
routes. The issue of risk is crucial in making the 
case for external finance for Early Intervention. 
Would external investors accurately assess the 
risks associated with Early Intervention? Would 
they assume an appropriate share of them? Above 
all, would external investors manage the risks 
expertly and efficiently so that Early Intervention 
can achieve its promised benefits for children 
and families and produce value for money for 
the taxpayer? All these issues need to be worked 
through with the government machinery, the Early 
Intervention Foundation and the developing Social 
Finance markets already mentioned. 
16. I believe that external finance can deliver 
despite these difficulties, providing that appropriate 
information and evidence are available to investors 
and intermediaries. I set out later the role of the 
Early Intervention Foundation in helping to provide 
that information and evidence. Early Intervention 
is largely unknown territory for external 
investors and the role of the Early Intervention 
Foundation will be important in raising awareness 
and confidence. 
Recommendation 11 
I recommend that, given the public 
expenditure situation, we need to be much 
more creative in finding additional (not 
substitute) non-government money. The 
social goal of Early Intervention and the 
design of new instruments should be tightly 
coupled together so that the instruments 
do not lose their raison d’être, as happened 
in the past with Private Finance Initiatives. 
This will require outcome-based contracts 
coupled with external investment. 
Government and local areas can pay for 
results from the savings that they will make. 
Requirements for an effective outcome-
based commissioning agreement 
17. It will be vital to get the details right in 
any outcome-based payment agreements for 
Early Intervention. Hence my proposals in 
earlier chapters about the governmental and 
non-governmental institutional arrangements 
necessary to provide the preparatory work. Five 
issues will require particular attention: 
Measurable outcomes 
18. The outcomes specified in an outcome-based 
agreement need to be easily quantifiable and 
measurable, in order to be able to demonstrate 
whether an outcome has been achieved and a 
payment should be made. An outcome-based 
contract could focus on one specific outcome or a 
broader basket of outcomes. 
19. As I have already mentioned in Chapter 2, 
there may be a long time between an intervention 
and its outcome. So, for instance, it may take some 
years to establish whether an Early Intervention 
programme has successfully prevented a child from 
being excluded to a Pupil Referral Unit (PRU). 
However, on the other hand, the 0–5 assessments 
suggested earlier would enable statistics on school 
readiness to be more easily collected, measured 
and monetised; in addition, other interim indicators 
could be measured to check whether the child 
is on track or not. So at primary school it could 
be possible to measure whether additional non­
teaching assistant time has been required, while at 
secondary school truancy rates and incidence of 
antisocial behaviour could be measured as interim 
proxies prior to exclusion. 
20. Care would need to be taken to ensure 
that any measurements chosen did not enable 
providers to be rewarded on the basis of achieving 
easier outputs, which do not have a long-term 
positive effect on breaking down inter-generational 
cycles of dysfunction. It would be especially 
important to avoid rewarding providers in a tick-
box fashion simply for achieving a certain level of 
activity (for example, so many visits to families in 
a certain time) regardless of whether that activity 
achieved any useful result. Table 5.2 sets out 
examples of the type of potential outcomes that 
existing Early Intervention programmes can deliver. 
We have used Family Nurse Partnerships (FNP), 
Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and Incredible 
Years programmes. I am not suggesting that 
these outcomes are prioritised; they are merely 
examples of what positive outcomes can be 
delivered by Early Intervention programmes. 
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Table 5.2: Some examples of Early Intervention outcomes from three programmes. 
FNP FFT Incredible 
Years 
Improvements in mothers’ mental health and/or self-esteem ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reduction in children’s attendance at emergency departments ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reduced incidence of child abuse ✓ ✓ 
Improvement in parenting competencies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Vulnerable parents’ attendance at antenatal classes ✓ 
Reduced sadness and depression in children ✓ ✓ 
Reduced hyperactive behaviour ✓ 
Increased child well-being in several aspects ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reductions in conduct problems ✓ 
Reductions in the use of tobacco, drugs and alcohol ✓ 
Fewer marital or relationship breakdowns by age 25 ✓ ✓ 
Positive effects on child behaviour and parenting in specific 
areas 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reductions in domestic abuse ✓ ✓ 
Increased participation in positive activities and volunteering ✓ 
Increased participation in education, employment or training ✓ ✓ 
Reduction in teenage pregnancies and repeat pregnancies.  
FNP – also reduction in subsequent pregnancies and births as 
well as longer interval before birth of next child 
✓ ✓ 
Reduction in first-time entrants to justice system and 
re-offending 
✓ 
Fewer arrests ✓ 
Reductions in antisocial behaviour ✓ 
Improved cognitive development ✓ 
Improved behavioural, social and emotional development ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Fewer mothers experiencing postnatal depression within the 
first three months after giving birth 
✓ 
Improvements in school attainment ✓ ✓ 
A good early home learning environment ✓ ✓ 
Fewer children living in households that are dependent on out­
of-work benefits or Child Tax Credit 
✓ ✓ 
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21. It is important that both the public sector 
and investors have confidence that outcomes will 
be measured accurately, and that steps will be 
taken to mitigate the risk of data manipulation. 
Importantly, investors have made it clear to the 
review team that independent verification of 
outcomes delivery will be essential in encouraging 
them to invest. The review has examined existing 
arrangements for monitoring and measuring 
outcomes, and I believe there are currently gaps in 
the provision of these important functions. These 
issues and a way forward to resolve this shortfall 
are explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Well-defined target population 
22. A target population will need to be defined in 
a way that cannot be manipulated by either of the 
parties. For example, in the Peterborough prison 
pilot (see below), the contractual arrangement 
defined the target population as all offenders in the 
prison with a sentence of less than 12 months. A 
tightly defined population will reduce the potential 
for unwanted ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’, or, where 
variations in the target population are observed, 
can provide tiered incentives to ensure that those 
children who are going to be most difficult to 
support are given all the help they need. 
Causal link and perverse incentives 
23. A clear link between the Early Intervention 
in place and the result needs to be established to 
ensure that the contracting parties are: 
•	paid for the outcomes they are responsible for; 
and 
•	not paid for positive outcomes that are not 
directly related to the intervention (deadweight). 
Deadweight should be minimised but it is 
unlikely that a contractual arrangement could 
eliminate all. This will need to be factored in the 
price the commissioner is willing to pay for the 
outcomes. 
24. The causal link could be established through 
randomised controls and longitudinal data where 
there is a clearly defined and appropriate control 
group and an agreed baseline. For example, it 
would be possible to measure the proportion of 
young people who have received a final warning 
or referral order, both within a cohort who 
receive an intervention and a cohort who do not. 
Effectively targeting the right cohort of children is 
essential in achieving long-term future savings. 
25. Targeting a variety of Early Interventions to 
the same population is likely to achieve the desired 
impact on social and emotional capabilities yet 
may make the establishment of a causal link more 
difficult, and could create perverse incentives for 
investors to rely on other interventions being 
undertaken elsewhere. Where there are a number 
of programmes aimed towards the same outcome 
for the same cohort, there could be a case for a 
single intermediary/delivery provider to deliver all 
those interventions. This would involve a larger 
intermediary/delivery provider with responsibility 
for investment and delivery across a range of ages. 
26. Commissioners will have regard for a wide 
range of outcomes, not all of which will be 
explicitly included in an outcome-based agreement. 
By rewarding only the achievement of particular 
outcomes, there is a risk that other important 
objectives are jeopardised. 
Definitions of ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ 
Providers are increasingly being paid by results, rather than a flat fee. There are two particular risks 
associated with this approach. The first is that of ‘creaming’, or cherry picking, where contractors 
who are paid by results are likely to concentrate their efforts on those people who are most easily 
‘cured’. The second is that of ‘parking’ where participants who are deemed most difficult to ‘cure’ 
receive a bare minimum of services and are unlikely to make any progress while participating in a 
programme. In this way providers seek to maximise their profit, focusing on customers who will 
earn them outcome payments, while spending as little as possible on customers who will not. 
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27. There is a potential conflict of interest 
between investors who want to make investments 
over, say, a period of between five and seven 
years, and the beneficiaries of Early Intervention 
who benefit over a longer time period. This could 
lead to investors pushing for programmes with 
shorter-term measurable outcomes, rather than 
programmes that maximise outcomes. The use of 
interim proxy measures will therefore be crucial. 
Establishing the right price for outcomes 
28. To enter an outcome-based contract, 
commissioners will need to be able to calculate 
the value that they place on the agreed outcomes. 
The price of the outcome can, but not necessarily, 
be linked to the amount of cashable savings that 
the interventions generate. We need to ensure 
that outcomes are improved for a sufficiently large 
cohort of the population in local areas to enable 
the decommissioning of services to ensure future 
cashable savings are achieved. However, positive 
outcomes can also deliver social benefits that may 
not necessarily deliver cashable savings. I accept 
that the need to link outcomes to cashable savings 
may be critical in the current financial climate, but 
it is important to avoid focusing exclusively on 
outcomes which offer immediately quantifiable 
savings to current budgets. The rewards of Early 
Intervention are long term and long lasting and 
typically outlive all of the holders of current 
budgets. As mentioned in Chapter 2, government 
and local areas should be working together to 
attach prices to the outcomes that they wish to 
achieve. This work should be the responsibility 
of the Task and Finish Group referred to earlier 
which should be held to account for progress. 
Recommendation 12 
I recommended that the Social Justice 
Committee commissions the Early 
Intervention Task and Finish Group (see 
Recommendation 5) to work with the 
Early Intervention Foundation to assess 
the financial and economic value of 
outcomes, to inform better decision 
making by commissioners of services.  
This should also assess the extent to which 
cashable savings can be made, to whom 
the savings would accrue and over 
what timescale. 
Cashability of  savings and affordability 
29. Local areas or central government may enter 
Early Intervention outcome-based contracts on the 
basis that they would generate sufficient cashable 
savings to pay the contracting parties. Payments 
are, however, linked to the achieved outcomes 
and not to whether local or central government 
manage to realise any cashable savings from 
them. Hence, local or central government take a 
budgeting risk and will need to ensure that funds 
are available to honour the contract even if it does 
not generate additional cash resources to make 
the payments. The actual cost of dealing with a 
particular issue may rise for reasons which have 
nothing to do with Early Intervention. Indeed, late 
intervention, in not reducing the flow of problems, 
has to address this all the time. For example, 
Early Intervention should reduce the requirement 
for children to be taken into care, but a local 
authority may still find itself taking more children 
into care after an Early Intervention programme 
is completed, simply because more children from 
dysfunctional families have become part of its 
population. It may take a number of interventions, 
over a number of years, to reach a point where 
unmet need is reduced sufficiently to close a care 
home down, for instance. This indicates that, in 
the short term, it may not be possible to rely 
entirely on cashable savings being delivered before 
an outcome is paid for. Nevertheless, there is 
strong and mounting evidence to suggest that Early 
Intervention can deliver significant cashable savings 
for local areas in the longer term. 
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30. For commissioners to be able to generate 
cashable savings, the following conditions are 
required: 
•	the savings generated need to be part of a 
budget controlled by the commissioner, hence 
reinforcing the need for pooling all relevant 
budgets; 
•	costs respond to the decline in demand (i.e. they 
are variable as opposed to fixed); and 
•	no additional demand on resources (for 
example, if social services no longer have to 
deal with family X, they would need to be able 
to pull that resource away rather than redeploy 
that resource to another family lower down the 
priority list). 
An effective Early Intervention contract 
31. An effective Early Intervention contract should 
be focused on delivering a number of important 
and measurable outcomes. Table 5.3 sets out 
how these outcomes will be seen over a number 
of years. 
32. There is therefore a choice as to how the local 
and central government attach a financial value to 
the delivery of specific outcomes. Those values 
could either be based on shorter-term outcome 
measure, over say a seven-year period, but that 
would restrict the financial value of outcomes to a 
more limited set of cashable savings. Alternatively, 
the financial value could reflect savings over a 
much longer period, but investors would also need 
to change their expectations relating to the period 
over which they receive a return. 
Paying returns: would agreements be 
reached at the local or national level? 
33. In the short run, benefits will accrue to central 
government departments as well as to local areas. 
So central government will need to play a role in 
co-commissioning or co-paying the outcomes set 
by local areas. 
34. Central or local government could take 
the lead in contracting to make payments at a 
local, regional or national level with the aid of a 
social intermediary and the Early Intervention 
Foundation. The approach required may differ. 
For example, while a locally driven arrangement 
seems preferable, and better for smaller-scale 
projects, a larger scale national approach could be 
needed to help kick-start work and for contracts 
where economies of scale are required to make a 
contract viable. 
35. There is currently only one SIB in existence 
(Peterborough), which involves central 
government contracting with an intermediary, 
although Social Finance, which developed the 
SIB idea, is developing more. For local areas, the 
accounting will be different. Local areas have used 
Table 5.3: Some examples of the savings from Early Intervention aiming to support children to be 
school ready and life ready 
Cashable savings  
1–5 years 
Cashable outcomes 
6–11 years 
Cashable outcomes 
beyond 11 years 
Intervention X 
(school ready) 
Reductions in special 
educational needs (SEN) 
statements 
Reduction in SEN 
statements and numbers 
entering fostering and 
care 
Reduction in violent 
crime and mental health 
expenditure 
Intervention Y 
(life ready) 
Reduction in expenditure 
on child abuse, fetal 
alcohol syndrome and 
drug-dependent babies 
Reductions in SEN 
statements and numbers 
entering fostering and 
care 
Reduction in costs of 
alcohol and drug misuse, 
crime and domestic 
violence; higher tax 
receipts from labour 
market activity; reduced 
welfare payments 
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outcome-based contracts. However, while the 
current accounting rules remain, local authorities 
need to ‘score’ the future payments to the point 
at which the services are received, as opposed 
to when payments are made. This leaves little to 
attract local areas to local SIBs. The Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
would have to change regulations (secondary 
legislation) to alter this. This should be examined 
by the Task and Finish Group proposed earlier, 
and DCLG and the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) should ensure 
that incentives are put in place so that local areas 
can maximise the potential of social investment 
and that a method of accounting exists to enable 
local areas to honour future payments based on 
successful outcomes. 
36. The key point is that both local and central 
government need to have a way of paying for 
outcomes. I have examined the option of creating 
a cross-departmental Early Intervention payment 
pot top-sliced from departmental budgets and 
held by the Treasury or DCLG; however, for 
now this will be through making provision within 
local and departmental budgets. This should be 
reviewed by the Social Justice Select Committee 
if it proves ineffective. HM Treasury and 
departments will need to work up a method of 
accounting to ensure that future payments based 
on successful outcomes will be honoured. In the 
longer term, it could also be done by getting local 
finance pooling working effectively. 
Recommendation 13 
I recommend that central and local 
government agree to pay Early 
Intervention outcome-based payments 
(where savings accrue to them). Specifically, 
I recommend that: 
•	HM Treasury and departments develop 
methods of accounting to ensure that 
future payments based on successful 
outcomes will be honoured from their 
departmental budgets; and 
•	the Department for Communities 
and Local Government, and the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (for Local Government) 
develop a method of accounting to 
ensure that future payments based on 
successful outcomes will be honoured, 
and that incentives are in place for local 
areas to utilise outcome-based contracts. 
Getting local finance pooling working. 
37. In Chapter 3 we talked about the potential of 
Community Budgets. This is the avenue through 
which many of these contracts can be made. 
Initially, however, we need to ensure that local 
finance pooling will really work in the longer term 
so that local areas can make the payments. This will 
enable local areas to contract more effectively for 
services that meet their needs. 
38. In the first instance we need to remove 
existing barriers to local finance pooling for Early 
Intervention. For example, a number of budgets 
are tied to particular late intervention activities, for 
example the police main grant, is paid under s.46 
of the Police Act 1996 which states that the grant 
is made for ‘policing purposes’. Similarly, money 
made available to the Department for Work and 
Pensions for benefits is linked to that purpose. 
39. As a second stage, we need to ensure that 
those delivery agencies who stand to benefit 
from Early Intervention policies co-pay for the 
outcomes. At present it is a choice to pool. 
Legislative routes could be looked at to ensure  
that local agencies pay up. 
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40. Once finance barriers are aligned there may 
be other non-finance barriers, such as statutory 

provision, service protocols and different 
assessment frameworks. Government needs to 
look at deregulating or suspending some of these, 
so that the benefits of pooling finance can be felt. 
41. Finally, once these have been rectified, then 
we need to replicate the lessons learnt across all 
areas, perhaps by the Foundation, highlighting and 
spreading best practice. 
42. As set out in Chapter 2, my consultations with 
the local government community demonstrated 
concern about the extent of control which local 
authorities have to meet future payments for 
outcomes. While local authorities are keen to 
have as much control as possible over entering 
into local contracts that meet their local needs, 
there is concern that central government could, 
at any point, announce further future cuts which 
would absorb any savings set aside for paying for 
outcomes. Central government must resolve this 
problem and give certainty to local areas, especially 
where planning for long-term policies such as 
outcome-based payments and Early Intervention 
are concerned. A long-term cross-party approach 

is also needed to ensure the stability that means 

future outcome-based payments are honoured at 

local level.
 
Central government accounting: 

the Peterborough example 
43. Central government also needs to be able to 
account for payments made through outcome-
based contracts. The Peterborough example can 
be used to demonstrate how this currently works. 
The Big Lottery Fund co-commissioned the SIB 
with the Ministry of Justice and is contributing 
£6.25 million to a total of £8 million, which is 
made up of infrastructure and development 
costs (£1.25 million) to run the SIB itself and 
outcomes payments (up to £5 million). This makes 
both the Big Lottery Fund and Ministry of Justice 
responsible for paying for successful outcomes. 
Although described as a bond, the SIB has more 
characteristics of a traditional equity vehicle. Under 
this model the intermediary was classified to the 
private sector, and the outcome-based payments 
did not need to be accounted for because there 
is no certainty that the outcomes will be achieved. 
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Justice and the Big 
Lottery Fund need to be confident that that can 
meet their contractual commitments to provide 
a return to the intermediary if the interventions 
are successful. 
How the Peterborough social impact bond is structured 
Under the Peterborough model the outcome-based contract specifies that: 
•	the intermediary targets services exclusively on 3,000 adult offenders sentenced to less than 
12 months in custody discharged from Peterborough prison; 
•	the services are provided to three cohorts of 1,000 offenders, one after the other over up to 
six years; 
•	the intermediary will raise around £5 million of finance from investors; 
•	the Ministry of Justice will pay the intermediary a fixed unit outcome payment for each 
reconviction avoided within a cohort, providing reduction within cohort equals 10% (using a 
control group to measure reconviction impact); 
•	outcome-based payments will be adjusted for economic shocks; 
•	returns will be capped at £3 million (above the original £5 million investment); and 
•	should the intermediary fail to deliver at least a 10% reduction in any cohort but still reduce 
reconvictions by 7.5% across all three cohorts, the Ministry of Justice will make a smaller 
payment to the intermediary. 
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Moving on from the Peterborough social 
impact bond 
44. It is likely that similar outcome-based contracts 
would not require the Government to reflect the 
intermediaries’ activity in the national accounts 
or for local or central government to reflect the 
contingent revenue claim in future years’ accounts 
(although this would currently be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis). However, if a greater number 
of SIBs are going to emerge, more thought 
needs to be given as to how this could work on a 
broader cross-Whitehall level. In particular, there is 
need to incentivise cross-Whitehall commissioning 
of contracts, given how diverse the benefits of 
Early Intervention are. 
45. A key point also involves releasing cashable 
savings, as mentioned earlier. The Government 
cannot afford to continue to fund both legacy 
services and payments for outcomes; however, it 
has a number of long-term commitments to the 
in-house provision of services that typically have 
high fixed costs. 
46. Central government must look to 
decommission services which are reduced 
due to Early Intervention to be able to pay for 
outcomes. It needs to get to a position where it 
is ‘fleet of foot’; where commissioners can adjust 
budgets more rapidly to the emerging problems 
of today and not the legacy services that address 
the problems of yesterday; where government, 
and the spending allocations to it, are linked 
to the objective of improving the social and 
emotional capability of children, and not to the 
delivery of ‘what they have always done’ through 
departmental silos. These are issues that the 
forthcoming Public Services White Paper should 
also address. 
Models for local/central contracting 
47. While the Peterborough approach outlined 
above is based on central government paying for at 
least a proportion of the outcomes, this does not 
detract from the fact that most Early Intervention 
agreements will be locally led. 
48. There are a number of different options which 
could be used by local and central government 
when contracting with an intermediary on an 
outcomes basis. These are set out in Annex F. The 
Early Intervention Foundation could help to test 
and improve the contracts which are used for 
Early Intervention. 
Note 
1	 Muntz R, Hutchings J, Edwards RT et al. (2004) 
Economic evaluation of  treatments for children with 
severe behavioural problems. Journal of  Mental Health 
Policy and Economics 7(4): 177–89. 
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Chapter 6 
Early Intervention funds and bonds 
An investment in knowledge always pays the best interest.
	
Benjamin Franklin (1706–90)
	
1. This chapter sets out the ways in which finance 
could be raised for Early Intervention. 
2. I focus on an Early Intervention Fund, resourced 
from private investors and institutions such as 
the Big Society Bank, as the best way to raise 
the first tranche of external investment in Early 
Intervention. 
3. Our initial objective, and that of central 
government, is to create a platform for the 
development of the social investment market in 
Early Intervention, and to do this we are building 
on the social impact bond idea. 
Terminology 
The term ‘social impact bond’ is misleading. 
It is not a traditional bond. 
We are recommending a broader product, 
like a social impact bond, that will invest in a 
wide range of Early Intervention projects. 
We call it the Early Intervention Fund. 
4. The concept of how the fund works is simple: 
local and central government choose to contract 
with an intermediary (who chooses delivery 
providers) to deliver Early Intervention outcomes 
for a price. These outcomes could, for example, 
be improved ‘school readiness’, attainment levels 
or measures of social and emotional competence. 
The social intermediary holds a fund with money 
raised from external investors that will pay delivery 
providers for their delivery costs as they are 
incurred, and according to performance. If the 
outcomes are met, investors are paid by local and 
central government. If the outcomes are not met, 
there is no return. 
5. The fund could be run by any intermediary 
that has appropriate Financial Services Authority 
clearance, for example a social intermediary or 
bank. However, a social intermediary would add 
value to this system by assisting providers to 
become investment ready, helping to structure 
the deal, pulling together and negotiating with 
the parties, bringing in investors and pushing the 
service provider to deliver success. Contracts 
could also be drawn up to share some risk with 
providers. While investors could still contract 
directly with providers, the attraction of having a 
managed fund is one of risk mitigation, which is 
particularly important to investors in new markets. 
For the expansion of Early Intervention, it would 
be a powerful force, driving the demand for better 
data on outcomes, driving better service delivery 
and supporting the development of new and 
promising programmes. 
6. This fund is not the only model. Indeed, as set 
out in Chapter 5 and Annex F, local and central 
government could choose to contract directly 
with a delivery provider,1 and they would then be 
free to seek finance from whichever source they 
56 Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive Savings 
Figure 6.1: How an Early Intervention Fund would work 
Local areas and 
central 
government 
Returns paid to 
intermediary on 
the basis of 
outcomes 
achieved 
Intermediary pays 
individual returns 
to investors 
Agree contract, which speciﬁes 
required outcomes and returns 
intermediary will be paid if 
outcomes achieved 
Intermediary (with 
Early Intervention 
Fund) 
Intermediary raises ﬁnance from 
investors and agrees terms of 
that investment with individual 
investors 
Outcomes 
delivered 
and 
assessed 
Programme 
delivery 
Intermediary decides 
how to invest money 
to achieve outcomes, 
providing funding to 
delivery providers 
Investors 
felt most appropriate. The creation of an effective 
market could see all sorts of variants taking off 
and being tailored to meet the needs of differing 
clients. 
7. In addition, I also expect alternative financing 
mechanisms to be developed in the longer term, 
and these are explored further in this chapter and 
Annex H. 
Developing the market 
8. In the first instance, I talk about the creation 
of one Early Intervention Fund, run on an equity 
basis, to reassure government that payments 
will be made only for effective delivery. This is 
to provide a model. There could, of course, be 
many funds, and I would encourage the market 
to develop them. One of the key factors would 
be to ensure that products have a strong visible 
brand. Some of the investors would be happy 
to work with just one brand, others would like 
a choice, and local delivery organisations would 
want to ensure that they still have some flexibility 
to contract directly with external investors if the 
opportunity arises. This is for the market to decide 
and for government and the Early Intervention 
Foundation to support. 
9. The market is already developing, and a 
number of propositions are being developed. 
For example, the Private Equity Foundation has 
a proposition to raise funds, with elements of an 
Early Intervention focus. 
10. The Private Equity Foundation (a registered 
charity) has developed a proposition for a Social 
Investment Fund for Disadvantaged Children 
which would draw new private investment to 
programmes for disadvantaged children that they 
believe generate cashable savings. 
11. This Social Investment Fund would initially 
be commissioned to raise numeracy for primary 
school children who are struggling, reduce 
truancy and improve behaviour of children 
who are disengaging at school. The fund would 
raise investment from private investors to pay 
charities with a proven track record to deliver the 
outcomes. More details on this proposition can be 
found in Annex H. 
12. RippleZ, a newly created social enterprise that 
houses the Derby City Family Nurse Partnership 
programme, is already attracting investment. 
Impetus Trust, a pioneer venture philanthropy 
organisation, is finalising its decision to invest in 
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Pay for Success Bonds in the US 
President Obama’s 2012 budget announced $100 million for Pay for Success Bonds, the US’s 
version of social impact bonds. 
The money will pay for pilot schemes to test Pay for Success Bonds. The guidelines on suitable 
projects include: 
‘Early childhood interventions that reduce costly long-term special education placements of 
children whose mild learning disabilities or behavioural problems could be better treated 
early on.’ 
In addition, President Obama has introduced rule changes so that money can be committed over 
longer periods than is usual in public contracts, with repayment contingent on performance. The rule 
changes will also allow for much less detailed terms on the methods to be used than is typical. Public 
money can also be set aside for evaluation of whether the targets have been met. 
The US is learning from us, as we must learn from it.2 
the organisation. The aim of the investment would 
be to deliver on its ambitious growth plan over 
the next three to four years. Impetus provides an 
average £400,000 of funding to investees over the 
investment period. They are particularly attracted 
to RippleZ, given ‘the undoubted strengths of the 
FNP programme, the track record of the RippleZ 
team and the opportunities for further expansion 
available to it’. 
13. However, there is more for local and central 
government to do to price outcomes and develop 
the market. It is perhaps worth noting here that 
this would not be a novel thing for the British 
government to undertake, and that it could also 
look to international examples. For example, the 
US government has recently announced that it is 
to set aside funds to test Pay for Success Bonds 
(see box above). 
The Early Intervention Fund 
14. An Early Intervention Fund should be created 
as a vehicle to make investments into Early 
Intervention programmes. It could be informed by 
its close partner, the Early Intervention Foundation, 
in the identification of the best evidenced-based 
programmes with a track record in the UK that are 
most likely to deliver positive outcomes. 
15. The fund would be used as a vehicle for raising 
money from investors and for investing in Early 
Intervention programmes in local areas. A social 
intermediary or commercial fund manager could 
be asked to run such a fund, in addition to seeking 
the best providers to deliver Early Intervention 
programmes. The key to success would be to 
identify some contracts that it could help to finance. 
16. The fund itself would be independent 
from central government, which would pay for 
outcomes arising to central budget streams from 
money set aside in departmental budgets (see 
Chapter 5) into the fund once success has been 
achieved. Local areas would also pay back on 
outcomes once success has been achieved. This 
would separate them from investors, who would 
put in upfront investment (although central and 
local government could choose to additionally 
invest upfront if they wanted). 
17. As the US has done, it is important to 
recognise the need to invest in the evidence base. 
Some of the money raised should be used to 
develop promising Early Intervention programmes 
into investment-ready propositions. For example, 
a fifth could be set aside to help promising 
programmes conduct better evaluations and 
deal with scaling-up issues. This would also drive 
innovation in the market and improving outcomes. 
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Why a fund would be suited to Early 
Intervention 
18. A fund could have a number of benefits for 
raising crucial finance for Early Intervention and 
represents a scalable and flexible option: 
•	A fund can transfer a greater level of risk 
to investors It can be structured so that it 
consists wholly of equity investment in the first 
instance, with any dividends based purely on the 
performance of funds. If the funds investments 
fail to deliver the expected outcomes, then the 
investor stands to lose their money. 
•	A fund can be established quickly and with 
a relatively small amount of investment 
It can then be adapted for different scales of 
investment as the market grows. While it might 
start off with a smaller amount of money, it can 
be easily scaled up into a much larger vehicle as 
investor confidence and markets grow. 
•	In the longer term different types of finance, 
including both debt and equity, can be included, 
which can again help to bring down the overall 
cost of finance. For example, the fund managers 
could develop bonds at a later date. 
•	A fund can attract different types of investors 
A fund can easily be divided up into different 
‘tranches’ for different types of investor. It 
might therefore be a better model to attract 
philanthropic and social investors, and to help 
bring down the overall cost of finance. 
Scalability 
19. The next chapter explores the amount 
of money that we might wish to raise. In the 
first instance we would envisage that the fund 
might helpfully raise £27 million for pilots, 
with a potential to rise substantially to around 
£200 million in this spending review period and 
higher in the future. The Task and Finish Group 
recommended earlier that government should 
do further work to get more accurate figures on 
the potential for the market and work with the 
Early Intervention Foundation on this when it is 
up and running. 
20. One of the many benefits of a fund would 
be that it could operate at different levels. The 
Peterborough social impact bond model, which 
is like a small fund rather than a traditional bond 
(see Chapter 4), demonstrates that it is possible to 
establish a fund of this nature at the smaller end of 
the spectrum. The intermediary, in this case Social 
Finance, effectively acts like a fund manager, which 
gives money to providers to deliver outcomes. 
21. It is possible to imagine how a larger 
intermediary could invest across a greater number 
of programmes and with a greater number of 
providers. This would begin to look more like 
a traditional fund, where an investor’s money is 
invested across a diverse portfolio, rather than in 
one place and one project, as is the case with the 
Peterborough social impact bond. 
22. Over a longer timescale, the fund managers 
could also potentially incorporate debt finance 
and issue bonds to investors. This would require 
a more established track record and is likely to be 
a longer term aim. It would have the advantage of 
helping to bring down the overall cost of finance 
(debt finance is cheaper because the investor 
takes less risk). If the local areas have been able to 
make the sort of progress outlined in Chapter 3, 
there could be much helpful learning and market 
development to share. 
Investing in the fund 
23. Consultation with our expert finance group 
has led us to believe that a fund would attract 
the right mix of investors. While a traditional 
fund would consist of financial investors whose 
sole motivation is to maximise their return, our 
research indicates that an Early Intervention 
Fund could also attract social and philanthropic 
investors who are interested in contributing to 
social and economic outcomes. 
24. Would investors want to diversify the 
portfolio over a number of cohorts? Even 
if a good programme is funded and delivered 
effectively, performance could be impacted by a 
number of external factors. These may balance 
themselves out over a number of years, and there 
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may therefore be a case to invest over a number 
of years. A more diverse and larger cohort or 
group of babies, children and young people could 
also allow government to agree a programme with 
a more challenging set of outcome-based targets. 
25. Would investors provide all their funding 
upfront or could their investment contributions 
be staged? If investors want to spread their 
investment over a number of cohorts, this 
would mean their money would not necessarily 
be required for two or more years. It may be 
preferable for individual investors to make their 
money available to the fund on an annual basis. 
This could also help to reduce the cost of finance 
for government. 
26. Would all investors have an equal stake 
in the fund? A simple fund would provide all 
investors with an equal stake in the fund, which 
would mean every investor would receive the same 
proportionate return for every £1 invested. The 
alternative would be for some investors to take a 
greater share of risk. For example, one tranche of 
investors could purchase a lower risk stake with the 
characteristics of a ‘preference share’. 
27. How long do investors wait until they 
receive a return? Outcome-based returns by 
nature mean that an investor needs to wait a 
period of time before they receive any return  
on their investment. Investing for a period of  
more than five to seven years is likely to be less 
attractive to investors who may also demand a 
higher premium from government. Therefore it 
may be more suitable to tie payments to outcomes 
that can be measured between two and five  
years, in addition to longer term outcomes.  
It could therefore be possible to stage any 
payments to investors over time – with a 
proportion or returns based on output indicators 
being made at interim milestones. 
28. Which sort of organisation runs the fund? 
A fund could be established and run by an 
existing social intermediary or bank. Such an 
organisation would already have the required skills, 
infrastructure and licences in place. This means 
that it could introduce a fund more quickly and run 
the fund more efficiently than through the creation 
of a new organisation. Alternatively a new  
entity could be created to hold the fund.  
The Early Intervention Foundation may also  
wish to consider whether or not it would be  
able to take this role in future years. 
29. How will the fund exert influence over 
the providers? The fund managers would only 
provide capital to providers and prime contractors 
where they are confident that they can successfully 
deliver. The agreement could include an element 
of performance management and the fund 
managers are likely to want to be part of the 
governance arrangement if it is a significant 
contract. It is up to the market to develop the fund 
in relation to these points and this will influence 
the fund structure. Some options for structuring  
a fund are explored in Annex H. 
Recommendation 14 
I recommend that, through pilots and 
agreeing to pay for outcomes, government 
enables private money to be attracted 
to Early Intervention through the 
establishment of an Early Intervention 
Fund or Funds in close co-operation with 
the Big Society Bank, which over time can 
be developed to offer investors a diverse 
range of Early Intervention products. This 
should be driven forward by government, 
local areas and the Early Intervention 
Foundation, working with fund managers 
such as social intermediaries or banks. 
Recommendation 15 
I recommend that this initial fund should 
look to raise around £200 million of 
investment, although in the first instance 
£27 million would enable the Early 
Intervention Places to begin with pilots 
over the current Comprehensive Spending 
Review period. 
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Local and central government – working 
with the fund 
30. Local and central government will need to 
attach a price for outcomes and, when these are 
met, honour their obligation to the fund, so that 
it can pay back investors and pay for the delivery 
costs accrued by the providers. There are many 
ways that local and central government could do 
this, and these will differ according to a number 
of factors; for example, whether local or central 
government takes the lead, whether any minimum 
service requirements are required and the nature 
of the intermediary. 
31. A number of the Early Intervention Places 
would be open to discussing the possibility of a 
pilot. For example (see box below), the Greater 
London Authority (GLA) is working in partnership 
with London Councils to build a consortium of 
London boroughs, voluntary sector agencies 
and social investors with the aim of piloting an 
approach to financing Early Intervention in London. 
Recommendation 16 
I recommend that central government 
supports local areas to pilot different ways 
of contracting for Early Intervention 
outcomes, and that when a fund is available 
they pilot the use of this fund. 
The GLA – keen to pilot an approach to Early Intervention financing in London 
There is a strong case for Early Intervention in London. The number of children up to the age 
of four is set to increase more rapidly in London than in any other region in England over the 
decades ahead. At the same time London children are more likely than other children in England to 
experience problems such as poverty and poor health, which will impact upon their lifelong 
well-being if left unaddressed. The GLA, together with London Councils, the Association of 
Directors of Children’s Services, the Metropolitan Police and the Regional Public Health Group, has 
been leading work to increase the level and impact of investment in Early Intervention in London. 
This includes: 
•	publication of an economic case for investment (Early Years Interventions to address Health 
Inequalities in London – the Economic Case); 
•	part funding Dartington social research unit to translate a model developed by Washington 
State Institute for Public Policy enabling public bodies to select, deliver and predict the returns 
of evidence-based interventions that match local needs; and 
•	the development of a London-wide framework for measuring impact (Oracle). 
The GLA is now working in partnership with London Councils to build a consortium of London 
boroughs, voluntary sector agencies and social investors to pilot an approach to financing  
Early Intervention in London. This will aim to develop and promote investment opportunities 
in London’s public, voluntary and community sector with the proven potential to bring about 
improved outcomes for London’s children. The consortium approach will support voluntary sector 
agencies to become ‘investment ready’. And it will build on the potential of Community Budgets in 
London to simplify the investment landscape for public sector bodies. 
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32. In line with the national policy context set by 
government in Recommendation 1, I expect that 
the fund would invest in the best programmes 
available to improve the social and emotional 
bedrock of babies, children and young people. 
Investing in the best evidence-based policies 
would be essential to maximise the chance of 
a good return for investors. For example, local 
and central government could ask the fund to 
concentrate on delivering the best programmes, 
such as those listed in Annex A and to work 
with the Early Intervention Places to meet the 
national ambition on Early Intervention. The Early 
Intervention Foundation could advise local areas 
on those programmes best suited to meeting the 
needs of their populations and creating packages 
for them to be school ready, child ready and life 
ready. Existing schemes could be invited to develop 
proposals building on the work already done. Local 
areas expertise and that of the foundation would 
add value over and above commissioning singly for 
programme delivery. The potential for joining up 
these first investments might bring economies of 
scale that would make this an even more appealing 
proposition to investors and commissioners. 
Attracting cornerstone investment 
33. Attracting large-scale investors to kick-start 
the Early Intervention Fund would help to create  
a market for the fund and allow funding for  
Early Intervention programmes in local areas  
to begin quickly. 
34. The Big Society Bank has been set up 
especially to grow the social investment market. 
This welcome addition to the social investment 
infrastructure cannot however invest in frontline 
organisations, as we would expect with the fund, 
but only in social finance intermediaries that in turn 
provide frontline organisations with investment 
and other support. This means that it could be 
appropriate for a new Early Investment Fund to 
approach the Big Society Bank for a tranche of 
investment, along with other institutions such as 
the Big Lottery and private investors. Ensuring that 
the Early Intervention Fund is independent from 
government will be important in helping to secure 
such investment. 
35. The Big Society Bank concept has been widely 
publicised, but as yet it is unclear how to apply 
for funding. This clarity is needed and should 
be communicated widely, well before the Big 
Society Bank is open for business. Rather like the 
Early Intervention Foundation, it will need to be 
accessible and user friendly to potential customers 
if it is to help build and populate new markets. 
36. When this clarity is available, I believe that this 
would be an ideal opportunity for the Big Society 
Bank and other investors to be approached to 
supply a first tranche of investment for any new 
Early Intervention funds, which in turn would 
invest in outcome-based contracts. 
Phase 2: other financing mechanisms 
37. Any new fund would initially need to be 
set up on an equity basis. However, there is a 
challenge of building scale in the market. Other 
forms of financing exist, and could be considered, 
that might raise more money for lower, yet more 
guaranteed returns. The financial sector is keen on 
some of these products, but the Government is 
more cautious. I document some of these options 
below and the opportunities that exist for when 
local and central government are ready to provide 
guaranteed returns on Early Intervention. 
Early Intervention bond 
38. Where sufficient market confidence exists, 
it could be possible to incorporate debt into 
products and thereby create bonds. This means 
that fund managers could issue bonds, as described 
in Annex H. This could help to bring down the 
overall cost of finance as investors take on much 
less risk through debt financing, which in turn 
means that they require less of a financial return. 
39. Early discussions with leading investment banks 
suggest that there would be considerable appetite 
for helping to place a £100 million Early Intervention 
bond on a tranched basis. The model that is being 
discussed would have a junior equity portion and a 
senior equity portion with a very low risk coupon.3 
The result would be to turn the social impact bond, 
as deployed in Peterborough as a special results 
contract, into a genuine bond issue. This should be 
pursued by the Early Intervention Foundation and 
government as appropriate. 
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40. A thematic approach to issuing a bond could 
help to attract genuinely interested investors, 
who might not otherwise have put forward their 
money. I believe that there is strong potential in an 
Early Intervention bond which enables investors 
to specifically put their money into the social and 
emotional development of babies, children and 
young people. Once an Early Intervention Fund 
has been established, I believe that the use of 
Early Intervention bonds should be considered as 
the market develops, investor confidence grows 
and appropriate opportunities arise. 
41. We have also considered a range of options 
for bonds that could be issued through other 
means. These include the following options, which 
are discussed in more detail in Annex H: 
•	options for a government retail bond for 
Early Intervention; 
•	the use of capital protected bonds; 
•	use of bond issuance once the fund is 
established; and 
•	a community bond. 
Options for local government to raise finance 
42. Chapter 3 outlines some of the contribution 
that the localities can make, and Chapter 4 shows 
the leading role for them in a foundation. I have also 
considered whether additional investment in Early 
Intervention could come from local authorities. 
Until local authorities are allowed to raise their own 
resources or retain some of the taxation raised 
locally, they are left with borrowing. There are three 
reasons why borrowing from the capital markets 
makes sense as a way of financing Early Intervention. 
First, it helps to overcome the basic problem that 
council budgets are already fully committed to 
dealing with immediate spending on fixing problems 
rather than preventing them. Second, it allows 
councils to match the maturity of the funding to the 
payback period needed for the savings from Early 
Intervention to appear. Third, it creates transparency 
about the balance between upfront costs and 
long-term savings: in effect, through matching the 
bulk of the repayments with the time when the 
outcomes and cashable savings are achieved by 
the Early Intervention programmes; the structure 
of a bond reflects the financial business case for 
Early Intervention. It is simultaneously a discipline, 
performance measure and demonstration of the 
need to focus on Early Intervention. 
43. There are currently a number of important 
barriers to using local authority bonds to finance 
Early Intervention. However, I have considered 
how important they are and how they might  
be addressed. 
44. First, all bonds must be the most economical 
way of borrowing available. Until recently, this 
argument was a show-stopper because the 
Government distorted the lending market 
by offering heavily subsidised long-term loans 
through the Public Works Loans Board (PWLB). 
PWLB debt was always the cheapest option and 
the local government bond market has been 
dormant as a result. This is unlike the multi-
trillion-dollar US local government bond market. 
However, this argument no longer has the same 
force because the Government has brought PWLB 
lending much closer to market rates. Many in local 
government and the financial markets consider 
that local authorities can sell bonds at a cost 
below the current PWLB rate, even after taking 
into account the risk margin and the additional 
expense of legal and underwriting fees associated 
with raising private finance. The Treasury-led 
team preparing for the next, hopefully Early 
Intervention-themed, Comprehensive Spending 
Review should explore these possibilities with local 
government and the foundation. 
45. Second, all bonds have a cost of issuance – 
in banks and legal fees, for example – over and 
above the interest coupon which may make them 
unattractive in value for money terms to councils. 
This can, though, be addressed by: 
a	 Issuing bonds at a sufficiently large scale that 
the issuance costs do not play such a large part 
in the total cost. Many countries solve this by 
issuing municipal bonds through an intermediary 
which packages the borrowing needs of several 
councils in one issue. A number of market 
players have proposed models along these lines 
and I understand that the Local Government 
Association is pursuing discussion with councils 
and the financial sector about the possibility 
Chapter 6 Early Intervention funds and bonds 63 
of establishing a new intermediary. Early 
Intervention would be an obvious policy area 
that could pioneer this approach. 
b Creating a standard set of products and 
documents that can be used to make smaller 
scale investment models more practical. This 
does of course require someone to initially 
pay for the standard documentation and this 
would certainly be of interest to the 27 Early 
Intervention Places and the Early Intervention 
Foundation. 
46. Members of my financial working group have 
said that option a) may be more practical where 
capital is being sought from the wholesale market. 
Option b) may be more suitable where capital is 
being sought from the retail market, pension funds 
or philanthropic investors, who will be less worried 
by the scale of the borrowing. This may also open 
up an opportunity to allow investors, including local 
individuals of high net wealth, to invest in a local 
area, which may be attractive to some investors. 
47. The third issue is specific to using bonds to 
finance Early Intervention by councils. Under the 
statutory prudential borrowing rules that govern 
council financing, local government can borrow 
only for capital purposes (for example equipment, 
buildings, etc). This would mean that many of 
the elements of programme spend, such as staff 
or training costs, could not be covered out of 
additional borrowing. 
48. The capital requirement under the prudential 
borrowing rules is much more restrictive than the 
rules used by most private sector accounting; it 
could also bear comparison with the practices in 
other democratic countries. I have been told that 
it is designed to protect the taxpayer, because the 
capital project itself (for example a school building) 
offers security in the event of default and can be 
sold on. There are also a limited number of capital 
projects that will be needed at any one time (for 
example, there are only so many roads or schools 
you can build in an area), meaning that the risk 
is further limited by only allowing borrowing for 
capital. Finally, it prevents Council Tax payers of the 
future having to pay for services consumed now, 
because they will still benefit from the school or 
road that will remain in existence for many years. 
Conversely, borrowing for current budgets means 
that future Council Tax payers will pay for services 
that have already been consumed. I believe that all 
these traditional arguments need to be reappraised 
and tested. As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, a 
similar argument applies to the benefits of Early 
Intervention, which will be experienced by future 
Council Tax payers long after the initial spending 
on the relevant programmes. If one accepts, as all 
of Government now does, the general proposition 
that Early Intervention represents essential 
investment in human capital for future generations, 
then there is a case for allowing local authorities 
to finance it by borrowing in the same way that 
they can borrow to finance a bridge or a building. 
This is especially true if measurement of cashable 
savings that are intended to be used to pay back 
the coupon continues to improve over time. 
49. There is a simple mechanism for extending local 
government’s capitalisation rules. The Secretary 
of State is able, with Treasury consent, to issue 
Capitalisation Directives. These statutory regulations 
can govern both the definition of what can be scored 
as capital – and so be financed by borrowing – and 
how much borrowing within a particular category the 
Government is willing to allow. 
50. The case for using a Capitalisation Directive 
to kick-start a new local authority bond issue to 
finance Early Intervention has a compelling financial 
and policy logic. However, any relaxation of the 
rules on local authority borrowing would add to 
the overall public sector borrowing requirement, 
because this form of local authority borrowing is 
currently included in the deficit measure which 
the Treasury targets in each budget. It would 
be important to ensure that any change did not 
compromise the Government’s deficit reduction 
target. At the same time, a central message from 
this review is that Early Intervention generates 
savings for the taxpayer, and borrowing to that 
end now makes a significant and continuing 
contribution to reducing the structural deficit in 
the long term by massively reducing the costs of 
failure and dysfunction. 
51. I consider that there is a strong case for 
a limited relaxation of the local government 
capitalisation rules linked to an effort to place 
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an Early Intervention bond. I consider that any risks 
to the deficit reduction target would be negligible 
in the short term. In the longer term, if local 
authorities were allowed an amount of new 
borrowing, through bonds, for specific investment 
in Early Intervention, this could be limited to a 
figure that would round to zero against today’s 
£759.5 billion deficit. 
Recommendation 17 
HM Treasury should encourage councils, 
in association with financial institutions, 
to produce practical yet innovative 
locally based financing ideas for 
Early Intervention. Should economic 
circumstances allow, this could include 
putting together an innovative collective 
bond issue on Early Intervention to 
kick-start a revived local authority bond 
market. To facilitate this, ministers would 
need to issue a Capitalisation Directive to 
councils that allows up to £(less than 500) 
million of Early Intervention spending to 
be capitalised, provided that it is funded 
through the local bond market. 
52. Whitehall can and does do a great deal on 
Early Intervention. If we now ensure that our 
localities are freed up to be an effective partner, 
the ambition set in Recommendation 1 becomes 
realisable. 
Notes 
1	 A delivery provider could include, for example, an 
individual provider, prime contractor or special purpose 
vehicle. 
2	 www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet/paying-for-success 
3	 Senior investors generally receive a modest return, but 
are paid back first. Junior investors take more risk, are 
paid later, but for a higher return. 
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Chapter 7 
Creating the social investment market and 
tax incentives 
Unless the investment in children is made, all of humanity’s most 
fundamental long-term problems will remain fundamental long-term 
problems. 
UNICEF, 1995 
1. So far I have looked at why we should invest 
in Early Intervention and some of the barriers 
to investing more. I have set out how this could 
work for local areas, how we need to contract 
on a payment-by-results basis, and how the Early 
Intervention Foundation will support local areas, 
and keep the momentum on Early Intervention 
going to effect a real and sustainable change in 
society. I have also suggested that one or more 
Early intervention Funds should be created to 
bring in the first tranche of external investment. 
2. However, we will be unable to create a fund if 
external investors are not attracted to investments 
into Early Intervention. In this chapter, I explore 
the potential for Early Intervention to form part of 
the growing social investment market, specifically: 
•	the scale of funds sought; 
•	the types of investor we are trying to attract; 
•	the level of risk attached to outcome payments; 
and 
•	the tax incentives that might incentivise 
investment. 
3. It will of course take time to grow such a 
market, and the use of pilots will be needed to test 
the appetite of investors and the most appropriate 
models for attracting them, as stated in Chapter 6. 
Establishment of an Early Intervention Fund and 
the Early Intervention Foundation should help to 
give further momentum to these developments. 
The scale of  funding required 
4. The scale of funds required will increase as 
the evidence base for programmes and the social 
investment market grow. It is difficult to predict 
the total amount of investment needed; however, 
we have provided some examples to illustrate how 
much might be necessary. 
5. As a local authority, Nottingham has invested 
heavily (around £17 million per year) in a 
comprehensive Early Intervention package of 
support for 0–5-year-olds and their parents/carers. 
This has boosted Nottingham’s Foundation Stage 
results to above national average. Despite budget 
cuts it is keen to deliver as much work as possible, 
but it will not have enough money to deliver Early 
Intervention services to all those who need them.1 
6. If Nottingham City Council were to roll out 
Family Nurse Partnerships to all those teenage 
parents who were eligible for the programme 
in Nottingham, this would require an additional 
£1.6 million per year but, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 1, it would save three to five times 
that by the time the children were 15.2 The 
Nottingham Communication, Language and 
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Literacy programme would require an additional 
£92,000 in order that it could be rolled out 
city-wide over the next two years. In addition, it 
would cost an additional £77,000 to extend the 
DrugAware programme, which is saving £756 for 
every education-referred young person, to the 
next cohort of schools.3 
7. In total therefore, Nottingham City Council 
could benefit from an additional £1.8 million on 
the basis that it was able to maintain current levels 
of investment – which might not be possible given 
the budget cuts. 
8. Of course, when trying to attract additional 
money in innovative ways, we should perhaps start 
on a smaller scale, with pilots as required. Spread 
across the Early Intervention Places, a figure in the 
region of £27 million (£1 million for each of the 
27 Early Intervention Places mentioned in Early 
Intervention – The Next Steps) would be plausible. 
9. However, over the current Spending Review 
period I believe that the potential levels of 
investment required could be grown to around 
£200 million, if local and central government get 
behind these opportunities for Early Intervention 
and some of the big cities become as involved as 
they wish to be. Rolling out services across three 
different age cohorts in at least five large local 
authority areas, targeting 10,000 individual families, 
children and young people a year will require 
somewhere in the region of £200 million of 
investment over three years. 
10. For example, as set out in its 2009 Business 
Plan, Birmingham City Council is investing 
£41 million in its Brighter Futures programme, 
referred to in Early Intervention – The Next Steps. 
Most of the spend has been set aside for the 
first six years of the programme, although the 
programme is expected to last 15 years, with an 
expected cashable return of £102 million.4 
11. In the longer term, once a greater track 
record of programmes has been developed in 
the UK and these approaches spread to all areas, 
I believe that up to £1 billion of investment could 
be used across the UK. This is a ballpark figure, 
and, as I have made clear in earlier chapters, 
government needs to improve the data it has on 
expenditure on Early Intervention programmes 
and coverage if it is to predict the size and growth 
of this market accurately. 
12. Another way of looking at how much money 
we might need is to ask programme directors. 
Success for All, a programme that delivers literacy 
and maths from Foundation Stage through to 
Key Stage three, for example, is another of the 
programmes with a strong evidence base. Some 
£22 million would be required to expand provision 
from 100 primary schools across England to 1,050 
by 2015/16.5 
Social investment and the range of 
potential investors 
13. My ambition in the longer term would be 
that investors could consider Early Intervention 
investment alongside any mainstream investment. 
However, this is a new investment area and the 
first priority will be to strike the right balance to 
ensure value for money for the taxpayer (through 
outcome-based payments) and a reasonable level 
of return for investors. 
14. I have consulted widely and have been aided 
by an expert finance group. It has become clear 
that there are many different investor groups 
that may be interested in putting their money 
into Early Intervention, such as large financial 
institutions like investment houses, insurance 
companies, banks, and high net worth individuals. 
15. Individual and institutional investors sometimes 
have two ‘pots’ of money – one for investing with 
the aim of maximising financial return, and another 
which they are prepared to put into good causes 
(such as supporting a charity). Here we are largely 
talking about investors being able to combine 
both, to receive a financial return for putting their 
money into producing good social outcomes. This 
is social investment. It is a relatively new area for 
investors, and one which the markets are starting 
to test out. The Government is supportive of 
developing a new social investment market, and 
I believe that Early Intervention products should 
form a key part of this. Without such a focus, 
the market could just develop in remedial areas 
of social finance. Government and investors 
have wisely started with remedial areas, as these 
are easier to measure – for example reducing 
re-offending rates and drug rehabilitation. My 
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ambition is for social finance to go further and 
invest in pre-emptive action, not least around the 
social and emotional development of babies and 
children and young people. 
16. Additionally, there is emerging evidence to 
suggest investor interest in such ‘social’ products, 
particularly in the case of very high net worth 
individuals. A recent report commissioned by 
NESTA6 describes, for instance, how ‘many of the 
more affluent wealthy individuals (over £100,000 
of investment assets) can be motivated to try 
social investments’. 
17. For social investors, even the small amounts 
previously set aside for charitable donations can be 
put to work to produce income while still having 
social benefits. Additionally, if an outcome-based 
payment system is used, investors are able to see 
very clearly the impact their money has had. It 
therefore provides, for those who seek it, a greater 
level of engagement than a simple donation would 
normally do. 
18. Discussion with those in my expert finance 
group indicates that the Early Intervention Fund, 
presented in Chapter 6, which focuses on babies, 
children and young people, will be of particular 
appeal to social investors – more so than other 
themes that are less fundamental to our future. As 
the social investment market grows, it is likely that 
a more segmented thematic focus will emerge. 
19. Understanding the different motivations 
of investors will help to ensure that the design 
of a product can be structured most efficiently 
according to their different preferences. 
Table 7.1: Social investors and their motivations 
Types of social investor Motivations and types of product sought 
Retail investors (excluding Retail investors will usually seek a safe means of building up their savings. 
high net worth individuals) They will usually have limited amounts of money to invest (average 
monthly savings are around £170) and will be wary of unfamiliar 
products. While they may be interested in investing in good causes, they 
will have a much lower risk tolerance than other institutional investors. 
Research suggests that they will be unlikely to accept lower interest rates 
for ethical investments. Additionally, there are a myriad of regulatory 
protections for retail investors, which limit the amounts of risk transfer 
they can assume. 
High net worth individuals Very wealthy individuals will be likely to have a greater amount of 
disposable income to put towards good causes. Research suggests that 
they may be motivated by a desire for their wealth to achieve social good 
as well as seeking a financial return, and that they will be keen to have an 
impact on society. 
Corporate institutions These are companies or businesses that will have established corporate 
social responsibility programmes. They may have particular local interest 
in investments that have an impact near their offices, or that relate to 
their core business. However, where social purpose is not the primary 
objective for the investment, higher returns will be sought. Depending 
on size and stage of development, they may be more used to complex 
financial products. 
Financial institutions These include banks, insurance companies and pension funds, among 
others. They may be used to investing in a range of complex products 
and can be prepared to take risks, given the appropriate financial 
incentives. Liquidity will be important to this type of investor. 
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Table 7.1: Social investors and their motivations (continued) 
Types of social investor Motivations and types of product sought 
Public sector The public sector will continue to have grant funding available for 
Early Intervention, and there may be a case for it to invest some of that 
funding alongside that of other investors, to either leverage in additional 
external finance or bring down the overall cost of capital (it takes less 
of a return than other investors). It could be possible for parts of the 
public sector, such as a local authority or a Community Budget, to invest 
in an Early Intervention Fund. This would involve the local area receiving 
a financial return upon successful achievement of outcomes. That return 
would not necessarily have to come from savings accrued in the same 
area, particularly where outcomes and savings are spread across both 
central and local government. Because of its social purpose, the public 
sector will place a high value on the social outcomes achieved through 
investing in Early Intervention. It will also be a relatively risk-averse 
investor, given the range of statutory duties that it is required to perform. 
In addition, the public sector will be likely to prefer less complex financial 
products, given its risk aversion and the need to protect taxpayers’ money. 
Charities and foundations Charities and foundations will have a social aim at the heart of 
their strategies. They may decide to invest in Early Intervention 
philanthropically if this meets their aims. In addition, many will have 
substantial reserves. They may choose to invest their reserves in social 
investment products. 
Source: Joy I, de las Casas L, Rickey B (New Philanthropy Capital) (2011) Understanding the demand for and supply of 
Social Finance: Research to inform the Big Society Bank. London: NESTA. 
20. While there is likely to be a more limited 
amount of investment to be found from investors 
who are prepared to take a lower return for a 
higher social outcome, they can play a crucial 
role. By accepting a lower return, they can help to 
push down the overall cost of raising the finance 
through the taxpayer. They may be more willing to 
take on the first ‘tranche’ of risk in an investment 
vehicle, which will help to draw in a greater 
number of investors from other sources who 
would not otherwise have put in their money. It 
is likely, therefore, that a product which is able to 
accommodate a combination of different types of 
investor will be the most cost-effective. 
Risk 
21. Investors will have different levels of appetite 
depending on the risks associated with their 
investment (i.e. what the chances are of getting 
their money back), the timing and amount of any 
interest or dividend payments, the length of time 
their money is tied in for and how easy it is to 
access, and what their investment is used for. 
22. In the case of Early Intervention, issues of 
timing and risk will be particularly tricky and will 
need to be adequately addressed so as to build 
investor confidence and develop the market. As 
discussed in previous chapters, there is a need to 
ensure that any new Early Intervention mechanism 
is focused on measurable outcomes that are 
independently validated. Additionally, pilots should 
help to demonstrate the means of measuring the 
impact of specific programmes and the length of 
time required for the real impact of interventions 
to take shape. The Early Intervention Foundation 
will have a key role here. 
23. In addition, the novelty of the market will 
make it seem risky. As the scale grows, the 
perceived risk will fall. This is another good reason 
for incentivising investment in the first tranche of 
investment, to get the ball rolling. 
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24. The Foundation, intermediaries, 
philanthropists and venture philanthropy 
organisations can all play a key part in reducing 
risk. One of the main ways they can do this is to 
ensure that the Early Intervention service provider 
is investment ready. They can help find finance, 
as a gift or as a percentage of a fund, to build up 
capacity and to help with evaluation costs and 
workforce training. 
25. Intemediaries can also help to reduce risk 
through assisting in structuring the deal, pulling 
together and negotiating with the parties, bringing 
in investors and pushing the service provider to 
deliver outcomes. These are roles that the Early 
Intervention Foundation could fulfil, working with 
existing social intermediaries as required. 
Tax incentives 
26. There are two principal ways of incentivising 
investors. The first is to offer a financial return that 
is paid to them on the back of their investment, in 
the form of interest payments, dividends, etc. This 
has been explored elsewhere in Chapter 6. The 
second is to offer tax incentives, which encourage 
investors to put their money into certain types of 
investment so that it costs them less tax. The two 
are not mutually exclusive – it is possible to offer 
both a return and a tax incentive, or either one 
on its own. Investment in Early Intervention, as we 
have demonstrated, can produce massive savings 
for the taxpayer. However, tax incentives may 
initially mean a relatively small loss in revenue for 
the Exchequer, and therefore need to be factored 
into the overall cost of the finance. Investors 
may also be happier to receive less of a financial 
return were their investment to be treated more 
favourably by the tax system, showing that the two 
are intrinsically linked. 
27. All governments try to simplify the tax 
system, so there is never a good time to develop 
innovative tax relief. However, the returns on Early 
Intervention for the taxpayer and the Exchequer 
more than justify it. I have focused my thinking on 
the incentives and potential for change surrounding 
Early Intervention specifically but social investment 
more generally. I believe that the issue of tax must 
be addressed if the social investment aims of 
government are to be met. 
28. Tax incentives are of crucial symbolic 
relevance in the case of social investment, and a 
key psychological factor in determining whether 
or not investors choose to invest. For example, an 
individual who was interviewed as part of NESTA’s 
project that looked at wealthy individuals’ response 
to investing for the good of society said: ‘Tax relief 
or tax incentives would encourage me to make an 
investment’.7 
29. I am by no means suggesting that investors 
should be able to profit from Early Intervention 
investments on a fully tax-free basis. However, if 
government wants to maximise the opportunity 
of social investment as a new means of delivering 
social outcomes, then it needs to ensure that the 
relevant tax incentives exist, otherwise there is 
a risk that investors simply will not put forward 
their money. 
Wider context 
30. Government has been extremely positive 
about the role of social investment in today’s 
society. The Social Investment Strategy,8 launched 
recently by Francis Maude and Nick Hurd, sets out 
the overarching framework for encouraging a social 
investment market. The Big Society Bank, a key 
initiative of the Coalition Government, will look 
to stimulate the social investment market through 
wholesale funding of intermediaries. Hopefully the 
Public Service Reform White Paper will include a 
commitment from government to support new 
forms of social investment. All of these recent 
policy announcements demonstrate a serious 
commitment from government to advance the 
role of external finance in supporting the delivery 
of social outcomes. It therefore seems timely and 
important to launch a thorough review to consider 
whether the current tax system is fit for the 
purpose of increasing social investment (outlined 
further in the recommendation at the end of 
this chapter). 
31. I am mindful of the current work of the 
Office of Tax Simplification (OTS), whereby the 
Government intends to abolish 43 tax reliefs, the 
rationale for which is no longer valid. This has the 
objective of reducing compliance burdens on both 
businesses and individual taxpayers. Any revisiting 
of the tax system should be undertaken within this 
context and make relief relevant to current policy 
objectives, not least Early Intervention. 
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32. Investors pay taxes in a number of areas that 
could be relevant for consideration here. Taxes on 
income from investments are as follows: 
•	Income Tax. Individuals below age 65 pay 
Income Tax on their taxable income above 
£7,475. This includes interest on savings, and 
dividends from holding shares. The tax rate 
depends on the total amount of taxable income 
and the type of income, but ranges from 0–50%. 
•	Capital Gains Tax. Individuals pay Capital Gains 
Tax when they sell or dispose of an asset. This 
includes selling on shares. There is an annual 
exempt amount of £10,600 (2011/12), after 
which an 18% or 28% rate is paid, depending  
on the total amount of taxable income. 
•	Corporation Tax. Corporations pay tax on 
the total profits of their company, including 
profits from investments. The main rate of 
Corporation Tax is currently 26%. 
It could be possible to offer a relief, additional 
allowance or credit to social investments under  
any of the above schemes. 
Dutch Green Funds Tax Credit 
33. The new ideas from the Obama administration 
and some of the innovations in Australia deserve 
particular attention in our proposed HM Treasury 
review. In addition, the Dutch Government offers 
investors a tax credit for investing in funds which 
promote socially responsible outcomes. There 
are currently three schemes in place, offering tax 
incentives to invest in: 
•	green funds; 
•	microfinance; and 
•	arts and culture. 
34. Investors receive a tax credit to the value of 
1.9% for investing in approved funds. This credit 
is applied both to Income Tax and to the Dutch 
Assets Tax that individuals pay in Holland. While 
investors will accept a lower rate of return than 
they would on other investments outside the 
scheme, it provides comparable returns once  
the tax credit has been applied. 
35. Qualifying funds are established by existing 
banks and must meet certain criteria. In addition to 
being approved by the relevant financial regulatory 
body, the fund must be able to demonstrate 
that at least 70% of its investments are going 
into programmes that qualify for the scheme. 
Preference is given to particularly innovative 
programmes. The Government sets the criteria for 
qualifying programmes and thus is able to ensure 
that additional investment is being channelled 
towards areas of the greatest policy importance. 
36. Those organisations delivering programmes 
that relate to the preferred policy areas apply 
to their preferred bank for a loan. The bank will 
apply to the Government for a certificate for the 
programme or project, confirming that it qualifies 
for the scheme. The bank is then able to offer 
loans from the fund at a lower return than would 
otherwise be available. 
37. The scheme has been of significant impact in 
raising social investment. By 2008, investors had 
contributed more than €6.8 billion since 1995 for 
the financing of 5,000 projects that may not have 
existed otherwise. Because of the tax scheme, the 
market in green funds grew from €10 million to 
€7 billion in this timespan of 13 years. Many more 
countries are now investigating the implementation 
of similar schemes because of the strong success 
in Holland. 
38. I believe this is the scale of ambition that the 
UK Government has to explore to be serious 
about Early Intervention. While I do not intend 
for the Early Intervention Fund to provide loans, 
it could be possible for the Government to offer 
a tax incentive to investors who put their money 
into Early Intervention programmes through the 
fund. This could be one of several funds approved 
by government in terms of providing investment to 
achieve social outcomes. 
Incentives in Australia 
39. Tax incentives in the area of social investment 
are now well established in Australia. The tax 
system allows companies who pay dividends 
on their profits to get a tax credit on those 
dividends to say that tax has been paid. So tax is 
paid only once, rather than the company paying 
both Corporation and Income Tax. By making 
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social investment tax efficient in the UK, it should 
encourage businesses/individuals to get involved 
in eligible schemes. Crucially, it would also help to 
attract many smaller investors. 
Early Intervention Tax Credit 
40. It is possible to apply the notion of a tax credit 
to Early Intervention to incentivise and top up the 
contributions of local agencies – named an Early 
Intervention Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC could be 
made available on a cash-limited basis, to qualifying 
Early Intervention programmes. The EITC could 
be made available as a 5% tax incentive over a  
five-year period. This would mirror the terms 
available for the current Community Investment 
Tax Relief – discussed below – for forms of social 
investment, but would be administered separately 
and in a way that would lend itself to a bond issue. 
The EITC would be drawn down on a pro-rata 
quarterly basis and used to ease the cash-flow 
pressures experienced in the first one to two 
years of investing in specific Early Intervention 
programmes in a locality. 
41. An EITC model could be beneficial 
compared with a model whereby different central 
government departments offer top-up grants 
to different localities, which are often layered 
in unknown ways on top of new local funding 
arrangements. 
42. The new EITC model could produce clear 
positive benefits: 
•	Investors are presented with a much reduced 
risk that they will receive their return. 
•	Funders and providers face a much lower cost 
of capital. 
•	The cash-flow pressures on providers are greatly 
reduced, meaning that most, if not all, of their 
capital requirements can be addressed through 
private capital markets. 
•	Tax credits can be deployed in any locality and 
benefit any provider, as well as be applied to 
a range of forms of financing. 
•	In this way we can maximise the potential 
for a fully scaled, diverse Early Intervention 
marketplace to evolve. 
43. There could also be scope to make EITC 
available only in cases where two or more local 
agencies have agreed to work together. In this way, 
only those localities that pooled budgets would 
be able to seize the opportunity to make their 
budgets go much further. 
Community development finance 
institutions and the Community 
Investment Tax Relief 
44. Many of those with whom the review team 
has spoken have pointed to the local tax incentives 
available in the US and the impact that these have 
on raising social investment. In the US there is an 
established system of municipal bonds, which in 
many cases are exempt from both Federal and 
State Income Tax. While we do not have a similarly 
devolved tax system in the UK, it is important to 
consider the potential for local tax incentives here. 
45. I was pleased to see that Budget 2011 signalled 
the Government’s intention to retain Community 
Investment Tax Relief (CITR). It is important that all 
tax relief opportunities are used to encourage and 
support investment in Early Intervention delivery. 
Example of tax credit 
A company makes a profit of £100 and pays Corporation Tax at 28%. It then pays out dividends 
on the remaining £72 to its shareholders and attaches a franking credit of £28, which effectively 
states that tax has been paid. The individual then pays tax on the notional amount of the dividend  
(£72 cash + £28 tax credit) at the prevailing rate of 10% for standard rate taxpayers, giving an 
actual tax rate of −18% (i.e. they would get a tax refund of £18 at year-end). For higher rate 
taxpayers it is 32.5%, giving an actual tax rate of 4.5%; and for top rate taxpayers it is 42.5%, giving 
an actual tax rate of 14.5%. 
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46. CITR is a tax relief available to individuals 
and corporate bodies that invest in accredited 
community development finance institutions 
(CDFIs), which in turn provide finance to qualifying 
profit-distributing enterprises, social enterprises or 
community projects. 
47. The tax relief is available to individuals and 
companies and is worth up to 25% of the value 
of the investment in the CDFI. The relief is spread 
over five years, starting with the year in which the 
investment is made. 
48. CDFIs lend money to businesses, social 
enterprises and individuals who struggle to get 
finance from high street banks and loan companies. 
They help deprived communities by offering loans 
and support at affordable rates to people who 
cannot access credit elsewhere. 
49. CDFIs provide finance for a range of 
purposes, including: 
•	start-up capital; 
•	working capital; and 
•	business purchase. 
50. Such finance could play an important role 
in supporting new or existing providers of 
evidence-based Early Intervention programmes, 
either through a franchise model as described 
in Chapter 4 of this report, where programmes 
are being developed by a programme developer, 
where an existing programme provider 
is expanding or to support a new mutual 
organisation. 
51. CDFIs and CITR could provide useful funding 
for Early Intervention. I understand that many 
people in the Early Intervention field are not 
necessarily aware of CITR and the funding through 
CDFIs along with the tax relief opportunities and 
the Early Intervention Foundation would clearly 
have a promotional role in this area. I believe that 
options to improve the effectiveness of CDFIs and 
CITR should be considered as part of the review 
of the tax regime that I recommend at the end of 
this chapter. 
Additional tax incentives 
52. Another alternative in relation to individuals 
could be to ensure that specified social 
investments are taxed for capital gains rather 
than Income Tax purposes, thus increasing the 
incentives for the majority of the types of investor 
we are likely to be targeting. 
53. There are also a number of additional tax 
incentives that could be relevant here: 
•	Gift Aid. This enables charities to reclaim basic 
rate tax on gifts that are made to them. Higher 
rate taxpayers also receive an additional relief 
on charitable donations, as do corporations. 
Extending Gift Aid (or creating a similar new 
scheme) for social investments could be an 
option. Research shows that this would encourage 
41% of individuals to invest. This idea is particularly 
attractive to those with children at home.9 
•	Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS). This is a 
tax relief for investors who purchase new shares 
in smaller high-risk companies, which is necessary 
for economic growth. While not directly 
applicable to social investment, it is possible to 
envisage how a similar scheme could apply to 
Early Intervention – i.e. if government believes 
that social investment is important for the 
growth of the economy, then a tax relief could 
be offered to those purchasing stakes in relevant 
funds, including an Early Intervention Fund. 
•	Venture Capital Trust (VCT) scheme. The VCT 
scheme is designed to encourage individuals to 
invest indirectly in small higher-risk companies 
whose shares and securities are not listed on 
a recognised stock exchange. They enable 
investors to spread the investment risk over 
a number of companies in a VCT, and offer 
various tax reliefs, including on Income Tax, 
Capital Gains Tax, and Corporation Tax.  
A similar mechanism could be designed to offer 
tax breaks for Early Intervention investors, and 
to help grow the social investment market. 
•	Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs). Over  
20 million people in the UK currently have 
an ISA, which works out at 40% of the adult 
population. The total value of these assets sits 
at £350 billion. Over 12 million people in Britain 
with incomes below £20,000 currently hold an 
ISA. ISAs offer individual investors a specified 
tax-free ‘wrapper’ on savings investments.  
I believe that there are many people who would 
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use ISAs available on every high street to invest 
in better outcomes for babies, children and 
young people. In addition to developing Early 
Intervention products that could form part of  
an ISA investment package, another option 
would be to increase the tax-free allowance on 
ISAs for Early Intervention social investments. 
These options are considered in more detail in 
Annex I. 
•	Junior ISAs. The rules on Junior ISAs are due to 
be published in summer 2011 and Junior ISAs 
are expected to be available by autumn 2011. 
They will offer parents a new, tax-free way to 
save for their own child’s future. It cannot be 
beyond our ingenuity to put these savings to 
work to offer a way to secure the future for 
other children too. However, unlike the Child 
Trust Fund account (which has been closed to 
children born on or after 3 January 2011), the 
Government will not make any payments into 
the new accounts. A Junior ISA could provide 
one ‘patient capital’ option for helping to finance 
Early Intervention on a longer-term basis. 
Further information on Junior ISAs can be found 
at Annex I. 
Broader aims relating to tax incentives 
54. My expert finance group had some more 
innovative suggestions that we have not considered 
in depth, but which warrant a mention. These 
suggestions tended to look at the taxation of 
wealthy individuals. One example provided 
centred around non-domicile tax status. It was 
suggested that if individuals did want to bring 
money into the UK from tax havens, then this 
could be permitted, but only after the money 
had been used for a number of years for social 
investment purposes in the UK. This – and no 
doubt other possibilities – should be fully explored 
by the review recommended below. 
Recommendation 18 
I recommend that HM Treasury should 
commission a thorough review of Early 
Intervention growth incentives ahead 
of the 2012 Budget to assess what 
more the tax regime can do to enable all 
relevant investor groups, including high net 
worth individuals, social and philanthropic 
investors, businesses and retail savers to 
support Early Intervention investment. This 
should include: 
•	incentives relating to Capital Gains Tax; 
•	incentives relating to Corporation Tax; 
•	lessons learnt from tax credits as part of 
the Dutch Green Funds Scheme; 
•	allowing local authorities the right 
to borrow against cost savings from 
outcome-based contracts (similar to tax 
incremental financing); 
•	Community Investment Tax Relief; 
•	a cash-limited Early Intervention Tax 
Credit; and 
•	accreditation for Early Intervention ISAs 
and increased ISA allowances for Early 
Intervention investors. 
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Chapter 8 
Moving forward 
Culture eats strategy for breakfast, every day. 
Peter Drucker 
1. In Early Intervention: The Next Steps and 
in this Report, I have set out a number of 
recommendations – political, cultural, institutional, 
financial and economic. If followed for a generation, 
they will allow for a shift in spending from 
late intervention to Early Intervention, and a 
subsequent improvement in the outcomes for 
young people and for society as a whole. The need 
for Early Intervention is not just confined to those 
in poverty, nevertheless this move to an Early 
Intervention culture should enable greater social 
mobility and a significant rebalancing of economic 
resources. 
2. A way forward is mapped out clearly in places, 
necessarily vaguely in others, but always with a 
clear sense of direction. We will need to leave the 
path to explore opportunities, but must always 
keep the destination in sight, to ensure that all 
our babies, children and young people have good, 
safe and happy lives now and build the social and 
emotional competencies they need to make the 
most of their futures. 
3. There are huge expectations about 
Early Intervention. These two Reports are a 
contribution. They are not the answer; we all now 
need to continue the move towards a culture of 
Early Intervention. 
4. The responsibility for improving the lives of our 
children is shared. Central government, local areas, 
the voluntary sector, parents and investors all have 
roles to play in improving society. I expect the 
Early Intervention Foundation to drive this change, 
with government support. Of course, there is 
a risk, as with any venture, that the Foundation 
might not come into fruition in time. Because it 
represents such great value for money to society, 
I do not envisage this, however I would not want 
to fail the children for lack of a contingency plan. 
If, for whatever reason, the Early Intervention 
Foundation is not set up by December 2011 
as I have recommended, then central and local 
government must step in to fulfil the functions 
which I have earmarked for it. 
5. I have recommended that central government: 
considers prioritising Early Intervention in the next 
Comprehensive Spending Review; enables local 
areas to work flexibly with their resources; and 
provides timely support on the outcomes that  
it would share payment for, and at what price.  
I recommended that better co-ordination of Early 
Intervention policy between the Department 
of Health and the Department for Education 
would facilitate this, with a focus on having a 
Foundation Years Plan. In addition, it is clear that 
the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury must take 
roles in co-ordinating activity in government on 
social investment. They must ensure that, where 
government departments benefit from the savings 
generated by Early Intervention in later years, that 
there are systems in place to ensure that these 
savings are recycled to investors through outcome­
80 Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive Savings 
based contracts so that further investment can be 
made for future generations.  
6. Without vision and commitment to change, 
however, nothing will happen. We could get 
to a position where progress is halted in the 
quest for perfect data. We do not need to get 
to this position and we cannot wait 25 years 
for longitudinal data on the effect of every 
programme in the UK – we might not be able 
to afford such data collection, and it may not be 
relevant to the problems 25 years hence when 
we have it. Central government needs to trust 
the accumulation of evidence that we do have, 
on many programmes and from many countries, 
and so model outcomes and likely cashable savings 
from what we know now. It needs to agree a price 
that we will attach to children not being in care, 
to young people not being in the criminal justice 
system, and to young people having the social and 
emotional capabilities to hold down good jobs, so 
that we can reward those companies and investors 
who deliver this for us. Central government can 
also hedge its bets by transferring the risk onto 
providers and investors who, if they want to be 
paid, then need to make sure that the programme 
works. This is not to say that data should not be 
improved; it should, as it will help to develop the 
market, but it should not hinder progress. 
7. We need to recognise the lead of other 
countries like the US, where President Obama 
has endorsed the use of Payment for Success 
contracts for Early Intervention programmes. 
We need to look at our maternity and paternity 
systems and see if there is something positive to 
learn from Scandinavian countries. In short, central 
government needs to be open to change, to shake 
off old systems and to accept that these ways of 
working and decades of massively funded late 
intervention have not created the fair and equal 
society that they have strived for. 
8. To facilitate these changes, central government 
needs to set aside money for outcome-based 
payments, co-ordinate social investment activity 
and consider whether HM Treasury’s spending 
formulas really are fit for purpose in a society 
where it is evident that preventive policies provide 
the best long-term value for money. It needs to 
be mindful of local area work. Where local areas 
are implementing payment-by-results contracts 
for Early Intervention, they need to be assured 
that they can pay these back in later years. Central 
government cannot claw back savings made by 
local areas before they go to investors. 
9. Local areas need to identify their needs for 
Early Intervention and to have systems in place 
which will direct support at the earliest stage 
to those families and children who need it. 
Some resources will be available from the Early 
Intervention Grant, and others from the public 
health budget and other sources. However, 
where this is not sufficient, local areas should 
look at where they will make savings from Early 
Intervention and, with central government where 
applicable, seek to put a price on these outcomes. 
This can then enable external investment to be 
sought through outcome-based contracts. 
10. The Greater London Authority has kindly 
offered to co-ordinate the 27 Early Intervention 
places and to forward change at a local level.  
These areas will be the first to be able to access 
the resources of the Early Intervention Foundation 
and we will ensure that some are on the board of 
the Foundation, to ensure that the Foundation is 
sector-led. 
11. The Early Intervention Foundation will 
champion and drive change. With government, 
and other research partners, it will continue to 
improve the evidence base on what works and 
ensure that it is disseminated to commissioners 
and providers of services. This information will 
also be made available to social investors in order 
to encourage an increase in investment in Early 
Intervention. The Foundation will work for local 
areas in order to enable them to make the best 
use of data and funding opportunities. It will 
provide advice on contracting and outcome-based 
payments, help to negotiate deals with central 
government and work with investors to develop 
an Early Intervention Fund. 
12. While I have been writing this Report, a 
group of endorsers of the Foundation have 
been working hard to develop a business plan. 
Obviously, some money will need to be found 
for set-up costs and it is for this reason that they 
are advocating an endowment fund to enable 
this to happen. The Foundation will monitor 
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progress on my recommendations and ensure 
that change is delivered and sustained. The Early 
Intervention Foundation will have a central role 
in driving forward the government agendas on 
Early Intervention. It is for this reason that in this 
Report I am requesting funding from central 
government. This represents good value for 
government because the remaining start-up cash is 
expected to come from charitable foundations and 
philanthropic gifts. 
13. The voluntary sector has a role in ensuring 
that it delivers effective programmes, and in 
disseminating information regarding what works. 
In my first report, I recommended that there 
should be a national parenting campaign led by 
charitable groups, parents and employers. This 
campaign would help to educate parents about 
the importance of their children’s early years, 
with practical examples to enable them to better 
support the social and emotional development of 
their children. 
14. Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers: A Strategy 
for Social Mobility, which set out the first high-level 
response to my first Report, agreed with this 
recommendation and agreed that government 
would help to move this forward. 
15. Finally, I would like to thank again all those 
who helped on my two Reports, especially my 
wonderful review team. I would also like to 
apologise to those whom I annoyed, offended or, 
in the case of my family, neglected. You should all 
be confident in the knowledge that as we achieve 
what we set out to achieve for our children, it was, 
and is, worth it. 
Recommendation 19 
I recommend that when the Early 
Intervention Foundation is in place, it 
initiates serious all-party discussions on 
Early Intervention to agree on actions 
to maintain and promote long-term 
commitment to Early Intervention. 
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Annex A 
The 25 best Early Intervention programmes in 
the UK
 
The following programmes identified in Early 
Intervention: The Next Steps are implemented 
and/or available in the UK. The programmes are 
colour-coded according to the three levels defined 
in Annex B of that report: 
Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 
Conception to school 
Curiosity Corner (as part of Success for All) 
Incredible Years 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care 
Nurse Family Partnership 
Success for All 
Parent Child Interaction Therapy (PCIT) 
Breakthrough to Literacy 
Community Mothers 
High/Scope Perry Pre-School 
Parents as Teachers 
Triple P 
Primary school 
Incredible Years 
Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) 
Reading Recovery 
Success for All 
Parent–Child Interaction Therapy (PCIT) 
Breakthrough to Literacy 
Caring Schools Communities 
Cooperative Integrated Reading and Composition 
Good Behavior Game 
Olweus Bullying Program 
PALS 
Quick Reads 
The Reading Edge 
Roots of Empathy 
Triple P 
Secondary school 
Functional Family Therapy 
Incredible Years 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care 
Multisystemic Therapy 
Success for All 
Olweus Bullying Program 
Parenting Wisely 
Read 180 
Roots of Empathy 
Triple P 
This is a living list which has evolved even since my 
first Report and it will continue to do so. There are 
many – even hundreds of – excellent programmes 
(including many which I helped to bring to 
Nottingham) not currently listed. As further 
evidence becomes available, this list will develop. 
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Annex B 
What government departments are already 
doing for Early Intervention 
I asked my review team to collate information from government departments on the Early Intervention 
work occurring across Whitehall in order to give readers some background. 
Sure Start children’s 
centres 
The Government has said that it wants to retain a network of Sure 
Start children’s centres, accessible to all families but focused on those in 
greatest need. 
Health visitors The Government has committed to funding an extra 4,200 health 
visitors, who will work closely with Sure Start children’s centres and other 
early years practitioners. 
Outreach and family Sure Start children’s centres provide outreach and family support 
support services, which have a critical role to play in reaching vulnerable families. 
They work alongside health visitors, social workers and other early years 
professionals. 
Family Nurse Partnership The Government is committed to doubling the number of places on the 
Family Nurse Partnership programme by 2015. 
Early Years Foundation 
Stage framework 
All early years settings – schools, children’s centres providing childcare, 
childminders, nurseries, pre-school playgroups – have been required 
since September 2008 to meet the standards set out in the Early Years 
Foundation Stage (EYFS) for all children aged 0–5 in their care. 
Early Years Foundation 
Stage review 
The Government asked Dame Clare Tickell (Chief Executive of Action 
for Children) to carry out a review of the EYFS. The review looked at 
how best to protect young children’s safety and welfare and support 
their development and learning, particularly the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged children. Underpinning this, the review also looked at how 
to reduce burdens on providers, recognising their professionalism and 
that they deserve professional freedom. 
Free entitlement to early 
education for 3- and 
4-year-olds 
The Government has increased the 3- and 4-year-olds entitlement to 
15 hours a week of free early years provision for 38 weeks per year. This 
applies until they reach compulsory school age (the term following their 
fifth birthday). Some 95% of 3- and 4-year-olds access some or all of 
their entitlement. Free places are delivered by a range of providers from 
the maintained schools sector and private, voluntary and independent 
sectors. 
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2-year-old entitlement to Since September 2009, all local authorities have been funded to deliver 
early education up to 15 hours a week of free early education to 15% of their most 
disadvantaged 2-year-olds. Approximately 20,000 children currently 
benefit from this. 
Early Intervention Grant The new Early Intervention Grant (EIG) brings together the funding 
for Early Intervention and preventive services. It is a substantial pot of 
funding allocated to local authorities which is not ringfenced so that it 
can be used more flexibly to address the particular issues affecting local 
communities. In its first two years, £2,222 million (2011/12) and £2,307 
million (2012/13) is being allocated to local authorities in England via 
the EIG. As I have said, this is a helpful and symbolic statement of intent, 
but its purpose and use must be seen to advance Early Intervention as 
proposed by my review. 
Payment by results The Department for Education’s (DFE’s) Business Plan commits it to 
working with local authorities to explore the introduction of payment 
by results for Sure Start children’s centres. A trial with a number of local 
authorities should begin later in the year, running until March 2013. 
Special educational needs 
(SEN) Green Paper – 
early years 
The DFE’s Green Paper Support and Aspiration: A new approach to special 
educational needs and disability, published in March 2011, emphasises the 
importance of effective identification of SEN and disabilities if children 
are to thrive, be ready for school, make good progress in their education 
and, as adults, live independently and make as positive contribution to 
society as is possible. 
Pupil Premium The Pupil Premium will make sure that the most deprived pupils, 
including those most able, receive the support they need to reach their 
potential and will help schools ensure that all their pupils have the same 
opportunities. It will be for schools to decide how the Pupil Premium 
is spent since they are best placed to assess what additional provision 
should be made for the individual pupils within their responsibility. 
Every Child Funding previously held centrally for the Every Child programmes, 
targeted at those children in the bottom 5% in early reading and 
mathematics has now been made available to schools through the 
Dedicated Schools Grant. 
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National campaign to In December 2010 the Prime Minister announced a new national 
campaign to support and help turn around the lives of all families with 
multiple problems, including reducing costs to public services. The 
national campaign will include: 
support families with 
multiple problems 
•	DfE’s Early Intervention Grant of £2.2 billion; 
•	the roll out of Community Budgets (all local areas can access support 
to redesign services to provide more integrated and cost-effective help 
to troubled families); 
•	£10 million investment in national voluntary and community 
organisations with expertise in supporting families with problems; 
•	Working Families Everywhere – a new national charity developing ways 
to support families into work; and 
•	£200 million European Social Fund investment to support families who 
have been stabilised by family intervention services to move towards work. 
Family Support Services The Government is looking to build on the experience and understanding 
gained in recent years from funding a wide range of services to support 
parents and families in England by procuring a new set of services, 
delivered through the internet and by telephone. 
telephone and online 
helplines 
Multisystemic Therapy Multisystemic Therapy is a community-based treatment for antisocial 
behaviour in young people that started in the US and is now being 
delivered in the UK. A randomised control trial has been set up to 
measure the impact of Multisystemic Therapy on outcomes for young 
people and families. 
Youth crime The Home Office has announced a total of over £18 million of ring-
fenced funding over two years for police, local agencies and the voluntary 
sector to tackle teenage knife, gun and gang violence and to prevent 
young people from entering a cycle of crime. The funding will support 
enforcement work by police in three police force areas, alongside positive 
activities for young people across England and Wales, and local work to 
bring about long-term changes in attitudes and behaviours. Activities 
aimed at youth crime prevention may also be funded from the Early 
Intervention Grant, which provides local authorities with an unringfenced 
funding stream to fund Early Intervention and prevention activity. 
Munro Review Professor Munro concludes that preventive services will do more to 
reduce abuse and neglect than reactive services. Helping early delivers 
better outcomes for children, young people and families and is more cost 
effective. 
DfE Business Plan Milestone 5.C: First annual data released on number of families that have 
been through an evidence-based Early Intervention programme by local 
authority (exact measure to be agreed after publication of this report 
from Graham Allen). 
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Early Intervention in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales 
Northern Ireland 
The Northern Ireland Department of 
Health, Social Services and Public Safety 
has a number of strategies that promote 
and support prevention and early 
intervention. 
At an operational level, the Public 
Health Agency (PHA) is convinced that 
investment in early years interventions 
brings significant benefits later in life across 
a range of areas such as health and well-
being, education, reduced violence and 
crime. The PHA’s approach is informed 
by the dynamic growth of scientific, 
neurological and economic knowledge 
which clearly demonstrates that creating 
the right conditions for early childhood 
development is likely to be more effective 
and less costly than addressing problems at 
a later age. In particular, the PHA supports 
prioritisation of investment in services 
that provide intensive support during 
pregnancy, the first five years of life and 
later childhood. Such investment will bring 
an important return for the individual and 
society as a whole. 
There is close collaboration between 
government agencies and the voluntary 
and community sectors in this area. 
The PHA has introduced two evidence-based early 
intervention programmes to Northern Ireland: Family 
Nurse Partnership and Roots of Empathy. 
Other initiatives include: 
•	An increase in the current level and efficacy of the 
Incredible Years parenting support programme. 
•	Increased access for professionals and all organisations 
to bespoke infant mental awareness training. This 
includes promoting increased uptake of training such 
as that provided through the Solihull approach model. 
•	An antenatal ‘care bundle’ aimed at maximising 
interventions with parents who have risk factors. 
•	Active consideration through research of incentive-
based smoking cessation aimed specifically at young 
expectant mothers. 
•	Enhancing links between the implementation of 
existing PHA Action Plans, e.g. breastfeeding, mental 
health and well-being, community development and so 
forth. 
•	Developing local models such as the South Eastern 
Health and Social Care Trust parenting programme 
and the New Parent Project which targets intensive 
health visitor support at vulnerable young pregnant 
women. 
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Northern Ireland (continued) •	Department of Education support for 32 Sure 
Start projects located in the most deprived areas in 
Northern Ireland, providing a balanced mix of services 
to an estimated 34,000 children and their families. 
•	Consideration is being given to a new strategy to 
increase the rates of breastfeeding. 
•	An updated child health promotion programme to 
ensure that universal services delivered to all families 
by maternity services, GPs, health visitors and school 
nurses is based on the latest evidence of what is best 
for children. 
•	Hidden Harm, which provides support for children 
whose carers have significant problems with alcohol 
and/or drugs. 
•	The Parenting Helpline Family Support hubs provide 
needs-based family support services. 
•	A web-based Regional Family Support Information 
System providing access to local information on the 
range of family support services available. 
•	Independent philanthropic funding from Atlantic 
Philanthropies, which has supported a number of new 
evidence-based early years intervention programmes 
both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of 
Ireland. There is a commitment to sharing the learning 
from these models and to the systematic dissemination 
of best practice in their implementation. 
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Scotland 
The new Scottish Government has made 
a number of manifesto commitments 
relevant to early intervention in the early 
years. 
This builds on a six-month investigation 
into Preventive Spending by the Finance 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament in 
early 2011, which said there needed to be 
a shift from reacting to crises, to a greater 
focus on prevention and early intervention. 
The Committee’s report also emphasised 
the need for a consensual approach 
in moving towards a more preventive 
approach to public sector spending and 
investment in early years in particular, and 
that this will require leadership across all 
political parties. 
•	The Scottish Government has allocated an additional 
£50 million in a change fund to support projects 
designed to deliver effective early intervention in a 
child’s life, including a new generation of family centres. 
This includes:
– creating an early years task force to co-ordinate 
policy and ensure that early years spending is 
prioritised by the whole public sector; 
–	 ensuring that every council in Scotland reflects the 
early years and early intervention agenda in its Single 
Outcome Agreement; 
– continuing to roll out the Family Nurse Partnership 
programme across Scotland; 
–	 developing a national parenting strategy, providing 
parents with access to a guaranteed level of support; 
–	 further developing the highly successful PlayTalkRead 
campaign to highlight the importance of parents’ 
input to a child’s development; and 
–	 continuing to develop the Early Years Early Action 
Fund, which supports projects in the third sector 
that deliver early intervention. 
•	The Scottish Government is also considering how 
social impact bonds might be used in a variety of 
contexts, including childcare, and recognises the need 
for further development. 
Wales 
The new Welsh Government is taking 
forward a number of commitments that 
recognise the importance of early and 
effective interventions in the lives of 
children and young people. 
•	The Flying Start programme has been doubled so 
that more children and families can benefit. Flying 
Start is a programme for families with children aged 
0–3. It is targeted at Wales’s most deprived areas 
and encompasses free childcare, parenting support, 
intensive health visitor support and support for early 
literacy and delivers quality experiences for children in 
those areas. International research shows that support 
in the early years is vital to a child’s emotional, social 
and cognitive development and Flying Start is the 
Welsh Government’s flagship programme for providing 
that support. 
•	The Families First programme is being maintained 
throughout the period of the next Assembly, with a 
distinct focus on the circumstances of disabled children 
as part of the programme. 
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Wales (continued) •	Families First seeks to drive improvements to the 
systems and services that support families, particularly 
those with children living in poverty. A key message 
of Families First is that, in order to prevent escalation 
of need and its associated costs, prevention, early 
identification and early and appropriate interventions 
are key. The programme, currently at pioneer stage, 
seeks to reduce the numbers of families developing 
more complex needs, with their associated more 
intensive and costly interventions, at a later date. 
•	Other actions include: 
– the adoption of a programme focusing on the 
importance of health in the early years, drawing on 
experience from health professionals, family support 
services, education, social care and others; 
– prioritising new models of working with families with 
complex needs by rolling out the Integrated Family 
Support Services across Wales; 
– the continuation of the Free Breakfast programme, 
with free school milk for pupils under 7 years of age; 
and 
– continued support for Incredible Years Wales. 
•	Alongside these commitments the Welsh Government 
also has continued with the implementation of the 
Foundation Phase, a holistic developmental curriculum 
designed to meet the needs of the individual child and 
to support their development whatever their abilities. 
Its skills-based curriculum places greater emphasis 
on experiential learning and the use of the outdoors. 
Roll out of the curriculum will be completed from 
September for all 3- to 7-year-olds. Its prime objective 
should be to produce high levels of ‘school readiness’ 
for all children regardless of family income. 
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Introducing a franchise function 
There are a number of proven Early Intervention 
programmes that are currently delivered outside 
the UK. Introducing these programmes to the 
UK would require them to be developed for a 
UK context, reflecting different social and cultural 
norms. It is also the case that a number of existing 
UK programmes operate only in particular areas of 
the country, and rolling them out more widely may 
require support. An independent body such as 
the Early Intervention Foundation could introduce 
a franchise model to both make programmes UK 
ready and to support effective roll out. 
A master franchise agreement allows individuals 
or organisations to buy the rights to sub-franchise 
within a specific territory or another country, such 
as the UK. This model could be applied in respect 
of Early Intervention programmes. A single entity 
(an independent body or the Early Intervention 
Foundation) could act as the master franchisor, 
purchasing the franchise agreement for a range 
of the best Early Intervention programmes and 
acting as the sole owner and manager of individual 
franchises. The entity would then have a role to 
help develop programmes to be more UK ready, 
so that they could be rolled out more widely. 
The entity could raise finance for these purposes, 
paying back investors once the franchises had been 
bought by local authorities etc. This could help to 
address any capacity issues. The entity could also 
offer direct support to local areas which purchase 
the franchise, therefore improving fidelity and 
increasing the chances of success. 
The additional benefits of a franchise model  
would be: 
•	To incentivise providers to deliver as best they 
can with fidelity (otherwise the franchise goes to 
another local provider). 
•	To incentivise innovation, as new models could 
be sold for development under the franchise 
model (i.e. by a local authority which develops 
a new programme). The entity could help the 
local authorities to implement and develop a 
new model if the entity deems it a possible 
success through its rigorous evidence-based 
testing. This could be particularly beneficial in 
the case where a single academic institution or 
local authority has developed a new programme, 
but may not have the resources (time or 
financial) for rolling out more widely. 
•	To minimise the risk of many external 
contractors throughout the UK, as there will 
only be one entity buying the programmes. 
Using a single entity to run the franchise would 
reduce the need for a programme owner to 
organise multiple contracts for rolling out across 
the UK. The economies of scale would also help to 
generate greater cost savings. 
The entity could also enable the programme 
owner(s) to provide additional support to those 
who have purchased the franchise for particular 
programmes. The entity would have responsibility 
for ‘recruiting’ relevant local authorities and 
possible charitable organisations to roll out 
relevant programmes in their areas. 
92 Early Intervention: Smart Investment, Massive Savings 
In order to develop the programme for wider 
roll out, the entity could consider taking a loan 
from private sector organisations. Once the local 
authorities have bought a franchise from the entity 
this money can pay back the loans. This means 
there would be a guaranteed stream of finance 
coming back to the private organisations, which is a 
potentially economical option as loans are typically 
cheaper. This is something that the Big Society 
Bank could be approached for. 
Guide for the franchise model 
•	An Early Intervention programme developer 
would sell the rights to use their programme to 
an independent body or the Early Intervention 
Foundation. The developer would be the 
‘franchisor’. 
•	The Foundation would be the master franchisee 
and would have responsibility for running, 
managing and developing the Early Intervention 
programmes. 
•	The Early Intervention Foundation would seek 
private sector and charitable funding to help 
develop the programmes and provide support 
to local authorities/commissioners implementing 
the programmes. This could be in the form of a 
loan or through the Early Intervention Fund. 
•	The Foundation would provide a package of 
support to the local authorities to help them 
implement the Early Intervention programme 
with fidelity. 
•	If the local authorities/commissioners implement 
the programme successfully then they could buy 
the franchise agreement from the Foundation. 
•	If the programme is not implemented 
successfully and with fidelity then the franchise 
agreement would be taken away from the local 
authorities/commissioners. 
Figure D1: The franchise model 
£ Foundation 
buys franchise 
Finance for 
interventions 
Investors Foundation 
Programme 
owner 
Commissioners 
£ Commissioner 
buys franchise 
Package of 
support 
provided to 
commissioners. 
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Concept paper: The Early Intervention 
Foundation
 
Summary 
The Allen Report has proposed the creation of 
an independent Early Intervention Foundation 
(EIF) that would promote a major shift towards 
investment in proven approaches that can 
break the cycle of childhood abuse and neglect. 
The EIF would perform four critical functions: 
to build and champion the evidence base for 
investment in Early Intervention; to support 
local agencies to draw up new results-based 
contracts; to help providers to build their 
capacity to deliver Early Intervention services; 
and to assist providers to access new sources of 
capital. 
The proposal is that EIF is founded with  
£10 million of funding from central government, 
in recognition of the major savings that will 
accrue to government over the longer term. This 
sum will be matched by private and charitable 
sources. An endowment will be used to invest 
in research and to allow the EIF to generate 
income on a results basis through services to 
local agencies, providers and investors. Twenty 
pilot EIF programmes would be developed in the 
first 18 months of operation, with potential for 
up to two additional programmes to support a 
scaling up of interventions in pioneer authorities. 
Introduction 
Thousands of children’s lives are blighted needlessly 
each year. Disadvantage and harm are passed on 
from one generation to the next. Only 0.1% of 
the £55 billion spent by government on services 
targeted at children is directed towards prevention. 
And yet we now know with remarkable clarity 
which interventions would break this cycle and, 
indeed, we can make sound predictions about how 
different young lives are likely to turn out. 
We can cost the major, ongoing savings that would 
be made by government and wider society if we 
funded the best, most powerful approaches to 
break this cycle. Furthermore, there are now 
new sources of investment that can be mobilised 
to make these interventions happen in towns 
and cities across the UK. There is, in short, no 
longer any excuse for inaction: we need to make 
a large-scale and long-term investment in Early 
Intervention now. 
This is the conclusion of the Allen Report 
on Early Intervention, which has set out a 
vision that is shared by the leaders of all the 
main political parties, by leading investors and 
funders, international experts as well as provider 
organisations from across the sectors. We have 
a coalition of willing partners: the next step is to 
move from talk to action. What we envisage is 
akin to the major investment in public health made 
in the 19th century that produced a permanent, 
population-wide change in life experiences and 
expectations. We envisage a shift over the coming 
decade to a position where 5% of public funding 
rather than the current 0.1% is directed to 
prevention rather than cure. 
The Allen Report has argued that a new 
institutional engine is required to ensure that the 
right investment is made in the right actions, in 
locations across the UK. This new engine is 
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the Early Intervention Foundation. The Report 
proposes that such an institution must be: 
•	independent from government; 
•	guided by the strongest possible evidence base 
of what works; 
•	financially sustainable and scalable; 
•	responsive to the voice and experience of young 
people; and 
•	an intermediary and connector: bringing 
together money, providers and funders in 
partnership, in order to inspire a spiral of hope 
rather than an endless cycle of dysfunction. 
In what follows, I outline the key functions of the 
proposed Early Intervention Foundation: 
•	Its mission in building and disseminating the 
evidence base regarding what works. 
•	The contracts it will help to broker between 
local authorities and providers. 
•	How it will help to build the capacity of a wider 
supplier network. 
•	The ways in which capital will be raised. 
•	How it will be organised in terms of legal 
structure, governance and staffing. 
Note: This is a concept document only and much 
further business planning – including detailed 
financial modelling of the proposed investment 
fund – will be required over coming weeks. Your 
comments are invited on all aspects of these 
proposals, which remain at an early stage of 
development. Our intention is then to move to 
a more detailed business plan that can be taken 
formally to partners and investors over coming 
months. 
Interventions to be supported by  
the EIF 
Aim: The EIF will help to build the evidence 
base for the most effective early interventions in 
children’s lives and champion these interventions 
as widely as possible. 
a) Support for portfolio management 
Central to our approach is a focus on investing 
in proven models. We will recommend to 
local agencies that they invest in well-balanced 
portfolios of interventions, where at least 80% 
of programmes meet the standards of evidence 
outlined in the Allen Report. Other funds should 
be directed to programmes geared to systematic 
innovation, where a proper process of evidence 
gathering, evaluation and peer review is in 
place. In this way, local communities can realise 
the long-term benefits of both replicating and 
scaling proven successes and innovating new and 
potentially better interventions for the future. 
b) Evidence standards 
A summary of some of the key interventions 
can also be reviewed in the Allen Report – Early 
Intervention: The Next Steps. The report also 
summarises the standards of evidence that we 
consider should be applied to any intervention 
targeted for increased investment. It is critical 
that the EIF should stand for an especially high 
rigour of evidence-based investment. Its model 
of performance management needs to be both 
exhaustive and maximise knowledge building for 
the future. 
c) Evidence-building systems and standards 
The EIF will not itself manage performance of 
different local interventions, but it will recommend 
standards and systems for ensuring that 
performance data is captured in order to support 
effective delivery, manage contract compliance, 
protect investors’ interests and also build the 
wider evidence base. Granular, real-time data will 
be required of providers and contract managers: 
some, but not all, of this data will be required to 
serve other purposes, hence EIF will have a close 
interest in and a role in enabling all concerned to 
answer critical questions, such as the following, on 
a real-time basis: 
•	Are the prescribed interventions being delivered 
in the right way? We are looking for the greatest 
possible fidelity to the known critical success 
factors for successful action. 
•	Are the expected outcomes being delivered? 
We are targeting the smallest possible deviation 
from the norm for a specific intervention and a 
specific target group. 
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•	Are the outcomes being delivered at the right 
cost? We need provision to be as cost-efficient 
as possible, without compromising quality. 
•	Are there new hallmarks of successful practice 
that we should learn from? 
d) Building the research literature 
A central function of the EIF will be to continue 
to review and build the evidence base for all 
kinds of early intervention that break the cycle 
of disadvantage. Some research may be carried 
out in-house, but the default mode will be to 
commission research from leaders in the field 
internationally and indeed encourage fruitful 
collaborations between experts in this area. 
e) Dissemination of knowledge and championing 
of Early Intervention 
Significant investment will also be made in 
research dissemination in the form of expert 
advice to funders, providers and investors, as well 
as dissemination of research findings through 
mainstream and social media channels. Another 
critical role will be to popularise the cause of 
Early Intervention by working with Civil Society 
and other partners – to build the groundswell 
of support at a community level. We aim to 
transform the understanding of and commitment 
to far-reaching investment in the future of 
disadvantaged children so that over a generation 
we move from spending 0.1% on prevention to 
closer to 5%. 
Partnering with local authorities 
Aim: The EIF will act as a key partner for 
local public agencies wanting to invest in Early 
Intervention. 
The most important actors in making Early 
Intervention a reality are local public agencies – led 
by local authorities, supported by primary care 
trusts/GP commissioning bodies, the police and 
schools. Unlike models such as the Peterborough 
social impact bond experiment, we consider that 
the commissioning role of local agencies should 
not be delegated to investors, but it should be 
supported so as to be as collaborative and as 
effective as possible. The Allen Report has argued 
that local agencies should be given the greatest 
possible freedoms and incentives to invest in Early 
Intervention on a truly ambitious scale. 
The EIF will have a critical role in helping local 
agencies to invest in Early Intervention with 
confidence, offering advice and consultancy in the 
following areas: 
•	Championing Early Intervention locally and 
helping to build commitment from different 
agencies. 
•	Building the evidence base for different 
interventions. 
•	Baseline assessment of needs. 
•	Diagnostic screening to assist review of current 
support entitlements. 
•	Constructing a balanced portfolio of 
investments, so as to optimise short and longer 
term impacts and costs savings. 
•	Modelling of social and financial returns for 
different Early Intervention portfolios  
i.e. defining which results and cost savings  
will accrue to which funder over the course  
of a programme. 
•	Definition of outcome metrics for both interim 
and longer term outcomes, together with 
evidence-gathering standards and suggested 
payment schedules. 
•	A legal template for results-based contracts 
between a group of purchasers and providers 
– locking in the agreed portfolio, key outcomes 
and metrics, the monitoring and evaluation 
methodologies to be employed, resource 
contributions, target cost savings and agreed exit 
points. 
•	Facilitating additional contributions to results 
contracts from central government, for example 
from benefits bill savings and reduced cost 
burden on the Ministry of Justice – dependent 
upon the adoption of the Allen Report 
recommendations by central government. 
•	Offering advice and support for procurement 
on a value for money basis. 
The EIF will also add value through the activities 
outlined in the following sections, helping to build 
the capacity of the provider community and 
facilitating access to capital. 
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Joint working will be critical to the success of 
Early Intervention at a local level and the EIF will 
thus have a critical role in facilitating a model of 
co-purchasing of outcomes that is based on known 
benefits and savings to different stakeholders 
and follows a standard process. As a result of EIF 
support and advice, each local agency will be clear 
which outcomes it is prepared to fund, how these 
will be measured and validated, what price it is 
prepared to pay for each of these outcomes, and 
over what timescale. Where possible, the terms 
of trade will include some payment on account by 
local public agencies for early outcomes achieved. 
This will have the effect of decreasing the cost of 
capital for both parties, without compromising 
the risk transfer from funder to investor/ 
provider. Similar measures have been taken with 
the Government’s Work Programme, for similar 
reasons. 
The business case for local agency support will be 
as follows: 
•	transfer of risk from purchaser to investor and 
provider; 
•	paying for results out of cashable savings; 
•	co-purchasing of results without complex 
budget pooling arrangements; 
•	accessing the best available interventions; 
•	accessing the most capable providers; 
•	rigorous evidence-building systems and 
standards; and 
•	a financing model that seeks to cap financial 
returns and where possible reinvests profit in 
further investment in Early Intervention. 
The EIF would not charge for these services up-
front, but would add a proportion of the costs – 
perhaps in the region of £60,000 – to the overall 
value of a three-year results contract, such that the 
associated costs could be repaid as the contract 
reached the agreed targets. The EIF’s founding 
endowment will allow it to take these risks and 
manage the associated cash flow pressures. 
Building the supply side 
Aim: The EIF will help to build the capacity of 
providers of Early Intervention. 
The EIF will be devoted to building an effective 
marketplace in Early Intervention. Work with 
funders to maximise knowledge about the relative 
benefits of different interventions will thus need 
to be matched by measures to build supply-side 
capability. 
Providers will need to implement different 
interventions with maximum fidelity to known 
critical success factors. In the end, however, 
responsibility must sit with providers to ensure 
that they are able to evidence their ability to do 
this and no one funding stream can hope to cover 
all the costs of training, accreditation, introduction 
of new systems etc that will be required to bring 
many providers up to the required standard. 
What the EIF can do is to provide strategic 
funding and support for specific capacity building 
services. The preferred approach will involve 
funding agencies who can then offer cost-effective 
support services to providers to deliver specific 
interventions on an accredited, licensed or social 
franchise basis. A second approach would involve 
investing in new supply chain managers who could 
provide shared services and support for a supply 
chain of providers. A budget of £300,000, tapered 
to £150,000 per annum, has been earmarked for 
this purpose. 
Access to finance 
Aim: The EIF will maximise providers’ access 
to appropriate capital, above all by applying its 
unique depth of understanding of the social 
and financial risks and returns associated with 
investment in Early Intervention. The EIF will 
perform a role that combines expert analysis 
with access to a privileged pipeline of investment 
opportunities. 
a) The capital requirement 
If the EIF were to support Early Intervention pilot 
programmes in 27 localities, around £27 million 
would be required to finance this, over a three-
year period. The involvement of local authorities 
such as Birmingham or Manchester, however, 
would greatly increase the capital requirement, 
with a potential requirement for a single large 
authority of more than £100 million. Clearly, 
as other local agencies move to pilot and pilot 
sites move to mainstream programmes over a 
three-year period, the capital requirement could 
exceed £1 billion. Given the timescales involved 
and the risks – especially the perceived risks at 
the outset – it will be essential for a blend of both 
socially-minded and commercial capital to be made 
available. 
b) Towards a syndicated model of development 
The easiest way for the EIF to begin to help 
marshal the amount and blend of capital required 
will be to develop a club of interested investors – 
an arrangement that could evolve over time into a 
formal investment syndicate. The EIF could assist 
with many of the due diligence requirements of 
different parties, while leaving autonomy for each 
investment committee to allocate its capital as it 
sees fit. It would also offer an ongoing reporting 
service to investors on the performance of the 
portfolio. 
The initial ambition would be to build 
agreements in principle up to a total value of at 
least £27 million to invest in 27 localities in its first 
programme, with a typical investment of £1 million 
in each case. In recognition of its role in facilitating 
access to capital, the EIF would make a small annual 
percentage charge – perhaps between 0.5% and 
1% – on the gross value of capital invested. 
The short-term aim will be to build strong 
relationships with a core group of different kinds 
of investors including the following: 
•	social investors able to inject patient or equity-
like capital; 
•	trust and high net worth individuals, using 
balance sheets rather than grant revenues to 
invest (so-called mission connected investment); 
•	banks e.g. through the Merlin programme; and 
•	institutional investors – pension funds and 
insurance companies. 
c) Bond finance 
Under a scenario in which a mature local authority 
wishes to develop a much larger scale results 
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contract, the £27 million target for agreements in 
principle will be rapidly exhausted. One attractive 
option would be to work with a partner – the Big 
Society Bank is the obvious candidate – to launch 
a bond issue for up to £100 million on a proper 
commercial scale – most probably with  
a five-year term. The partner would assume a 
first loss position. Additional credit enhancement 
would also be required to make the issue more 
appealing to mainstream capital markets. The 
Gates Foundation and others have performed  
this role in other forms of complex securitisation 
for social investment programmes. Another  
option would be to seek a guarantee from the 
European Investment Fund, enabling the EIF to 
command an automatic AAA rating. The effect  
of such a guarantee would be to allow providers  
to borrow on very favourable terms – around  
10 basis points above gilts, i.e. just above the  
price that government pays for capital. 
d) An affinity Junior ISA 
As the market matures in Early Intervention, a 
further exciting option would be to develop a new 
affinity social investment product that would build 
on the creation of the Junior ISA. The EIF could 
partner to help launch and co-brand the product. 
Parents and grandparents would be encouraged 
to invest in either a cash or equity Junior ISA that 
would offer a double benefit: at the age of 18 
the young person would get a tax-free lump sum; 
and in the intervening period of up to 18 years, a 
proportion of the capital would be put to work, 
extending support to many other children. 
The great advantage of this model is that capital 
could be raised on attractive terms for truly 
long-term investment of the kind required. Rather 
than the EIF creating a product, it would build on 
the market reach of an existing high street bank. 
The marketing campaign would also serve to boost 
the profile of and appetite for early investment. 
The EIF would generate revenue by acting as a 
trusted fund adviser and deal arranger. 
e) Direct investment by the EIF 
There is also an opportunity for the EIF itself to 
invest directly in Early Intervention programmes, 
as it builds its endowment. In all cases it would 
be investing in only a portion of the total capital 
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requirement and would be able to manage its 
exposure by access to the management and 
evidence building systems and data flows outlined 
above. 
f ) Early Intervention marketplace 
In the first two to three years of operation it 
is inevitable that the EIF will need to be highly 
proactive in building the foundations of an Early 
Intervention marketplace – both with purchasers 
and investors. What is critical is that these early 
efforts do not have the effect of crowding out 
alternative sources of investment, but rather 
seek to encourage as many competing and 
complementary sources of capital as possible. The 
EIF should thus avoid building its own fund and 
develop a distinct intermediary role that leverages 
its core strengths of specialist intelligence and deep 
relationships. 
The EIF: business model and structure 
The EIF as envisaged in this proposal is a unique 
new kind of intermediary and change agent. It 
will bring investors, funders and suppliers into 
a new set of contractual relationships and it 
will manage the risks and optimise the blend of 
social and financial returns for each party, so 
that children’s lives are transformed. 
a) The need for an endowment 
Pioneering any new field, especially one as complex 
as that of Early Intervention will inevitably result 
in non-recoverable costs. Research is a public 
good that requires public investment. Capacity 
building is required so as to maximise the number 
of competent providers from which funders and 
investors can choose. Dissemination and general 
championing of the cause of Early Intervention are 
again long-term activities for which it is hard to 
develop income streams. Furthermore, these are 
all activities that will need to be carried out on a 
long-term basis so as to achieve substantive system 
change. It is for this reason that the creation of 
an endowment is critical to the development of 
the EIF as a permanent fixture at the heart of the 
Early Intervention marketplace. The Allen Report 
is calling for £10 million of central government 
capital to lever in a matched £10 million from 
other private sources. 
b) Revenue streams 
Even if the EIF secures an endowment, that capital 
will need to be made to work as hard as possible 
in order to sustain and grow the critical functions 
outlined above. 
Three main revenue streams are envisaged for  
the EIF: 
•	Charging for services to local agencies on a 
results basis, i.e. the costs of support are added 
to the value of the contract and paid to the EIF 
upon successful delivery of a contract. 
•	A management fee for services offered to 
investors and investees, i.e. an annual % charge 
on the value of capital invested. 
•	A return on direct investment in Early 
Intervention programmes. 
•	A process of business modelling will commence 
shortly to investigate these potential revenue 
streams in greater depth. 
c) Operating costs 
The EIF endowment fund will allow the EIF to 
build up a small, outstanding team capable of 
developing and promoting Early Intervention 
programmes across many localities. 
The approximate costs of maintaining the core 
functions of the EIF will be in the region of 
£1.4 million, as set out below. 
Staffing 620,000 
Office/services etc 65,000 
Marketing 40,000 
Research 350,000 
Training/dissemination 300,000 
Total 1,375,000 
Note: Staffing to include CEO, head of research, 
head of investment, communications director, four 
business directors – working with local agencies – 
and an administrator. 
d) Structure 
The EIF would be constituted as a charitable 
trust. The EIF board would include a range of 
stakeholders with an interest in and commitment 
to Early Intervention. 
Annex E Concept paper: The Early Intervention Foundation 99 
The Early Intervention Foundation would be 
responsible for delivering the key functions 
outlined above. Research and capacity-building 
functions will commonly be contracted out. 
e) Early Intervention Places 
Twenty-seven local authorities have identified 
themselves as Early Intervention Places, with a 
corporate commitment to pioneer investment in 
Early Intervention and support the development 
of the Early Intervention Foundation. It is proposed 
that these sites provide the focus for the first 
five years of the EIF. Ideally, in addition, up to two 
local authorities – Manchester and Birmingham 
– will commit to a scaling up of their existing 
pilot programmes in this area. The addition of 
these mature sites will have the advantage of 
moving Early Intervention from being a pilot 
or demonstration programme to an effort to 
combine the best current practice, research 
intelligence and financial innovation to transform 
mainstream commissioning behaviour. 
Graham Allen and Matthew Pike 
19 May 2011 
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Outcome-based contracts and Early Intervention 
There are two ways of contracting: with a provider or with a social intermediary. These are set  
out below. 
Figure F1: An outcome-based contract with individual providers: 
Provider 
A 
Investors 
Government 
local areas 
Agree contract, which speciﬁes 
required outcomes and returns 
Providers will be paid if outcomes 
are achieved 
Providers raise ﬁnance from 
investors and agree terms of 
investment with individual 
investors 
Provider 
B 
Returns paid to 
provider on the 
basis of outcomes 
achieved 
Providers pay 
individual returns 
to investors 
Providers either 
perform delivery 
in-house, or sub-
contract 
Programme 
delivery 
Outcomes 
delivered 
and 
assessed 
Under this model local areas and government 
could choose to contract directly with individual 
providers or with one single large provider that 
sub-contracts to other providers. Providers would 
need to be able to raise finance in order to fund 
their upfront investment to deliver services. 
For example, a local authority might choose a 
children’s charity in their local area to deliver an 
Early Intervention programme. They will agree 
to pay the charity once successful outcomes have 
been delivered with children on the programme. 
This means, however, that the charity needs to 
have sufficient upfront funds to be able to deliver 
the programme in the first instance, as they will 
not get paid until afterwards. This may present 
challenges for some smaller providers. It does, 
however, offer local areas more freedom over 
whom they choose to deliver their services. 
Groups of local organisations or groups of local 
authorities should consider using such an approach 
for commissioning their Early Intervention work. 
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The Early Intervention Foundation could provide 
support to local areas in this respect, helping to: 
•	broker agreement between different local 
organisations in order to facilitate better joint 
commissioning; 
•	support local areas with identifying the best 
evidence-based programmes to contract for; and 
•	support development of such outcome-based 
contracts and spread good practice. 
Figure F2: An outcome-based contract with an intermediary 
Returns paid 
to intermediary 
on the basis of 
outcomes 
achieved 
Intermediary pays 
individual returns 
to investors 
Government 
local areas 
Agree contract, which speciﬁes 
required outcomes and returns 
intermediary will be paid if 
outcomes are achieved 
Intermediary raises ﬁnance from 
investors and agrees terms of 
investment with individual 
investors 
Programme 
delivery 
Outcomes 
delivered 
and 
assessed 
Intermediary 
Intermediary decides 
how to invest money 
to achieve outcomes, 
providing funding to 
delivery providers 
Investors 
This model alternatively involves the use of an 
intermediary, who raises finance from external 
investment. As Figures F1 and F2 show, there are 
four key players in such a contract. The key roles 
for each player are: 
•	Local areas and national government 
(commissioners): 
–	 decide the type and level of outcomes that 
they want to be delivered; 
–	 tender for the contract for delivery of those 
outcomes; and 
–	 pay the intermediary upon successful delivery 
of outcomes. 
•	 Intermediary: 
–	 can agree a number of separate contracts 
with a number of different local areas; 
–	 holds and manages the outcome-based risks 
and acts as the hub between local areas/ 
government and the investors; 
–	 raises finance for the ongoing financing of 
interventions from a variety of sources; and 
–	 sub-contracts to providers and closely 

manages the provision of services.
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•	Providers: 
–	 deliver programmes directly to target 
population; and 
–	 can be private sector, charitable or public 
sector bodies. 
•	 Investors: 
–	 provide ongoing capital for the provision of 
interventions; 
–	 could use finance from a variety of sources, 
including internal working capital, grants, loans, 
debt and equity; and 
–	 receive a return from the intermediary once 
successful outcomes have been delivered. 
These are just two potential models; there may 
be others that the social investment industry 
can develop. Another model, not explored here, 
would be for government to pay returns directly 
to investors. This would prevent an additional 
premium being paid to an intermediary. We have 
not explored how practical this would be, but 
this might, in any case, be a useful provision for 
payment of returns in the eventuality that a social 
intermediary closes for business. 
Developing a contract for Early 

Intervention outcomes
 
The content of an outcome-based contract could 
be structured in a number of different ways, 
largely depending on the approach taken to three 
key variables: 
•	Whether the contract focuses purely 
on outcomes or also specifies further 
requirements as to the method of delivering 
those outcomes. A simple outcome-based 
contract will require the contracting party to 
deliver a particular level of outcomes, with 
no regard to how that is done. This enables 
the intermediary to control the levels of 
risk involved (for example, they can change 
providers if delivery is not up to scratch). 
Alternatively, local areas may also wish to specify 
that certain interventions or programmes are 
delivered. There could be a case for local areas 
to do this in order to ensure consistency with 
existing provision, to help plan and manage 
interdependencies between investment and 
wider capacity or to support requirements at a 
local authority level. However, this is less likely to 
sit well with social intermediaries, who will have 
less control over delivery risks if the delivery 
mechanisms are specified. 
•	Whether the contract ties future payments 
solely to final outcomes or also ties future 
payments to interim metrics or outputs. 
The more closely a contract ties payments to 
long-term outcomes, the more certainty there 
is that the intervention will deliver cashable 
savings. The Department for Work and Pensions 
work programme is an example of contracting 
on the basis of both outcomes and minimum 
requirements for service delivery. 
•	How future returns are structured. Under a 
model such as the Peterborough social impact 
bond, returns are only paid once a certain level of 
outcomes is achieved. If that level is not achieved, 
no return is paid. An alternative approach 
would be to step the levels of returns based on 
incremental levels of outcomes achieved. The 
exact structure of returns is important because 
it impacts on the levels of risk transferred to 
investors and the propensity of different types 
of investors to provide finance. 
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Figure F3: Different models of contracting between local and central government 
Model 1: Government signs an initial 
contract with an intermediary for 
outcomes, with the intermediary 
left to agree speciﬁc contracts with 
local areas. 
Government 
Contracts signed that 
commits government 
to pay £60 million if 
outcomes are delivered 
Intermediary 
Local 
area 
1 
Intermediary signs 
separate contracts with 
local areas that each 
agree to pay £x if 
outcomes are delivered 
Local 
area 
2 
Local 
area 
3 
Local 
area 
4 
Model 2: Each local area, with 
government, signs an individual 
contract with the intermediary. 
Government/ Government/ 
local area 1 local area 2 
Intermediary 
Government signs an 
individual contract 
alongside each local area 
Government 
/local area 3 
Model 3: Local areas agree individual 
contracts with an intermediary, but 
agree separate agreements with 
government for support to make 
future payments. 
Intermediary 
Intermediary signs a 
contract with local area 
Local area 
Local area reaches a 
funding agreement with 
government for future 
funding to support 
payments to intermediary 
Government 
Model 1: 
•	Government agrees that it is prepared to pay a 
capped amount of say £60 million for successful 
delivery of a set of agreed Early Intervention 
outcomes. This is on the basis that a proportion 
of benefits accrue directly to government 
departments and government also benefits from 
local-level savings over time. It also offers greater 
protection for local areas that may be worried 
about additional cuts being required by central 
government. 
•	Government signs an outcome-based contract 
with an intermediary. 
•	Intermediary agrees specific individual contracts 
with a number of local areas, with local areas 
committing to payments if outcomes are 
achieved. 
Model 2: 
•	Local area decides that it wants to sign an 
outcome-based contract. 
•	Puts that case to government and agrees terms. 
•	Intermediary signs a single contract with local 
areas and government. 
Model 3: 
•	Local area decides that it wants to sign an 
outcome-based contract. 
•	Reaches agreement with government that the 
local area will receive future funding to support 
payments if outcomes are achieved. 
•	Intermediary signs a single contract with local 
areas committed to making those payments. 
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Pros Cons 
Model 1 A single contract for government. 
Would provide government 
commitment and help encourage local 
areas to reach their own agreements. 
Centrally led as government would 
determine the outcomes intermediary 
delivers. 
Intermediary may not be willing to sign a 
contract with government in absence of 
local areas. 
Model 2 Easier for government to tailor 
commitments to specific areas – given 
benefits will vary area to area. 
Solutions driven at a local level. 
Allows more incremental development 
of contracts. 
Intermediary has certainty on payments 
at time of contract. 
Could be slower for local areas and 
government to reach agreement 
through a single contract. 
Less certainty to local areas on what 
government support will be. 
Government has to enter into more 
contracts. 
Model 3 Single contract between two parties. 
Local area contract best reflects that 
Early Intervention predominantly 
delivered at a local level. 
Funding agreement could be reopened 
by government, providing limited 
certainty for local areas. 
Involves government entering into 
longer term funding agreements 
with local areas, potentially setting a 
precedent. 
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Case study: Private Equity Foundation proposal 
for a Social Investment Fund for Disadvantaged 
Children 
The Private Equity Foundation (a registered 
charity) has developed a proposition for a Social 
Investment Fund for Disadvantaged Children 
which would draw new private investment in 
programmes for disadvantaged children and 
generate cashable savings. 
The Social Investment Fund would be initially 
commissioned to raise numeracy for primary 
school children who are struggling, reduce truancy 
and improve behaviour of children who are 
disengaging at school. The fund raises investment 
from private investors to pay charities with a 
proven track record to deliver the outcomes. The 
fund would run for seven years. 
The commissioner pays when successful outcomes 
are delivered; if successful outcomes are not 
delivered, the commissioner does not pay. The 
risk of failure of the intervention is solely born by 
the investors and responsibility for managing the 
programme sits with the fund. The delivery of 
outcomes will be independently audited. 
The Private Equity Foundation has selected 
Numbers Count (the intervention provided by 
Every Child Counts) and School Home Support 
as the first interventions to be provided by the 
fund. The details of the programmes are included 
below. 
Numbers Count School Home Support 
Intervention Numeracy tuition for children who are 
struggling 
Support for children disengaging or 
acting up in school and their families 
Target outcomes Increased numeracy in KS1 tests Increased attendance, reduced bad 
behaviour and reduced exclusions 
Target cohort Bottom 5% of children in Year 2  
(aged 6–7) 
Primary and secondary pupils referred 
by teachers for non-attendance, 
disengaging or being disruptive 
Cohort size £5 million upfront investment and 
annual payments for success of 
approximately £5 million a year 
would allow the programme to reach 
approximately 31,000 children 
£5 million upfront investment and 
annual payments for success of 
approximately £5 million a year 
would allow the programme to reach 
approximately 27,700 children 
Timescale September 2011 to September 2018 September 2011 to September 2018 
Composition of 
cashable savings 
Special educational needs (SEN) 
provision, exclusions (alternative places) 
and truancy. Longer term tax/benefit 
savings due to numeracy links with 
employment 
Behaviour (teacher assistants, welfare 
officers’ time, behaviour programmes), 
exclusions, truancy and NEET (Not in 
Education, Employment or Training) 
costs 
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These interventions were chosen because they: 
•	provide very clear, objective metrics that allow 
success, failure and distance travelled by a child 
to be measured easily and independently; 
•	have a proven track record of delivering in the 
UK context, which will be necessary to attract 
investors; and 
•	provide cashable savings to the public purse, 
for example by reducing SEN provision and 
exclusions, which are greater than the cost 
to central and local government of making 
payments for success to the fund. 
Independent modelling (by KPMG Foundation 
and Matrix Evidence) estimated that with a fund 
comprising £5 million upfront investment from 
private investors and annual payments for success 
in the region of £5 million a year: 
•	Numbers Count will deliver cashable savings to 
government in the region of £100 million over 
10 years; and 
•	School Home Support will deliver cashable 
savings to government in the region of  
£37–79 million over eight years depending on 
the profile of children. 
The cashable savings to government increase over 
time as these young people stay on the path of 
attainment, achievement and employment rather 
than follow the path of failure, truancy, exclusion 
and becoming NEET. 
This proposal provides a simple and easily 
scalable model for attracting private investment 
in programmes for disadvantaged children. The 
fund can easily expand to other early interventions 
that deliver cashable savings to government, a 
proven track record of delivery and clear objective 
metrics. Competing funds could be developed, run 
by different social intermediaries, creating choice 
for commissioners and investors. 
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Funds and bonds 
Options for structuring a fund 
One of the key questions is the type of investor a 
fund is open to, and how this impacts on both the 
rate of return and the ability to transfer risk. Figure 
H1 sets out three broad investor models: 
Figure H1: Three options for structuring a fund 
All investors 
purchase equivalent 
stake in fund 
Philanthropists 
(20%) 
Agree to a lower return, or 
take ﬁrst tranche of risk 
Other investors 
(80%) 
Philanthropists 
(20%) 
Agree to a lower return, or 
take ﬁrst tranche of risk 
Other investors 
(40%) 
Debt investors (40%) 
Agree to a lower return, on 
the basis of more certain 
returns 
• Simple model 
• Accessing philanthropists and 
social investors would be a 
more expensive approach, 
as they would expect the same 
returns asnormal investors 
• Adds complexity 
• Could bring down the overall 
cost of ﬁnance 
• Might not be sufficient 
investors willing to take 
greater level of risk 
• A more complex model 
• May only be suitable for a 
larger fund 
• Would bring down the 
overall cost of ﬁnance 
• Could help to leverage in 
equity investors 
• Would reduce risk transfer 
or lead to greater risk for 
other investors 
It is likely that the third option, which includes the 
possibility for debt finance, would be developed 
over the longer term once the market has 
established itself. 
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Key to any agreement between local/central 
government and a fund will be when returns will 
be paid, which in turn will impact on the type of 
investors that will be willing to invest. Figure H2 
sets out one way that investments and returns 
could be structured: 
Figure H2: How investments and returns could be structured 
Individual investor Investor who buys 2% stake 
in fund 
Fund and investor agree Year 1 – 
terms, including staged £1m 
Year 2 –nature of investment and 
£1mreturns Year 3 – 
£1m 
Fund 
Fund seeks to 
raise a total of 
£150m, spread 
over 3 years 
£50m £50m £50m 
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 
Year Investor payments to fund Investor returns from fund 
1 £1m – 
2 £1m – 
3 £1m – 
4 – Initial return for delivery of 
service to cohorts 
5 – – 
6 – Return for successful 
delivery of outcome for 
cohort 1 
7 – Return for successful 
delivery of outcome for 
cohort 2 
8 – Return for successful 
delivery of outcome for 
cohort 3 
Options for a government bond – little or 
no risk transfer 
The Government raises finance for public spending 
through a range of means, including: 
•	issuing gilts to the financial markets through the 
Debt Management Office (government bonds, 
whereby investors such as banks and pension 
funds loan the Government money over a 
specified period); 
•	issuing retail gilts to individual investors through 
National Savings & Investments (NS&I); and 
•	taxation (funds raised through Income Tax, 
Corporation Tax, etc). 
Taxation cannot be hypothecated for specific 
purposes. The Government says this is for a 
number of reasons, including: 
•	ensuring that funds raised from taxation can 
be allocated according to the priorities of the 
Government of the time; 
•	enabling greater flexibility to address any 
unexpected spending pressures or crises; and 
•	ensuring that taxpayers know that their 
payments are funding expenditure as part of a 
fair and democratic process. 
Given the public expenditure regime currently in 
place and the resistance to the raising of money 
by local authorities, it may be that the traditional 
taboo of hypothecation should be reconvened 
as part of the Treasury-led budget review 
recommended in Chapter 7. 
Gilts (government bonds) are issued by  
HM Treasury, and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. They are seen to be extremely low 
risk by investors, in part due to the fact that the 
Government has never defaulted. Part of the main 
appeal to investors (which are typically banks or 
insurance companies) is the liquidity associated 
with gilts. Ensuring that gilts are as broad based as 
possible means, therefore, that the Government 
can maximise liquidity and keep the cost lower 
than would be the case if the Government issued 
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specific Early Intervention gilts, as these would 
be less liquid and therefore more expensive. 
In addition, there are strict rules governing the 
hypothecation of funds raised through government 
gilts. A better alternative would, therefore, be 
for the Government to simply issue conventional 
gilts, but then to prioritise spending on Early 
Intervention programmes. 
An alternative to a government Early Intervention 
bond, however, would be for the Government 
to issue bonds to retail investors, where liquidity 
is less of an issue and there is a greater case for 
thematic appeal. This could be distributed to 
investors through NS&I, using entities such as the 
Post Office. It could be argued that the thematic 
nature would attract additional investors that 
otherwise would not have purchased government 
bonds. This may in fact be more appealing than 
issuing additional gilts. While issuing additional gilts 
would impact the cost of raising money through 
gilts (by increasing supply to the market), issuing 
a niche product to new investors through NS&I 
would not have a commensurate impact on gilt 
pricing. Hence, it can work out as a more cost-
effective means of raising money overall. 
It could be possible for NS&I to issue a specific 
Early Intervention bond, or a bond with a wider 
focus (for example, a babies and children futures 
bond), in order to raise additional finance for 
government to invest in programmes. NS&I retail 
products can represent a cost-effective means 
for government to raise funds, as they enable 
diversification of the investor base and have a large 
amount of credibility associated with their name. 
The specific theme could be of particular appeal 
to some retail investors that want to improve 
outcomes for babies and children in the UK. 
However, the same hypothecation issues would 
remain, and legislative change would be needed to 
allow this. 
There are many examples of governments having 
raised finance through retail savings products, and 
these are of comparable scale to what is needed 
to eradicate social dysfunction in the UK: 
•	War bonds. These have been issued by 
governments for the purposes of funding 
military operations when a country is going 
through war, offering civilians the opportunity to 
contribute towards the war effort. Appealing to 
the patriotism of investors enables governments 
to offer the bonds at a below-market yield, thus 
making it cheaper for government at a time 
when it will struggle to borrow. Declaring war 
on underachievement has obvious parallels. 
•	Irish solidarity bond. In 2010, the Irish 
Government launched a retail savings bond 
in order to raise additional investment for 
infrastructure, stimulating economic recovery 
and creation of employment. These 10-year 
bonds offered a 50% gross return to investors, 
40% of which was offered as a tax-free lump 
sum for incentivising savers to keep their money 
invested until maturity. Given the very attractive 
terms of the bond, in five months the bond 
succeeded in raising 255 million euro. However, 
there should be some caution when considering 
the Irish example – while it helps to raise finance 
cheaply in the first instance, it makes the cost  
of finance upon payment of the final coupon 
very high. 
•	IFFIm bonds. The International Finance Facility 
for Immunisation (IFFIm) raises finance for 
international immunisation programmes in 
developing countries through public bonds, on 
the back of government pledges for aid. This 
enables longer term government pledges for 
aid to be used to repay the bonds, creating 
immediately available cash for investment in 
vaccinations. A number of governments around 
the world support the bonds. So far they have 
succeeded in raising US$3 billion. The IFFIm 
model, therefore, is a means of front-loading 
money that would have been spent by 
governments anyway, and hence has similarities 
to Early Intervention work whereby a small 
percentage of long-term savings are invested in 
order to create them. 
How would a government retail Early 
Intervention bond work? 
An Early Intervention government retail bond 
could be distributed through NS&I, and would 
have potentially less of an impact on gilts pricing 
through attracting a different investor group.  
The investment would also aim to generate future 
savings for government. 
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Under this model, government would retain 
outcome-based delivery risk. While investment 
could generate future savings for government, 
the absence of risk transfer means that returns 
to investors would be fixed and would need to 
be accounted for through future taxation or 
borrowing income. Because government would 
issue the bond and create a liability, raising money 
through this route would under the current rules, 
despite significantly reducing future public sector 
expenditure on the cost of failure, be said to 
increase public sector debt levels. Clarity of focus 
on how the money raised will be used to achieve 
specific outcomes, for example to help a baby to 
thrive to avoid costly support later, would increase 
the attractiveness to many high street investors. 
Introducing outcomes into a bond 
An alternative is to consider whether the Early 
Intervention Fund or an alternative organisation 
could issue bonds. In this context, it is worth 
considering how a performance-related element 
could be added to such a product. There are a 
number of different ways of structuring a bond 
so that it includes a performance element. These 
different models depend largely on the scale of  
the money sought, and can be structured so that 
there are different amounts of risk transferred.  
A capital-protected bond, for instance, can provide 
investors with reassurance that they will receive a 
certain amount of their principal back, no matter 
what. The remainder can then be invested on a 
performance basis. The investor would receive 
interest, either as a variable coupon at intervals 
throughout the term of the bond or as a final 
coupon at the end. The certainty of repayment 
can be provided by: 
•	a guarantee (either central government or 
another entity that might benefit from the 
outcomes delivered); or 
•	if the underlying fund is large enough, the fund 
structures (i.e. if there is a tranche of equity 
investment in the fund). 
The capital-protected part of the bond can be 
invested in very safe-rated investments (likely to be 
outside of Early Intervention). 
Providing a guarantee 
Government or other parties could  
guarantee to investors that they will receive a 
certain proportion of their principal amount back. 
A guarantee would help to significantly reduce the 
cost of finance, as investors would be taking less 
of a risk. This would attract institutional investors, 
and would help to achieve a model of larger scale. 
However, shifting the balance of risk onto central 
government is unlikely to appeal in the current 
fiscal context, whereby a guarantee will be seen, 
not as a way of reducing future spending on 
failure, but as an immediate additional spending 
pressure. Thinking these issues through may help 
to drive the necessary change in default behaviours 
in Whitehall described earlier in this Report. 
Additionally, it could mean that the barriers of 
state aid implications would need to be addressed. 
It is possible, however, that instead of the 
Government, other organisations that benefit 
from the investment could provide a guarantee. 
For instance, a social housing authority or 
police service might benefit from a local Early 
Intervention programme on their area, and 
might therefore be prepared to provide a partial 
guarantee. This would, however, need to be 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, according to 
each individual contract. 
Using the fund structures 
In a larger scale model, it could be possible to use 
tranches of the underlying fund in order to help to 
provide greater certainty to investors, for instance 
using the existing equity as a ‘cushion’. 
Capital‑protected bond 
Capital-protected models are likely to be less 
applicable to larger sized investments. They could, 
however, provide some options for raising smaller 
amounts of money. 
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It may be the case that starting from scratch and 
issuing a fully thematic Early Intervention bond is a 
difficult starting point, although there is a growing 
ethical sector market. Before making an appeal to a 
wider group of investors, it may be more practical 
to consider options that involve piggybacking on 
the investor base for an existing product, where a 
track record and investor base already exist. 
Options 
One option would be to offer a bond that 
promises the investor a proportion of their original 
capital back. For instance, 80% of the investor’s 
funds could be put into highly rated investments 
(not necessarily related to Early Intervention). 
When these investments are paid back with 
interest over a longer period (say 10 years), the 
investor receives an amount that equals their 
original capital. Meanwhile, the remaining 20% is 
invested in Early Intervention programmes, and a 
variable coupon paid back when their investment 
has resulted in successful outcomes for babies 
and children. It could be possible to provide a 
capital-protected Early Intervention bond where 
80% of the investor’s money is used for loans to 
organisations that deliver Early Intervention (via an 
ethical bank or community development finance 
institution). The investor would receive their 
money back from the bank, once the bank had 
received the loans (and interest) repaid from the 
commissioners. The remaining 20% of the principal 
amount could be invested in a performance-
related Early Intervention Fund, which would be 
used for programme delivery (including the public 
sector). This model would ensure that all the 
money is directed at Early Intervention, but only 
20% of it would be outcome focused. Of course, 
these instruments would be tradable and that in 
itself would be a market measure of how well 
Early Intervention was doing. 
An alternative to this would be for 100% of the 
original investment to be used for safe highly rated 
investments. The investor knows that they are 
going to get back their principal investment, plus 
interest. The investor could agree to the additional 
interest being reinvested in Early Intervention 
programmes throughout the term of the bond. 
This latter amount would be invested on an 
outcomes basis, enabling the investor to increase 
the value of their interest payments (or potentially 
lose it if no outcomes are successfully delivered). 
The disadvantage, however, would be the time 
delay before investment could be made in Early 
Intervention. 
However, it is worth being aware that the more 
complex the structure of the model, the less 
attractive it will be to the majority of investors. 
In particular, it could blur any message that this 
is a social investment for Early Intervention. 
It is also hard to scale up such options, given 
the proportionately small amount of the total 
investment that is used for the social cause. 
Full risk/reward model 
An alternative option would be to offer a product 
whereby the investor takes on more of the overall 
risk themselves. Models used in Islamic finance may 
have some application here, whereby the investor’s 
money is put into an underlying investment fund 
or joint venture. Therefore, an Early Intervention 
bond could be issued, and then either: 
•	the recipient of the monies acts as an 
investment manager, investing funds in projects 
in order to seek a return. Some or all of these 
could be Early Intervention; or 
•	a joint venture is established between the issuer 
and its customers on a profit and loss sharing 
basis – both contribute capital. Central or local 
government could therefore take a tranche of 
risk in the joint venture. 
These options start to look more like equity, 
however, and are likely to be more expensive. 
Who would issue the bonds? 
In considering who takes on the majority of risk 
transfer, there are a number of options as to 
who could issue Early Intervention bonds. These 
include: 
•	creation of a new not-for-profit entity; 
•	use of an existing entity; and 
•	government (distribution through NS&I or 
institution such as the Post Office). 
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Creating a new entity to hold the Early 
Intervention Fund and issue Early Intervention 
bonds 
A new institution could be created to issue 
the bonds, on behalf of Early Intervention 
programmes. The main challenges of this approach, 
however, are as follows: 
•	The time taken to establish a new institution will 
mean it will take much longer before any bond 
could be issued. 
•	A new institution would not have the existing 
client base to draw upon. Investors would 
not have the same levels of confidence in a 
new entity, meaning potentially higher costs of 
finance. 
•	A new issuing body would need to meet 
a number of complex regulatory and legal 
standards, which again would be extremely 
time-consuming to achieve. 
However, establishment of a new entity could 
help in developing a trusted ‘brand’ for investors, 
particularly if local/central government pays for 
outcomes. 
Medium term note programmes 
Medium term note (MTN) programmes provide 
flexibility for issuing notes quickly and accessing 
wholesale debt investors easily at reduced 
documentation cost. The documentation process 
is simplified because many of the arrangements 
(including agents and listing) are already in place 
and allow a wide range of products to be issued. 
The conditions of the notes establish certain 
legally sensitive (‘non-pricing’) provisions upon 
which notes are based – these typically tend not 
to be varied for the duration of the outstanding 
programme. Estimated set-up costs are material 
and, in the context of £150,000, largely comprised 
of legal costs; it would typically take between two 
and three months for a new ‘financial’ credit to be 
realised. 
Some of the key documents of an MTN 
programme are as follows: 
•	Base prospectus – sets out clearly the terms and 
conditions of the notes that will eventually be 
issued under the MTN programme. The base 
prospectus also contains financial information 
and a general business description of the 
issuer and is required to contain all necessary 
information that will enable investors to make an 
informed assessment of the credit. 
•	Programme agreement – forms the contractual 
agreement between the issuer and the dealers 
and sets out the basis on which the dealers 
will buy the notes issued by the issuer. It also 
contains the representations, warranties, 
undertakings and indemnities to be given by 
the issuer to the dealers, and the conditions 
precedent which must be satisfied before any 
issuance takes place. This document usually 
contains the pro forma subscription agreement 
used for syndicated notes issues. 
•	Paying agency agreement – forms the 
contractual agreement between the issuer and 
the appointed paying agent(s) and sets out the 
process by which interest and principal are 
paid to noteholders. It further sets out certain 
other formal matters that may require attention, 
such as safekeeping of notes and the publication 
of notices. 
•	Listing documents – in addition to the principal 
documents listed above, there are various 
standard administrative documents that will 
be required in order to obtain full listing for 
the MTN programme on the London Stock 
Exchange, for example the application for listing. 
Facilitating investor participation and achieving a 
scalable issuance architecture from day one will 
be critical to the success of the scheme and to 
achieving cost-effective access to wholesale debt 
investors. 
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Individual Savings Accounts 
Junior Individual Savings Accounts 
Junior ISAs have the positive aspect of long-term 
savings, which is good in respect of longer timescales 
associated with Early Intervention, but investing ISA 
funds in Early Intervention does carry the risk of 
loss of savings because of the performance element 
of return. Children’s savings may not be something 
parents are willing to take a risk of return on, so 
a Junior ISA which encompasses the element of 
investing in Early Intervention may not achieve 
enough interest. However, this is for the financial 
market to investigate. 
A tiered fund could create a more viable option 
for Junior ISAs. A tiered fund can be divided 
into different tranches of investors, for example 
charities, ISA investors, etc. A fund designed to 
attract investment for Early Intervention could be 
tiered into different risk tranches. These tranches 
could have different levels of risk associated with 
them, whereby some tranches could take on more 
risk than others. The ISA investors could be placed 
in a tranche with less risk, so they would be ‘safer’ 
if successful outcomes were not reached. 
However, we have also found research that 
shows that individuals who have children at home 
become less likely to invest socially/ethically as  
they get older. ‘For those with children at home,  
it is possible that a desire to invest socially/ethically 
when younger is overtaken by other factors as 
their children’s age. The amount of investment 
assets is not particularly substantial among 
this group, especially when taking into account 
educational, accommodation and other needs of 
children as they become older.’1 
This may suggest that Junior ISAs that invest in 
Early Intervention may not be attractive enough 
for individuals, who are less likely to invest their 
assets socially/ethically as they get older. 
•	The new features of the Junior ISA are: 
–	 children living in the UK who do not have a 
Child Trust Fund account will be able to have 
a Junior ISA; 
–	 people will be able to put money into a cash 
account or ‘stocks and shares’ account; 
–	 each child will be able to have one cash and 
one ‘stocks and shares’ Junior ISA at any one 
time; 
–	 there will be a total yearly limit of £3,000 for 
all payments into these accounts; and 
–	 accounts will become ISAs when the child  
is 18. 
•	As with Child Trust Funds, the following will 
apply to Junior ISAs: 
–	 the accounts will belong to the child and they 
will not be able to withdraw money until they 
are 18; 
–	 any money the accounts make will be tax free; 
and 
–	 a range of banks, building societies, credit 
unions, friendly societies and stockbrokers will 
offer Junior ISA accounts.2 
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Early Intervention/ethical ISA	 
An ISA provides a tax-free wrapper under which 
a range of investments can be made. This enables 
individuals to save money on a tax-free basis, up 
to a certain allocation annually. An ISA could give 
investors the option to link their tax-free savings 
to Early Intervention. This would be an option to 
consider in order to encourage further investment 
in Early Intervention once the Early Intervention 
Fund has been developed. There are two types of 
ISA available: 
•	cash ISA: offers an individual allowance of 
£5,340 per annum. Once the investor’s money 
is deposited, the bank decides how this money 
is invested, seeking to maximise returns. The 
money is not ringfenced for particular purposes 
by the bank when it invests, and the bank takes 
on the risk of being able to deliver a specified 
interest rate to its customers; and 
•	stocks and shares ISA: offers an individual 	
allowance of up to £10,680 per annum.  
The investor can choose the portfolio of 
investments for their savings to be invested in, 
meaning the value can go up or down. While 
the ISA account manager will try to establish  
the best package of investments, the investor 
takes on the risk, diversified across their package 
of investments. 
A thematic ISA could provide a tax-free vehicle for 	
attracting investment for Early Intervention. Ethical 
ISAs provide a potential model of how an
 
Early Intervention ISA might work, and 
demonstrate that there is a market for investors 
that want their money to be used in a more 
socially responsible manner. There is a proven 
range of investors within this market that are 
interested in investing their money in a good cause 
with a fairly competitive rate of return. 
A thematic Early Intervention ISA could therefore 
be structured either as a cash ISA or as a stocks 
and shares ISA. 
Encourage the market to develop Early 
Intervention-specific ISAs 
To do this we will need to prove that they are 
a worthwhile investment for the banks and 
government, and that there would be a sufficient 
market for those looking to invest in babies, 
children and young people. There are different 
ways we could do this. One proposal would be to 
offer an accreditation associated with the ISAs that 
could present an official endorsement in this field. 
This would be a market-only solution, without 
government paying returns for outcomes. So, for 
instance, the ISA might invest on a commercial 
basis in charities and organisations that deliver 
services to babies, children and young people 
(through best evidence-based policies listed by the 
independent Early Intervention Foundation). 
However, there would not be any direct link with 
specific outcomes as a result of programmes 
under this model.
 
Case study: Charity Bank 
Charity Bank has recently introduced an ethical cash ISA where investors’ money is loaned to 
charitable organisations. These ISAs were created in response to both demand from customers and 
the banks’ social remit in setting up something like this. 
The money from this currently goes into a general pot and is loaned out to these various charitable 
organisations. They will only lend money to the charities if it is used for a charitable purpose. Charity 
Bank is looking to make these ISAs more thematic as it has identified a market demand and wants to 
support that demand. 
The fact that Charity Bank loans the money to charitable organisations means that it will always 
receive interest, which will create enough of a return for its customers. Its rate of return is fairly 
competitive, which would make it worthwhile for the investors and provide the incentive that their 
money will have a positive social impact. 
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Develop a model that includes an outcome-based 
payment element to the ISA 
•	Cash ISA with an ethical bank, whereby a 
proportion of the pot of money is used to invest 
in Early Intervention on an outcome-based 
basis. The incentive for the bank would be a 
potentially higher return than that provided for 
the remainder of the investment, some of which 
would be passed on to the investor. 
When the Early Intervention Fund is developed, 
it could include a tranche of Early Intervention 
investments for the ISA retail investor. 
•	Increase the ISA allowance for these types of 
investment, given the benefits for government. 
An investor would be allowed an additional 
£200 allowance, for instance, where that 
additional money is used for Early Intervention 
investments. This could include the option  
Figure I1: Ethical cash ISA model 
Investor Ethical cash ISA pot 
Early 
Intervention 
Other 
charities 
•	Stocks and shares ISA with any bank, whereby 
Early Intervention products could provide an 
option for part of the portfolio of investment 
(probably as part of an ethical ISA). The investor 
could choose to invest a proportion of its 
funds in an Early Intervention Fund or bond. 
If the investments are successful in producing 
outcomes, a return is paid. The investor 
therefore takes on the risk itself, as it does with 
the remainder of its portfolio of investments. 
There is less of a risk though, as only a small 
percentage of investment will go into Early 
Intervention and the remainder will be invested 
in more proven reliable investments chosen  
by the investor. 
of using the allowance for social investment 
generally, or for specific investments, such as in 
the field of babies, children and young people. 
For this option, future savings to government 
need to outweigh loss of revenue from tax. 
The centrally co-ordinated team could initially 
research the case for increasing the ISA allowance 
for individual investors that invest in Early 
Intervention or social investment more generally. 
They could then advise HM Treasury on the best 
approach for this. 
There has been research carried out in the Ipsos 
MORI report – Investing for the Good of Society – on 
a Social Investment Fund idea where the ability 
Figure I2: Ethical stocks and shares ISA model 
Investor 
Stocks and shares 
ISA pot 
Early 
Intervention 
Early 
Intervention 
Fund 
Other 
investments 
Early 
Intervention 
bond 
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to hold the investment in an ISA was viewed as 
the most positive aspect by 47% of individuals 
interviewed. The option given was to be able to 
offset any capital losses on the Social Investment 
Fund against the tax bill up to a certain limit, which 
was appealing to more than a third of individuals 
interviewed. 
Table I1: Pros and cons of what best meets the needs of Early Intervention 
Early Intervention-
specific ISAs 
Ethical cash ISA Ethical stocks and 
shares ISA 
Increase ISA 
allowance 
Pros Positive social impact 
that could attract 
more investors. 
Government 
wouldn’t need to 
pay a return for 
successful outcomes. 
Safer for investors, 
which will always 
receive a return. 
Positive social 
impact that could 
attract more 
investors. 
Already a proven 
market and range 
of investors. 
Investment is still 
made in other 
potentially more 
reliable investments 
in order to gain a 
significant return. 
Positive social 
impact that could 
attract more 
investors. 
Would ensure 
money is being 
invested in social 
investments. 
Cons May be too specific, 
therefore leading to 
fewer investors. 
No direct link yet to 
specific outcomes as 
a result of successful 
implementation of 
programmes. 
Not as high a return 
as some other cash 
ISAs. 
Slightly more risky, 
given that investing 
in an outcome-
based model. 
Need to establish 
Early Intervention 
products for 
portfolio. 
Treasury may find 
that there is a loss in 
revenue and it may 
not be worthwhile 
for government if 
the product is not 
attractive enough. 
Notes 
1 Elliot A (2011) Investing for the Good of  Society: Why and 
how wealthy nations respond. London: The FairBanking 
Foundation, NESTA and Ipsos MORI. 
2 www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/index.htm 
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The three major party leaders support action on Early Intervention 
Rt Hon David Cameron MP 
Prime Minister and Leader of the Conservative Party 
‘Graham Allen’s second report on Early Intervention provides an important step 
forward in the fight to eradicate poverty in this country. He convincingly argues 
the economic, fiscal and moral case for switching public spending from dealing with 
the causes of social failure towards investing in programmes that prevent that failure in the first place, 
and provides some practical steps to help government make this transition. But just as importantly, he has 
demonstrated that this is a mission that belongs not just to the state alone – the private and voluntary 
sectors must play a role in the financing of Early Intervention for it to be successful, especially when the 
public finances are constrained. I welcome this Big Society approach towards our shared goal of making 
British poverty history, and I am grateful to Graham for his excellent work.’ 
Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP 
Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Democrat Party 
‘Early intervention is vital for social mobility, as Graham’s first report confirmed. 
We have always known that Early Intervention is cheaper and more effective than 
waiting to tackle problems after they have taken root. The difficulty has often been 
finding the right mechanisms to draw in the necessary investment early enough in the life cycle, as well 
as reliably predict and capture the savings. Graham’s second report provides a wealth of ideas on how to 
plug this financing gap, and will be a spur to action both inside and outside government.’ 
Rt Hon Ed Miliband MP 
Leader of the Labour Party and leader of the Opposition 
‘I warmly welcome this report and Graham Allen’s thinking on the funding of Early 
Intervention. Early Intervention to reduce the risks of passing disadvantage from 
generation to generation is a long-term project. It requires not just “patient capital” 
but patient politics – including the commitment of all parties to realise the vision of an approach where 
we consistently help early enough in life to prevent problems in the first place. Graham’s independent 
report, its proposals and its call to action must be heeded by us all. It is right to argue that, alongside public 
funding, the private sector, philanthropic foundations, mutuals, charities and individuals must also play their 
full part in funding successful Early Intervention programmes. In the coming years we will need to place 
greater emphasis on creative thinking to use funding better and doing this must start with government 
itself being open to new ideas.’ 
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